CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/05/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03002528
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: May 27, 1954

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN /
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Office of Current Intelligence 5
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Rhee infuriated by Pyun's 14-point plan at Geneva (page 4).
2, Communists propose partition of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
(page 4).
3. India increasingly concerned over Communist gains in Indochina
(page 5).
SOVIET UNION
4. Bohlen comments on possible policy differences between Malenkov
and Khrushchev (page 7).
5. Soviet IL-28's probably redeployed to East German bases (page 8).
FAR EAST
6. Yoshida to seek US assurances against Japanese economic debacle
(page 8).
7. Chinese Communist offshore island operations reported intensi-
fied (page 9).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
8. Major Viet Minh attack in delta believed possible by 15 June (page 10).
9. Bao Dai may name e 10),
10.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
11. Syria may legalize Communist Party (page 12).
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WESTERN EUROPE
12. Comment on French denials that Saar agreement reached (page 13).
LATIN AMERICA
13. Honduran government asks American assistance against Commu-
nist threat (Daze 14).
14.
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GENERAL
1. Rhee infuriated by Pyun's 14-point plan at Geneva:
President Rhee was infuriated by Foreign
Minister Pyun's "unilateral" presentation
of the 14-point proposal at Geneva on
22 May,
Rhee maintained he had been "crossed
up" by Pyun, and threatened to recall him and publicly repudiate the
plan. He later changed his mind in view of the probability that the
Communists will reject the plan.
The American delegation believes that an
agreed 16-nation plan cannot be achieved and that Pyun's proposal must
stand despite its unrealistic demands for Chinese troop withdrawal in
advance of a UN withdrawal. The delegation hopes to focus attention on
the Communist rejection of the authority of the UN, and expects the
conference to break off on this point next week.
2. Communists propose partition of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia:
The American delegation at Geneva believes
that the Viet Minh cease-fire proposal made
in the restricted session of 25 May is a
"clear bid for partition" of Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia.
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The Viet Minh delegate proposed the "re-
adjusting of areas uncler, control of each state...taking into account
the actual areas controlled, including population, and strategic interests."
The Communist spokesman was explicit in demanding that a cease-fire
include arrangements for "Khmer and Pathet Lao, " the Communist-con-
trived regimes in Laos and Cambodia.
Comment: This Viet Minh proposal is a
further indication that the eTainmunists are not prepared to make sub-
stantial concessions to obtain a cease-fire at this time.
Forthcoming Communist terms on partition
may reflect a recent Chinese Communist map reprinted in the Soviet
New Times on 15 May (see map, p. 6). The map shows the Viet Minh
as holding most of Vietnam, about half of Laos and parts of Cambodia.
3. India increasingly concerned over Communist gains in Indochina:
Indian thinking is moving slowly away from
the idea that the Indochina war is purely
colonial and is becoming more aware of the
danger of further Communist approaches to
India's borders, according to Ambassador
Allen in New Delhi. Allen believes three
factors are responsible for this shift: (a)
the force of events; (b) mild British coax-
ing; and (c) the concern voiced at the Colombo
conference by other Asian states�notably Burma.
Comment: It is probably true that Commu-
nist successes in Indochina are causing increased concern in New Delhi.
It is doubtful, however, that this will lead to an early stiffening of
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Norplement to NEW TIMES
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India's attitude toward the Communists. India can be expected, rather,
to press more eagerly for a quick Indochina settlement which would allow
the Communists to retain their present gains, in the hope that they would
be satiated or somehow contained in the future.
SOVIET UNION
4. Bohlen comments on possible policy differences between Malenkov and
Khrushchev:
Ambassador Bohlen notes indications of policy
differences among the top Soviet leaders. A
comparison of speeches in the Supreme Soviet
suggests to Bohlen that Malenkov is inclined
to take a more sober and realistic view of the international situation than
Khrushchev, and that a similar difference can be noted on domestic prob-
lems.
Since Stalin's death the Soviet leadership has
embarked on a series of domestic program which appear to be difficult,
If not impossible, to implement simultaneously. Bohlen believes the top
leaders may doubt the ability of the Soviet system to support all these
measures, and that differences may exist as to which parts of the program
should be readjusted or sacrificed to others--perhaps partly because of
differing estimates on the possibility of a serious crisis in foreign af-
fairs arising out of the Indochinese situation.
Bohlen considers that, given the nature of the
Soviet system, when differences on policy become sufficiently acute, a
contest between rival factions with the eventual elimination of one or the
other automatically ensues. However, he warns that it is too early to
form any firm conclusions as to the full significance or possible conse-
quences of Khrushchev's steadily increasing prominence. He feels the
Soviet leaders must surely realize the great danger that a power struggle
would, under the present circumstances, constitute for their entire sys-
tem.
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5. Soviet IL-28's probably redeployed to East German bases:
_ /confirmed
the presence of at least 20 1L-28's and re-
vealed 24 POL trucks, 39 other trucks and
two trains at the airfield.
The number of IL-28's and units indicated
at Werneuchen and Briesen is similar to the number there prior to the
general withdrawal of IL-28's from East Germany in mid-1953.
Comment: Since the withdrawal of mid-1953,
as many as 30 IL-28's have reappeared in East Germany for short periods
on several occasions This time, how-
ever, the apparent arrival ground crew personnel as well as planes at
Werneuchen and the extensive logistical activity there suggest the IL-28's
will stay in East Germany for a more extended period.
In addition, the strength of the IL-28 forces
in Hungary has doubled during the past month. In the mid-1953 shift,
one of the two IL-28 divisions in Hungary was also withdrawn to the USSR.
FAR EAST
6. Yoshida to seek US assurances against Japanese economic debacle:
Prime Minister Yoshida on his visit to
Washington in early June will seek assurance
that the United States will take any necessary
action to stabilize and strengthen Japan if its
economy should deteriorate dangerously. A high Finance Ministry
official and a former minister of finance will precede Yoshida to the
United States to lay the groundwork for gaining such an assurance.
The Finance Ministry official informed the US
embassy in Tokyo that Yoshida will not emphasize obtaining an American
loan.
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Comment: American b ankers in Tokyo were
recently approached for a loan by close Yoshida advisers who hoped that
such American action would bolster Yoshida and his Liberal Party. The
negative response this approach elicited may have prompted a shift in
Yoshida% approach.
The topics to which Yoshida will reportedly
address himself during his world tour suggest that Japan is reassessing
Its world position and its ties with the United States. The relative eco-
nomic advantages to be gained from various possible,cburSes of Uction will
be a powerful influence in determining Japan's decision.
7. Chinese Communist offshore island operations reported intensified:
based on the mainland are flying regular patrol
missions over the area around Shihpu on the
Chekiang coast, north of the Tachens, and seem
determined to protect it from aerial attack and reconnaissance.
Meanwhile, the Nationalist air force is reported
to believe that the Nationalist navy will not "stand and make a fight" in
the Tachen area, and that the region is in "imminent danger."
Comment: The increased air patrols near
Shihpu suggest that the Communists may be preparing for intensified opera-
tions against offshore islands.
The Nationalist air force view of navy intentions
Is the first indication of possiblP diss'etisibn tri the armed forces since the
current island campaign began. In the first few days of operations, the
navy showed surprising aggressiveness against Communist naval forces,
but in the face of superior Communist air power and lacking substantial
air support from Formosa, the navy has lapsed into a less aggressive
role.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
8. Major Viet Minh attack in delta believed possible by 15 June:
believes
that the Viet Minh will be in a position by 15
June to launch an all-out attack against French
Union forces in the delta.
he redeployment of Viet Minh troops from
)ten Bien Phu is apparently proceeding faster
ban the most recent French estimates fore-
aw. These estimates anticipated that leading
elemeitts of the Viet Minh forces would reach the delta area about 10 June
and the main body about 20 June.
As of 25 May the French reported that elements
of the Viet Minh 351st Artillery Division were approaching an assembly
area at Tuyen Quang, north of the delta. The bulk of the 304th, 308th and
312th Divisions was well east of Dien Bien Phu (see map, p. 11). Two of
the three regiments of the 316th Division were still in the Dien Bien Phu
area.
9. Bao Dai may name new prime minister:
Bao Dai is seriously contemplating the appoint-
ment of the prominent Catholic layman Ngo Dinh
Diem to replace Premier Buu Loc,
If Diem assumes the pre-
miership, his main task will be to conduct
Internationally supervised elections, possibly
after negotiations to this end with the Viet
Minh.
The American embassy in Saigon comments
that Diem's integrity, though unwelcome to many Vietnamese politicians,
might be a real asset to the Vietnam government, although he lacks
dynamism.
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Comment: Bao Dai has long been hostile
toward Diem, but appears to have drawn closer to him in the past few
weeks. He has appointed Diem's brother as his personal representative
at Geneva.
As a member of Vietnam's most influential
Catholic family, Diem is a figure of some importance in Vietnamese
politics, but his personal qualifications as a leader have been discounted
by many Vietnamese. He lacks Buu Locts experience and skill as a
negotiator.
10.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
11. Syria may legalize Communist Party:
there is
a strong possibility that the Communist Party
in Syria will be permitted to function legally--
for the first time since it was outlawed in 1947�
e ore the parliamentary elections this summer.
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the Communists are planning to publish two
newspapers in Syria.
A Lebanese Commu-
nist weekly, which has recently begun to appear in Damascus, is now
being openly read by party members.
Comment: The present caretaker government
has permitted Communists co/a-Nimble freedom of activity. If this
policy continues, Khalid Bakdash--the leading Communist in the Arab
world- -will probably run for parliament in the elections now scheduled
for August. There is no acknowledged Communist in the parliament of
any Arab country.
WESTERN EUROPE
12. Comment on French denials that Saar agreement reached:
Public denials by French government spokesmen
that a Saar agreement was reached last week at
Strasbourg result from a tug of war between pro-
and anti-EDC elements in the cabinet and For-
eign Ministry. Each side seems to fear that
an immediate announcement of a Saar settle-
ment would weaken its position.
Deputy Foreign Minister Schumann told Ambas-
sador Dillon on 22 May that the agreement reached by Vice Premier
Teitgen and Chancellor Adenauer two days earlier could not be considered
"final." Under present circumstances, he stated, the French cabinet
might reject any accord publicized prior to the Socialist party congress
on 29-30 May. The congress is expected to approve enforcing party
discipline in the National Assembly vote on EDC. Schumann is certain
that the present French cabinet will then approve a Saar settlement and
proceed to ask for assembly debate on E'DC.
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LATIN AMERICA
13. Honduran government asks American assistance against Communist
threat
The Honduran government informed the Ameri-
can embassy on 23 May that it is "unable to
guarantee the lives and properties of nationals
and foreigners against the imminent threat
of international Communism" It asked that two American warships
stand off the north coast "to be ready for any emergency."
Several carloads of the arms which arrived
in Guatemala from the Orbit on 15 May are reported on a railroad
siding near the Honduran border.
Comment: Communist agitation has prevented
settlement of the general strike, involving 35,000 workers, which has
paralyzed the Honduran north coast region for the past three weeks. The
situation is considered explosive. The Honduran government could proba-
bly not enforce martial law.
Agitators from Guatemala are reported to be
encouraging the strikers and providing them with weapons.
14.
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