CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/03/26

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02994002
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 26, 1954

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26 March 1954
Copy No,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO if
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: OO q
AUTH: HR 70-2
DAT04/79 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. China trade controls may be questioned at COCOM meeting (page 4).
SOVIET UNION
2.
3.
4.
5.
USSR may raise European security plan at Geneva (page 6).
South Korean generals advise Rhee against independent military
action (page 6).
Chinese Communist TU-4's may have begun night training (page 7).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. New major attack on Dien Bien Phu expected within 10 days (page 8).
7. Bao Dai favors creation of high war council (page 8).
8. Right-wing Nacionalistas to demand abrogation of Philippine
agreements with US (page 9).
SOUTH ASIA
9. Pakistan reported willing to give $12,000,000 annually to settle
Pushtoonistan issue (page 9).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
10. UN secretary general opposes immediate Security Council review
of Israel-Jordan armistice (page 10).
11.
12. Comment on struggle for power in Egypt (page 11).
WESTERN EUROPE
13. Bruce and Dillon comment on EDC chances in France (page 12).
14. Adenauer to press Italians for prompt EDC action (page 13).
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LATIN AMERICA
15. Comment on Chile's position on copper sales to Orbit (page 13).
LATE ITEM
16. USSR proclaims East Germany's sovereignty (page 14).
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GENERAL
1. China trade controls may be questioned at COCOM meeting:
Consideration of the China Committee
report at the Consultative Group meet-
ing next month may be used by some
members as an occasion for raising
questions on the China controls, according to American COCOM
officials in Paris. Japan, in particular, May question the strin-
gency of restrictions applied to trade with Communist China as
compared to those applicable to Western exports to the Soviet
Union and the Satellites.
Comment: On 23 March the Japanese
COCOM delegate informed American officials in Paris that his
government felt that any relaxing of trade controls applied to the
Soviet bloc in Europe would "automatically" raise the question of
the China controls. He contended that the possibilities for trans-
shipment to China rendered more stringent China controls "point-
less."
Favorable political developments at the
Geneva conference, or a strong trade bid there by China, would
likely increase sentiment in COCOM for relaxing controls on the
China trade.
SOVIET UNION
2. Far East-based TU-4's scheduled to fly over Sea of Okhotsk:
see map, p. 5). This is the first time that TU-4's are
known to have been scheduled for operations in this area.
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NORTHEAST CHINA AND ADJACENT' AREAS
UNUSUAL TU-4 TRAIN ING FLIGHT
� ��� International boundary Scala 1:19,620.000
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National capital 0 200 400 600 Miles
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Comment:
Inc distance and the routing of the flight simulate those
%Merl might be used in operations from medium bomber bases in the
Vladivostok area against targets in the Tokyo area.
Third Long Range Air Army operations
have reflected increased stress on navigational training since mid-1953.
However, indications of overwater flights by Soviet TU-4's have been
extremely rare.
3. USSR may raise European security plan at Geneva:
A French Foreign Ministry spokesman
believes that the USSR's plan for European
security will continue to be the leitmotif of
Soviet foreign policy for several years.
He says that the French and British govern-
ments anticipate the USSR may again raise
the security plan at Geneva and that they are
preparing a flat rejection to any such approach.
The official agrees with Ambassador Bohlen
that the recent increase in Soviet emphasis on this plan in the press and
speeches is designed to undo Molotov's Berlin blunder of relegating the
United States to the role of observer, and to emphasize that the proposal
is meant to unite rather than divide Europe.
Comment: Communist propaganda since the
Berlin conference has sought to keep the Soviet plan before Western
public opinion and thus reduce active support of EDC to a point where
the scales will be tipped against ratification.
FAR EAST
4. South Korean generals advise Rhee against independent military action:
At a meeting with President Rhee believed
held on 23 March, top South Korean army
generals informed Rhee flatly that he could
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not hope to unify Korea by unilateral military action.
Briggs believes the generals included
Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Yi Hyong-kun, army chief of staff
Chong Il-kwon, and 1st Army commander Paek Sun-yop. He cites
this as "interesting confirmation" that top South Korean army offi-
cials are realistic in their appraisal of the military factors involved
in a drive north.
Rhee and his generals almost certainly
discussed the army's capabilities in the event it should be expanded
to 35 divisions, as demanded by Rhee as the price for South Korea's
attendance at Geneva. The generals' views may make Rhee less
adamant in his demands.
5. Chinese Communist TU-4's may have begun night training:
Comment: Introduction of night training
would signal another phase in the progress of Peiping's TU-4 unit.
Since the arrival in China of ten TU-4's from the USSR in February
1953, Chinese Communist bomber crews have carried out practice
bombing flights ranging up to 1 100 miles
The period of their familiar-
ization training with this B-29-type aircraft may be coming to a close.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. New major attack on Dien Bien Phu expected within 10 days:
The French expect a new major Viet
Minh attack at Dien Bien Phu within
10 days, according to a report on 24
March from the American army attach�
at Saigon. Despite French clearing
efforts, Viet Minh troops still occupy
trenches within 300 to 500 yards of some
French positions and are continuing their
attempts to isolate the southernmost
strong point from the center.
Meanwhile, the American consul in Hanoi
reports that the first attempt at
saturation napalm bombing on 23 March brought promising results.
French-piloted C-119's and C-47's burned swaths three kilometers
long and one kilometer wide to the west and east of the central French
defenses.
Comment: A Communist intention to risk
further costly attacks at Then Bien is suggested by the continuing
preparations there and also by a Peiping broadcast of 24 March which
quoted a Viet Minh journal. The latter asserted that the current cam-
paign ushers in a new stage in the Indochina war, with the Viet Minh
army "launching massive attacks against strongly fortified French
positions."
7. Bao Dal favors creation of high war council:
Bao Dai told Ambassador Heath on 23 March
that he wanted to create a "high war council
that would really contribute to winning the
war." In this connection, he praised the
Vietnamese chief of staff, General Binh, and
criticized Premier Buu Loc. Discounting the
desirability of creating a provisional assembly,
he carefully intimated that he himself might
take over the government.
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A well-qualified French observer states,
meanwhile, that Buu LOC% government is incapable of gaining popular
support and that Bao Dai, recognizing this, may be forced to take
action shortly.
Comment: Bao Dal's remarks tend to
bear out a recent report that he favors the creation of a three-man
military dictatorship to include himself and General Hinh. Such a
move might result in increased efficiency, but would inevitably stir
up popular discontent.
8. Right-wing Nacionalistas to demand abrogation of Philippine agreements
with US:
during the next two weeks,
Philippine foreign secretary Garcia and
Senator Recto will demand abrogation of the trade and bases agreements
with the United States. Their aim was said to be to secure more Ameri-
can concessions through "political blackmail."
Comment: Magsaysay has repudiated the
"Asia for Asians" slogan of Recto and Garcia, who represent the ultra-
nationalistic wing of the administration party. They have, nevertheless,
continued their efforts to undermine Magsaysay's strongly pro-American
policies.
SOUTH ASIA
9. Pakistan reported willing to give $12,000,000 annually to settle
Pushtoonistan issue:
The Pakistani ambassador in Kabul, Colonel
Shah, has told Ambassador Ward that his
government is prepared to make services
and facilities worth $12,000,000 available
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to Afghanistan annually for an unspecified period, in return for a
settlement of the Pushtoonistan issue. The services would include
technical training for the Afghan army and special economic con-
cessions. Pakistan would also sign a trade and frontier agreement,
and if practicable, a joint defense pact.
Comment: Pakistan has maintained that
It would make no concessioTs-liTlEis six-year-old dispute over the
status of Pushtu-speaking tribes in its northwestern frontier areas.
Recent indications that Afghanistan might be seriously seeking a
settlement may now have led Karachi to consider making offers.
Afghanistan probably would not accept
any proposals without considerable haggling. The chances of a
settlement nevertheless appear better than at any time since the
partition of British India in 1947.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
10. UN secretary general opposes immediate Security Council review
of Israel-Jordan armistice:
Secretary General Hammarskjold informed
American, British, and French representa-
tives at the UN on 24 March that he doubted
the desirability of having the Security Council
consider the Israel-Jordan armistice at the
present time. The group was generally
opposed to the council's review of the matter.
The British representative suggested, more-
over, that the question could be taken up in the
normal consideration of General Bennike's recent report on the Israeli-
Arab border situation.
In Hammarskjold's view, the UN chairman
of the Mixed Armistice Commission acted entirely properly by abstain-
ing on the Israeli proposal to condemn Jordan for the Negev bus incident.
Israel, Ha,mmarskjold stated, had prejudged the issue.
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The secretary general has also
informed the Israeli government that he is anxious to maintain
the authority of the commission. He expressed his hope that Israel
would fully cooperate with UN efforts to uphold the commission.
Comment: Hammarskjold's views probably
will be violently denouncediii-T, where a strong and immediate
condemnation of Tordan is sought.
11.
12. Comment on struggle for power in Egypt:
The announcement that the ruling Revolu-
tionary Command Council will be dissolved
on 24 July and parliamentary government
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restored in Egypt is another strategic
victory for General Nagib in his month-old
struggle for power with Colonel Nasr,
dominant figure in the council. The development emphasizes the split
between the two men and makes any lasting compromise unlikely.
Nasr and his supporters in the army, how-
ever, will probably resist implementation of the decision and a new
army coup or attempts on Nagib's life may follow.
Nagib's reported contacts with old-line
politicians, including Wafdist 'leader Nahas Pasha, and his identifi-
cation with the forces seeking a return to parliamentary rule, suggest
that he hopes to be elected president of a civilian government. It is
doubtful, however, that Nagib -could dominate a popularly elected
parliament, which would probably be controlled by either the nationalist
Wafd or Moslem Brotherhood. As long as Egyptian leaders are pre-
occupied with their power struggle, settlement of the Suez base
question is unlikely.
WESTERN EUROPE
13. Bruce and Dillon comment on EDC chances in France:
Ambassadors Dillon and Bruce in Paris
agree that the French National Assembly
would ratify EDC if Premier Laniel presented
the treaty before the current favorable
situation is changed by international or domestic developments. They
see, however, three main obstacles to early debate:
(1) The threat of Gaullist withdrawal from
the government. This threat may already have forced Laniel to agree
to avoid debate until after the Geneva conference. In the ambassadors'
opinion, however, the Gaullists would hesitate to take the responsibility
for overthrowing the cabinet just before the Geneva talks begin.
(2) The need for the Socialist Party to have
time to convene a special national congress for approval of the treaty.
The ambassadors believe that announcement before Easter that
National Assembly debate would open early in May would allow enough
time for this purpose.
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(3) The Saar issue. The ambassadors
state that the "outlines" of a solution "are now quite clear" providing
an Adenauer-Bidault meeting can be brought about soon.
Comment: Heretofore Bruce has frequently
differed with Dillon, who has been consistently optimistic on EDC' s
ratification chances.
It now seems clear that commencement of
the debate before Easter is out of the question. The treaty's opponents
can be expected to make an all-out effort to postpone action pending
the outcome of the Geneva conference.
14. Adenauer to press Italians for prompt EDC action:
The West German embassy in Rome has
informed American officials that Chancellor
Adenauer plans to see Premier Scelba on
26 March to urge prompt EDC ratification.
Adenauer will argue that if Germany is prepared "to go a long way on
the Saar, " Italy should be less difficult on Trieste.
Italian Christian Democratic right wing
leaders are insisting, however, that Scelba tell Adenauer that one
more effort must be made at a Trieste settlement before action is
taken on EDC.
Comment: Adenauer's visit is unlikely to
have much direct effect in expediting Italian consideration of EDC.
His making this effort in Rome, however, suggests a willingness to
make concessions on the Saar to speed up French ratification.
LATIN AMERICA
15. Comment on Chile's position on copper sales to Orbit:
Chilean officials have now promised the
United States that Chilean copper will be
sold only in Western markets. Their
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assurances, together with Chile's previous pledge to grant greater
operational autonomy to the American-owned copper companies,
meet the general terms set by the United States as a prerequisite
to its purchase of 100, 000 tons of Chilean copper.
Finance Minister Del Pedregal now states
that the cabinet statement of 17 March implying Chilean interest in
sales to the Orbit was made for domestic political purposes. This
factor was influential in the repeal last September of the decrees
prohibiting trade with the Orbit.
LATE ITEM
16. Comment on Soviet grant of "sovereignty" to East Germany:
The Soviet grant of ostensible "sovereignty"
to the East German government announced on 25 March includes
freedom to make its own decisions on domestic and foreign affairs,
including relations with West Germany. It provides, however,
that the Soviet armed forces will be retained "temporarily" to
enforce security, and indicates that East Germany must continue
to pay occupation costs.
The Soviet high commissioner's control
functions over the East German government are abolished, but
he will continue to "insure security" and to maintain relations
with the Western occupation forces in "all-German" matters and
in questions affected by agreed quadripartite decisions on Germany.
This statement indicates that the USSR will not at present risk
challenging Western rights of access to Berlin.
The Soviet high commissioner will of
course be aided in his security function by the Russian occupa-
tion army, now estimated at 400, 000 men.
The timing of the announcement suggests
that the primary purpose was to strengthen the position of the
East German government, which was seriously weakened by the
June 1953 riots and the subsequent unrest and economic instabil-
ity. The announcement attempts to give a maximum of prestige
to the Communist regime on the eve of the Socialist Unity. Party
congress, and to strengthen the position of the party's first sec-
retary, Ulbricht, whose authority has been threatened by the in-
creased factionalism and internal discontent in the party. This
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move will solidify the position of the East German Communist
hierarchy and reassure many party members who have been
demoralized by the uncertainties of the past year. It is un-
likely to convince the East German population, or to compensate
for the fiasco, in German eyes, of the position Molotov took
on Germany and Austria at the Berlin conference. It will
certainly carry no conviction in West Germany.
This grant of "sovereignty"� coming
after the rigid Soviet position at the Berlin conference,
suggests that the Kremlin does not believe that the prospect
of German unity, however slim, need be maintained in order
further to confuse the efforts to obtain French ratification of
the EDC treaty.
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