CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/04/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02893542
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: April 2, 1953

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SECU INFORMATION
2 April 1953
Copy No. BU
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1>e
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS
NE:a' REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 7C-2e
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECURI NFORMATION
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URITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1,Zomment on Soviet support of Chinese proposals for Korea (page 3).
Burma's UN complaint reportedly prompted by pressure from Peiping
00,.(page 3).
. Burma reportedly has alternative documentation to present to UN
page 4).
Formosa-Burma dispute raises new Indonesian suspicions of American
policy (page 4).
SOVIET UNION
5. Comment on Soviet price reductions (page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Indonesian National Party reportedly plotting to overthrow cabinet
(page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
. eneral Zahedi seeks Shah's support to overthrow Mossadeq (page 6).
. Arab states increasingly suspicious of Egyptian leadership (page 7).
9. Britain plans to move troops into disputed Buraimi area (page 8).
10. Comment on decree barring Greek-flag ships from Communist China
trade (page 8).
WESTERN EUROPE
11. Austrian government crisis reportedly ends with Socialist-People's
Party agreement (page 9).
to. Date of Italian EDC ratification increasingly remote (page 9).
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CURITY INFORMATION
GENERAL
1. Comment on Soviet support of Chinese proposals for Korea:
Molotov's quick endorsement of the Chinese
Communist proposal on Korea, in a statement employing Chou En-la's
terminology, provides further evidence that Chou's action resulted from
a joint Sino-Soviet decision. Molotov's statement follows an assertion
by the senior Soviet member of the UN Secretariat to a member of the
Norwegian delegation, only two hours after the Chinese communique
became public, that Chou's proposal was the "real thing."
Molotov's statement also indicates that the
Communists are seeking not only a resumption of the truce talks at
Panmunjom but a full-dress debate on broader issues at the General
Assembly. He suggests, for example, that Chinese Communist and
North Korean membership in the UN would facilitate cessation of the
war. It is not clear, however, whether these political questions are
being introduced as a condition for a cease-fire, or simply for bargain-
ing or prestige purposes.
2. Burma's UN complaint reportedly prompted by pressure from Peiping:
Pressure from Peiping and the possibility 3.3(h)(2)
that Chinese Communist armed forces might
enter Burma to fight the Chinese Nationalist
troops there prompted Burma's complaint
to the United Nation; according to the
military adviser assigned to Burma's UN delegate.
Comment: Burma's UN delegate has also
referred to pressure applied by Communist China and there are indi-
cations that such pressure, in part, has been applied through Burma's
pro-Communist Ambassador to Peiping, who visited Rangoon recently.
In addition, the Chinese Communist Embassy
in Rangoon is known to be providing funds and advice to the Communist-
front Burma Workers and Peasants Party, which has been active in
promoting public and political clamor for government action against
the Nationalists.
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3. Burma reportedly has alternative documentation to present to UN:
The Burmese Government has two sets of 3.3(h)(2)
exhibits for use in connection with its
complaint to the United Nations against
Chinese Nationalist aggression, 3.3(h)(2)
One set is to prove Taipei's direction and
support of Li Mi's troops, while the other cpntains "documentary
evidence" of American involvement. The latter will be used at the dis-
cretion of Burma's UN delegate.
3.3(h)(2)
Burma's case
hinges on two letters from Chiang Kai-shek to General Li Mi.; one
instructing him to consider the Burmese Government as a Communist
movement, the other promising more support in view of increased
American aid to Formosa.
Comment: Burmese officials probably
hope to avoid reference to American involvement during discussions
in the UN, but Burma's delegate has already publicly implied the
United States' moral responsibility. Moreover, Soviet efforts in the
United Nations and Communist pressures in Rangoon and from Peiping
may result in the presentation of evidence of American complicity.
4. Formosa-Burma dispute raises new Indonesian suspicions of American
policy:
The US Embassy in Djakarta believes the 3.3(h)(2)
situation created by the Chinese Nationalist
troops in Burma may sharpen Indonesian
suspicions of American Far Eastern policy.
In the Indonesian view, Formosa is an American satellite and the
United States is responsible for the Chinese Nationalists being in Burma.
A friendly Indonesian leader cited the prob-
lem as evidence of big-power indifference to the rights of small nations
and pointed out that, on the pretext of fighting Communists, Indonesia
too might be occupied and be unable to resist.
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Comment: While Burma and Indonesia
both have favored a neutral foreign policy, they have generally been
more inclined to the West than to the Soviet Orbit. American failure
to solve the Nationalist problem, despite Burma's friendly orientation,
will make Indonesia question the wisdom of closer cooperation with
the United States.
The American Embassy in Djakarta
commented that recent Burmese permission for rubber shipments to
Communist China will provide new impetus for existing pressures on the
Indonesian Government to allow similar trade.
SOVIET UNION
5. Comment on Soviet price reductions:
The American Embassy in Moscow reports
that the Soviet retail price reductions of both food and manufactured
goods are far broader than last year but similar to those for 1950 and
1951.
The wider range of price reductions as
compared with last year, along with the latest declarations of peaceful
Intent and the recent amnesty declaration, are intended to aid the new
regime in consolidating itself with the Soviet people.
The 50 percent price reduction in fruits and
vegetables may have added significance, since they are among the
chief products sold by the collective farmer on the open market. The
Kremlin may now be moving gradually to eliminate this market by
forcing it to compete with arbitrarily lowered state prices.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
6. Indonesian National Party reportedly plotting to overthrow cabinet: 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: President Sukarno ostensibly holds
himself aloof from partisan politics. The National Party is one of two
forming the present government. It has been reliably reported as
coming increasingly under Communist influence. 3.3(h)(2)
the
left wing of the National Party is seeking a cabinet change in order to
replace the party's moderates in the present cabinet with more radical
reoresentatives. 3.3(h)(2)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. General Zahedi seeks Shah's support to overthrow Mossadeq:
Minister of Court Ala told Ambassador 3.3(h)(2)
Henderson on 30 March that it is generally
agreed that Mossadeq must be removed in
the near future and that retired General
Zahedi is the only avai a le replacement. Zahedi would be supported
by Mullah Kashani and other conservative elements within the Majlis
and the army.
'Zahedi has visited Ala secretly and has
indicated that he would accept the premiership only if the Shah supported
him. Ala told Zahedi that the Shah would not act "unconstitutionally" or
take part in a coup. The Minister of Court said, however, that he will
try to persuade the Shah to make to the Majlis which meets on 5 April
statement condemning Mossadeq.
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Comment: Recent reports have indicated
that Zahedi and others are planning military coup. Henderson's
report suggests that they may be willing to try to remove Mossadeq
by parliamentary means rather than by armed action.
The Shah still remains the key factor.
His inability to make up his mind to take even constitutional action
against Mossadeq, however, will discourage Zahedi and his apparently
sizeable following.
8. Arab states increasingly suspicious of Egyptian leadership:
Comment: Growing Arab suspicion of
Egyptian leadership on such important problems as peace with
Israel and Middle East defense planning could lead to a break in
the united Arab stand on these issues. The situation is more likely,
however, to end in a compromise reaffirming hostility to Israel
and insisting on a British settlement with Egypt as a prerequisite
to any area defense arrangement with the West.
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9. Britain plans to move troops into disputed Buraimi area:
Great Britain intends to move local troopi3.3(h)(2)
the disputed Buraimi area and to take other
measures to make the present Saudi position
untenable. King Ibn Saud will be notified
beforehand, probably on 2 April, that Britain reserves its freedom of
action.
The Foreign Office explains that the Saudi,
through their actions, show no intention to carry out past agreements,
and that their suggestion for a plebiscite shows they are electioneering
in the disputed area.
Comment: The territory involved is techni-
cally in dispute between Saudi Arabia and two of the several British-
protected Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. The Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister
recently declared that his country would, if necessary, meet force with
force or possibly appeal to the UN Security Council. Saudi reaction
would also include a strong appeal to the United States.
10. Comment on decree barring Greek-flag ships from Communist China
trade:
The Greek Council of Ministers on 23 March
issued a decree prohibiting Greek-flag ships froth calling at ports in
Communist China and North Korea.
The Greek-flag merchant fleet comprises
approximately 20 percent of the total Greek-owned merchant tonnage
operating throughout the world. The other 80 percent consists of
700 to 800 ships which are registered in ten foreign countries. Five
of these countries have not yet prohibited ships in their registry from
entering ports of Communist China.
During the last quarter of 1952, only 13
Greek-flag ships were positively identified with Communist China
trade. The curtailment of this shipping will attain greater significance
when Greek-owned ships under foreign registry are likewise prohibited
or withdrawn from the China trade.
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WESTERN EUROPE
11. Austrian government crisis reportedly ends with Socialist-People's
Party agreement:
People's Party and Socialist representat12)veb
have reportedly reached an understanding which
will permit the announcement of a new Austrian
Government this week, under Chancellor-desig-
nate Raab of the People's Party.
Substantial agreement has reportedly also been
reached on a 1953 budget and on bipartisan parliamentary support for an
agreed "government program." The coalition voting agreement will not,
however, extend to all parliamentary issues.
Comment: The important decisions which
appear to have been postponed suggest that the new coalition will not
be a strong one, Barring some unforeseen reconciliation between the
two parties, the probability of new elections within a year is therefore
very strong.
12. Date of Italian EDC ratification increasingly remote:
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Premier De Gasperi told Ambassador
Bunker on 30 March that the recent
Communist-led riots in Parliament have
made it inadvisable for him to issue a
public statement of the government's intention to push ratification
of EDC, as he had previously promised. He said that he would do
his utmost for ratification after the national elections late this spring,
but that he could not now risk another debate in either house.
3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Bunker believes that under
present circumstances final approval of the treaty is unlikely
before late autumn.
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