CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/29
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02018021
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2019
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Publication Date:
December 29, 1953
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Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
L I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S . C -
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20 03
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: EVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Soviet emphasis on European security probable at Berlin conference
(page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Japanese government assured of Diet support on critical issues
(page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
3. Indian Communist Party line to remain "peaceful" (page 4).
4. British seen willing to deal more bluntly with Nehru (page 4).
5. Ceylon suggests regional prime ministers' meeting (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Shah may banish Qashqai khans (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Italian cabinet reshuffle expected (page 6).
8. British official forecasts small payments surplus for sterling area
(page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
1. Soviet emphasis on European security probable at Berlin conference:
Ambassador Bohlen notes that in the Soviet
note of 26 December the "necessity of assur-
ing European security" is mentioned ahead of
the "threat of a rebirth of German militarism."
He regards this as another indication that the USSR will develop the secu-
rity theme at the Berlin conference.
Bohlen believes that any security proposal
would be based on the French-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet treaties of mutual
assistance, with either an offer for similar bilateral pacts with other
Western European countries or a generalized proposal for a European
regional security arrangement.
FAR EAST
2. Japanese government assured of Diet support on critical issues:
From 12 to 15 members of the opposition
Progressive Party have agreed to support
the Japanese government in any critical
Diet vote, thereby assuring Yoshida a defi-
3.3(h)(2)
nite majority, according to Minister of Justice Inukai. The Progressive
Party will also support the government on a stringent budget for the next
fiscal year.
Ambassador Allison notes that a pattern of
greater political stability than has existed for three years is beginning
to emerge as a result of the recovery of confidence in Yoshida's leader-
ship. He believes this stems primarily from the greater clarification
of national policy by Yoshida's Liberal Party and the weakening of schis-
matic forces by Hatoyama's return to the party.
Comment: The return of the splinter
Hatoyama group to the Liberal Party gave it only four seats short
of a Diet majority. Therefore, the pro-Yoshida wing of the Progressive
Party, estimated at from 15 to 20 members, can now defect to the Liber-
als in the event the Progressives as a party fail to cooperate with the
government.
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Stabilization of the political scene will
enable Yoshida to adopt more definitive defense plans and sounder
economic policies.
SOUTH ASIA
3. Indian Communist Party line to remain "peaceful":
The "peaceful" policy directive presented
to the Third Congress of the Communist Party of India on 27 December
represents tacit recognition of the Indian government's strongly anti-
Communist attitude as well as a significant defeat for B. T. Ranadive's
terrorist party faction.
The policy directive, presented by Secre-
tary General Ajoy Ghosh9 who recently returned from six months in the
USSR, reflects Moscow's current policy of wooing India both politically
and economically. Primarily, however, it indicates the party's inability
to recover from drastic government repression of Communist terrorism
in 1948 and 1949.
The completeness of Ranadive's defeat is sug-
gested by the press report that he was not even allowed to attend the
congress as an official delegate. It presumably ends the rivalry between
Ranadive and more moderate party elements led by A. K. Gopalan and
S. A. Dange.
Since Indian popular opinion is now swinging
more toward the Socialists than the Communists, it is unlikely that con-
tinued Communist reliance on moderate tactics would achieve notable
results in the near future.
4. British seen willing to deal more bluntly with Nehru:
British officials, in contrast to their previow3.3(h)(2)
kid-glove handling of Indian prime minister
Nehru, are now less afraid of offending him,
according to the American embassy in London.
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The British are convinced that Nehru has
concluded firmly that it is to India's advantage to remain in the Common-
wealth. A senior official of the Commonwealth Relations Office feels
that he would surrender this membership only under extreme provocation,
which would not include the supply of a modest amount of American arms
to Pakistan.
Comment: Britain has previously shown great
deference to Nehru, as in its strong support for Indian views on the Korean
peace negotiations. An indication of a firmer attitude is the recent sugges-
tion by a British official to the Indian high commissioner in London that
India view the projected agreement between the United States and Pakistan
in the proper perspective.
. Ceylon suggests regional prime ministers' meeting:
3.3(h)(2)
Ceylonese prime minister Kotelawala told the
American ambassador in Colombo on 25 Decem-
ber that his suggestion for a meeting of the prime
ministers of India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia
and Ceylon had been ma�-e in order to seize the initiative from India and to
lead South and Southeast Asian nations into an anti-Communist bloc. He
failed to invite the prime minister of Thailand because he is "too unstable."
Kotelawala denied press reports that he had
called the meeting to discuss American military aid to Pakistan and stated
that he would welcome any "sale" of arms to that country.
Earlier, a Ceylonese official had said the meet-
ing would concern itself with problems common to the countries involved.
He also said invitations might later be extended to Indochina and Japan.
Comment: Kotelawala's suggestion represents
Ceylon's first major venture into the international political arena. Because
of the antagonisms rife in the area, however, it is doubtful that a conference,
acceptable to most of the nations, would achieve important results.
Both Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian press
have incorrectly indicated that concern over the question of American mili-
tary aid to Pakistan inspired Kotelawala to make his suggestion.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Shah may banish Qashqai khans:
3.3(h)(2)
The shah reportedly stated that he was assured
by "other Qashqai chiefs" that the khans had lost the leadership of the
tribes. He added that if they were exiled, it would not be necessary to
use force against the Qashqai.
Comment: The unwillingness of the Qashqais
to pledge their allegiance to the Zahedi government has greatly disturbed
the government in the past months. An attempt to exile the khans might
lead to a renewal of the Qashqai revolt against the government and necessi-
tate large-scale military action against the tribe. The shah's present atti-
tude indicates that he believes any emergency involving the tribes can be
dealt with,
two chiefs
of a Qashqai subtribe, apparently trying to increase their influence, are
intriguing with local army commanders against the khans.
WESTERN EUROPE
Italian cabinet reshuffle expected:
According to usually well-informed sources,
Premier Pella hopes to succeed in reorganizing
his cabinet rather than to resign and precipitate
a government crisis. The American embassy
in Rome believes that any reshuffle would probably be based on agreement
between Pella and the present Christian Democratic leadership, controlled
by the party's "left wing" and supporters of former premier De Gasperi,
for a legislative program of moderate social reform.
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"Left-wing" Christian Democrats Taviani
and Fanfani, who currently hold the defense and interior posts, would
be retained under such an agreement. Although Pella reportedly wants
to give up the post of foreign minister, no decision has been reached as
to who would fill this post.
Comment: Pella may hope to make up for a
consequent loss of Monarchist support by drawing the support of the
Christian Democrats' former center and left-center allies. The Foreign
Ministry post will be difficult to fill because of the reluctance of De Gasperi
and other leaders to assume responsibility for any unfavorable developments
in the Trieste situation.
8. British official forecasts small payments surplus for sterling area:
In outlining his government's views on the 3.3(h)(2)
Commonwealth economic conference to be
held in Australia next month, a senior British
Treasury official predicted that the sterling
area would show ow a modest balance of payments surplus for 1953-1954.
If the present high level of world trade continues, the terms of trade for
the sterling area are not expected to change drastically; but the United
Kingdom's own terms of trade are now at the point of maximum advantage.
The American embassy in London, commenting
on official concern over the slowness of Commonwealth economic develop-
ment, believes Britain is disturbed by decreased Commonwealth orders
for capital goods from industries in the United Kingdom.
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