CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/01/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02064894
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: January 23, 1953

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SECU INFORMATION
23 January 1953
Copy NO. 59
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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D CLAS �OCUMENT NO. 1_11_4: /)
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NEXT REVIEW DikTE:
AUTH: 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER.
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECUPd INFORMATION
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10.
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. British Foreign Office sees tightening of security in Orbit
developments (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Yoshida to dissolve Japanese Diet (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Preparation for decisive action against Viet Minh recommended
(page 4).
4. Indonesian Foreign Minister may approve rubber sale to Communist
China (page 5).
5. Burmese reported preparing to outlaw Communist parties (page 5),
6.
7,
8,
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iran plans to end Soviet fisheries concession (page 6).
Israel planning to introduce Soviet anti-Semitism issue in UN
(raze 7)
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Berlin elevated system reportedly to be split (page 8).
British arrest of German ex-Nazis seen politically motivated
(page 8).
EDC delegations to recommend early action on treaty protocols
(page 9).
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SOVIET UNION
1. British Foreign Office sees tightening of security in Orbit
developments:
The British Foreign Office considers
that recent developments in the Orbit
point to a major drive to improve in-
ternal security. Developments cited
range from the doctors' conspiracy and the criticism of a
Kazakh academician for nationalist distortions in the USSR to
upheavals throughout the Satellites. The Foreign Office feels
that this drive is not in preparation for military ventures or
reaction to an increased fear of attack.
The Foreign Office concludes that
there will probably be public trials in Moscow and interprets
the direct implication of the security forces in the charges
against the doctors as an indication that action has already
been taken against important security officials such as
Abakumov, ex-Minister of the MGB. The British see no sign
that Stalin is not still in firm control.
Comment: There is no firm indica-
tion that the doctors' conspiracy will be developed into a show
trial. However, the present situation may be used to explain
Abakumov's ouster as MGB Minister, which although effected
in 1951 has not yet been publicly announced.
FAR EAST
2. Yoshida to dissolve Japanese Diet:
une as tJ
majority.
Prime Minister Yoshida told Ambas-
sador Murphy in strictest confidence
on 20 January that he had decided to
dissolve the Diet sometime before
e only way to secure a government with a dependable
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Yoshida has decided to revise the con-
stitution's anti-rearmament clause. This requires a two-thirds
Diet vote which, with his slender majority, he is unable to ob-
tain. He does not desire a coalition with the Progressive Party
because its leftist elements are sympathetic to the Socialists.
Comment A primary factor in Yoshida's
decision to dissolve the Diet un4-6-ubtedly is his inability to control
the rival faction of his own party which can defeat him on any given
issue. New elections, which are mandatory within 40 days of the
Diet's dissolution, will not settle his basic difficulties, and may
further weaken or split the Liberal Party.
This is the first indication that Yoshida
is considering a constitutional change to pave the way for re-
armament. Previously he has insisted on a policy of gradual
rearmament within the framework of the constitution.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Preparation for decisive action against Viet Minh recommended:
Bao Dal's military adviser, General
Alessandri, has told Ambassador Heath
that many officials in North Vietnam be-
lieve that now is the time to prepare for
a successiut oiienstve effort against the Viet Minh. He is con-
vinced that expanded French-Vietnamese operations would rally
the Tonkin peasantry, who now hate the Viet Minh, as well as
bring about significant Viet Minh defections.
Alessandri recommends that 65 addi-
tional Vietnamese Army battalions be created without delay so
that decisive action may be taken by next October. He said that
there was now general agreement in Paris and Indochina on this
augmentation of Vietnamese forces, but problems of finance, ex-
cessive Vietnamese demands for greater military authority, and
the lack of a feeling of urgency in Paris must be overcome.
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Comment: Governor Tri of North
Vietnam, a reliable official, recently expressed similar views.
Alessandri's opinion that decisive action
could be taken as early as next October appears overly optimistic
in view of past French and Vietnamese performance in developing
a Vietnamese army.
4. Indonesian Foreign Minister may approve rubber sale to
Communist China:
The Indonesian Foreign Minister informed
the American Ambassador on 20 January
that he is under pressure from the Finance
and Economic Ministers to approve the sale
of rubber to Communist China. The For-
eign Minister stated that the Chinese have
made an offer for an initial cash purchase
in Swiss currency equivalent to $263,000.
Meanwhile, a responsible Singapore source
quoted information from Djakarta that a rubber-rice agreement had
been reached by the Chinese and Indonesians on 16 January. He said
delivery of some 15,000 tons of rubber per month was envisaged and
that the terms of exchange were very favorable to the Indonesians.
Comment: Many Indonesian oificials,
reportedly including the Foreign-Minister, are undoubtedly eager
to negotiate a rice-rubber deal with Communist China despite the
present embargo. There is no firm evidence, however, that an
agreement has yet been reached.. A reliable private trading source
stated recently that actual negotiations have been stalled.
5. Burmese reported preparing to outlaw Communist parties:
The Burmese premier is drafting legis-
lation to outlaw Communist parties,
The new law,
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to be submitted to Parliament in the near future, will call for
the banning of all "foreign political parties."
Comment: Although the Burmese
Government did not revoke the T6 British order outlawing the
smaller of Burma's two Communist parties, no legal action has
been taken against the larger, which has been carrying on armed
Insurrection during the past five years.
The passage of strong anti-Communist
legislation, closely following a speech this week by the premier
which contained the first public expression of gratitude by a
Burmese official for American economic aid, would be the most
striking evidence to date of Burma's orientation toward the West.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
60 Iran plans to end Soviet fisheries concession:
The Iranian Ambassador in Moscow
told the American Embassy on 21
January that Iran will insist that the
Soviet fisheries concession which
expires on 31 January be succeeded by an Iranian nationalized
fishing industry. He affirmed that the 20 to 30 Russians employed
by the industry would be dismissed and Soviet operation of the
fishing stations terminated.
The USSR could take its share of the
movable property and would be paid for its portion of the im-
movable installations. Iran, however, would probably offer to
sell fish to the USSR at favorable prices.
Comment: The Ambassador's state-
ments contradict the Iranian press, which reported on 10 January
that the fishing industry would not be nationalized and that the
Soviet Embassy in Tehran expected the contract to be extended
for a year without change.
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Prime Minister Mossadeq faces serious
internal criticism if he agrees to extend the Soviet concession.
On the other hand, he may be reluctant to offend both Britain and
the USSR at the same time and may consequently adopt a weaker
attitude toward the Soviet Union than reported by the Iranian
Ambassador.
7. Israel planning to introduce Soviet anti-Semitism issue in UN:
8.
Israeli UN Delegate Rafael has told the
American representative that Israel
tentatively plans to bring up Soviet
anti-Semitism in the UN when the Polish
Item on "measures to strengthen peace
and friendship among nations" is being considered. He asked the
American delegate to keep this information confidential, so that
the Polish item would not be withdrawn.
Rafael believes that the present Soviet
anti-Semitism stems more from a domestic power struggle than
from international motives, and that it does not represent a pro-
Arab development.
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WESTERN EUROPE
9. Berlin elevated system reportedly to be split:
East Berlin officials are reliably
reported to be preparing a plan for
splitting the Berlin elevated trans-
port system by discontinuing through
service on the lines crossing West Berlin between the Soviet
zone of Germany and East Berlin. The plan envisages substi-
tution in West Berlin of shuttle service using antiquated equip-
ment.
Comment: The elevated, which is
East German owned and ot-74e3��aERIT serves commuters from
Berlin suburbs and is the only city transport facility crossing
the West Berlin zonal border. The city's streetcar system was
split on 15 January. A split of the elevated system would be
more serious, however, because it would enable the East Ger-
mans to tighten security restrictions on the West Berlin-East
German border.
Coupled with the 19 january reorgani-
zation of the East Berlin government and the expected issuance
of special identity cards, this report suggests that the East
German government will go through with reported plans for
totally splitting the city within the next few months.
10. British arrest of German ex-Nazis seen politically motivatedt
According to the American Consul in
Duesseldorf, statements by British
officials in Germany suggest that the
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principal motive for the recent arrest of seven ex-Nazis may have
been London's desire to show the British public that it is not being
lax with regard to subversive elements in Germany. The British
High Commissioner in Germany was evidently advised by his For-
eign Office last December to arrest the Naumann group because of
its "dangerous" subversive activities.
A local West German security official
states his belief that the arrests, like the Oradour war crimes
trials in France, were designed to prevent the new American ad-
ministration from cooperating more closely with the Germans.
11. EDC delegations to recommend early action on treaty protocols:
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bourgian delegates to the EDC Interim
Commission have agreed to recommend
to their governments that they be author-
ized to reach an accord with the French on all protocols proposed
for the EDC treaty. They envisage a limited session of the interim
commission in order to permit complete ratification in all countries
in April.
The delegates stipulate that the language
of the treaty should not be changed and that each country should
proceed with treaty ratification while the protocols are being
negotiated.
Comment: Members of the West German
and Italian EDC delegations have expressed doubt that agreement on
the protocols can be easily reached, although both are awaiting de-
tails of the French proposals before taking a stand. A Dutch NATO
delegate has expressed concern lest the Germans and Italians also
ask for special protocols.
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