CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/08/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872254
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 9, 1953

di/Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872254.
TOP SEJCRET
Sd11NFORMATION
9 August 1953
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Copy No, 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
CF-:ANGE CLAL,).
1 V.:7:CLASS7'ED
AUTH: HA 7a-'2,
DA-4/.1 REV1tWER
3.5(c)
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOPS- RET
SEC INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
Comment on Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet (page 3).
. Coordinated statement by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee on Malenkov's claim that the USSR possesses a
hydrogen weapon (page 5).
FAR EAST
3. Japanese Communist front activity may presage Soviet overture
on prisoner of war issue (page 5).
Comment on the North Korean purge (page 6).
5,
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
USSR proposes bilateral talks with France on German problem
(page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
I. Comment on Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet:
Malenkov's speech to the last session of
the Supreme Soviet reaffirmed the policies effected by the new regime
since Stalin's death and indicated his pre-eminence among the top
leaders. Emphasizing the necessity for improving the welfare of
the Soviet people, Malenkov assured them and the world that a re-
duction of international tension through negotiation was both possible
and desirable.
Malenkov described the material welfare of
the population as "the main task" of the current Five-Year Plan. He
stated that production of consumer goods will be increased "at the
expense of other sectors" of the economy.
Heavy industry will continue as the prime
objective of economic development.
indicate that plan goals for three basic industries,
coal, oil and electric power, will not be met in 1955.
The reappointment of Presidium member
M. Z. Saburov as head of economic planning suggests that he is con-
sidered the most experienced and capable administrator for carrying
out the considerably modified objectives of the Five-Year Plan and
for the further reorganization of economic ministries which Malenkov
indicated was under consideration. The fact that the Supreme Soviet
was not asked to ratify the plan is further indication that it will be kept
under constant review.
In outlining the government's drive for greater
consumer goods production, Malenkov placed particular emphasis on
increases from the agricultural sector. These are to be accomplished
by new conciliatory measures to the collective farmers that contrast
sharply with Stalin's plans for the Soviet peasantry. To increase their
incentive, the state will pay the farmers more for their produce and
will demand smaller obligatory deliveries from their private plots.
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With regard to foreign affairs, Malenkov
reaffirmed the conciliatory post-Stalin policy for reducing inter-
national tension. At the same time he called upon foreign govern-
ments to meet the USSR half-way and served notice that the present
Soviet power position will be defended.
The main overtures were made to countries
bordering on the Orbit for a bilateral improvement of their relations
with the USSR. The statements on Italy and Japan were tailored to
exploit local dissatisfaction with American-sponsored export controls
and US military influence. Malenkov underlined Soviet willingness to
expand trade with all countries.
The premier also reaffirmed the value of
negotiations with the Western powers, but made no specific proposal
for talks and gave no hint that there would be concessions. He ad-
vanced a particular bid to France to solve its problems concerning
Germany and the European Defense Community by bilateral arrange-
ment with the USSR.
Malenkov's treatment of the recent "Berlin
provocation" may have been intended to serve notice that the USSR
will defend the East German government and implied a warning
against interference in the Orbit.
The timing of Malenkov's claim concerning
the hydrogen bomb probably reflected a desire to assert to the world
and the Soviet people that neither internal stresses, such as Beria's
purge and the current unrest in the Satellites, nor the present em-
phasis on conciliation were indications bf a Wakness -of the- new- Soviet
regime.
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2. Coordinated statement by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee on Malenkov's claim that the USSR possesses a hydrogen
weapon:
Up to 1530 EDT, 8 August 1953, no Soviet
explosion of a full Scale or intermediate thermonuclear device has
been detectecL We do not consider that a militarily significant
weapon exists until such a test has been conducted.
A capacity exists in the USSR for the
limited production of the critical materials required for a thermo-
nuclear weapon. The fundamental thinking regarding the thermo-
nuclear reaction is known to the Soviets and they have the technical
competence to have carried on advanced research. A field test of
a device involving a thermonuclear reaction is within their capability
at any time.
However, we have no evidence of a high
priority effort in the thermonuclear field. The Malenkov statement
may be pure propaganda, or it may be inspired by the attainment of
a specific stage of development short of an actual test.
FAR EAST
3, Japanese Communist front activity may presage Soviet overture on
prisoner of war Issue:
Japanese Communist front organizations
r ecently have begun whipping up the issue
of returning Soviet-held Japanese war
priE-
oners in a manner which the American
embassy feels may foreshadow a Soviet move on this question. The
embassy believes recent Communist gestures are designed to test
Japanese policy and American reactions to possible closer Japanese-
Soviet relations.
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Japanese officials thus far seem cautious,
but the embassy doubts that Japan would insist on a formal treaty as
a condition for specific trade or prisoner of war negotiations.
Responsible Japanese officials apparently
believe that a formal Soviet request for negotiations may soon be
forthcoming.
4. Comment on the North Korean purge:
The identities of the twelve North Korean
leaders convicted for treason on 7 August indicate that the North
Korean purges are aimed primarily at an important part of the
domestic faction of North Korean Communist leadership. This
group, the South Korean Labor Party, has in the past been chiefly
responsible for guerrilla activities against the Rhee government
The convictions may represent a shake-up
of the agencies responsible for penetrating South Korea in view of
their previous lack of success, and may presage increased political
warfare and guerrilla activities against South Korea.
The convictions, however, actually weaken
the North Korean position since the leaders affected are those on
whom Pyongyang would have to depend primarily for communizing
South Korea. Therefore the convictions.may also mean that the
North Koreans have abandoned hope that they can secure control
over the entire peninsula in the foreseeable future, by elections
or other means.
It is also possible that the domestic faction
held nationalist views on unification unacceptable to over-all Com-
munist objectives or was believed to have been penetrated.
There is no information connecting the
convictions with the Beria purge or with possible differences be-
tween the Soviet and Chinese-oriented factions of North Korean
leaders.
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5.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
WESTERN EUROPE
6. USSR proposes bilateral talks with France on German problem:
According to the secretary general of the
French Foreign Ministry, the new Soviet
ambassador in Paris on 31 July and 1 August
suggested to French ambassador joxe, then
in Paris, that bilateral French-Soviet talks were the best means of
settling the German problem. joxe immediately rebuffed the sug-
gestion.
In the course of the conversation Soviet
ambassador Vinogradov asserted that both France and the USSR
had reason to fear German rearmament and questioned whether
EDC was really in France's interest. He also stated that current
Soviet policy is based on the possibility of "durable coexistence"
of the Communist and capitalist worlds as well as on the principle
that revolution is not an exportable commodity.
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Comment: This is the clearest indication
to date that the USSR regards approaches to France, particularly for
preventing Germany's integration into Western Europe, as the best
means of weakening the Atlantic alliance. Last October important
elements in the French Foreign Ministry gave serious consideration
to Vyshinsky's similar approach to Ambassador Joxe. Now, however,
the relaxation of tension in East-West relations affords the government
various opportunities for meeting public demand for a detente.
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