CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/11/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003749
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 28, 1953

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SEC INFORMATION
CO3003749
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28 November 1953 3.5(c)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 6.r
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
L] DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. P 09
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:2_04/29_ REVIEVVER
Office of Current Intelligence
3.5(c)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECURI FORMATION
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Comment on Soviet note of 26 November (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. French now expect main Viet Minh effort against northwest
Tonkin (page 3).
3. Bao Dai insists on revision of French Union (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Chinese troop movements reportedly under way in Tibet (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. British views on role of Iranian armed forces (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Yugoslavia offers Greece full use of Vardar Valley in war (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Assembly vote leaves French government without clear mandate
(page 7).
8. Bidault surprisingly optimistic on Saar settlement (page 8).
9.
LATIN AMERICA
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SE ITY INFORMATION
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SOVIET UNION
1. Comment on Soviet note of 26 November:
The Soviet proposal for a four-power
conference is a modification of Moscow's previous position that a
five-power conference on the reduction of international tensions
must precede any four-power discussions. There is no suggestion,
however, that the USSR has changed its basic position on the German
and Austrian treaties, and it is probably not prepared to discuss the
substance of these questions now.
The Soviet leaders were evidently moti-
vated by the unfavorable reaction in Western countries to the negative
Soviet stand of 3 November, and their note was also timed to affect
the French parliamentary vote on foreign policy and the forthcoming
Bermuda meeting.
The Kremlin apparently believes that the
proposed four-power conference should determine the agenda and
composition of a subsequent foreign ministers' meeting. It serves
notice that it will propose that this subsequent meeting include Com-
munist China. The Soviet leaders will attempt to use a foreign min-
isters' debate on the agenda to repeat the arguments of recent notes
and to propagandize on such subjects as EDC, military bases, and
disarmament.
The note alleges that the Kremlin is pre-
pared to cooperate in "assuring European security by means of ap-
propriate agreement between all countries of Europe independent of
their social structure." This is inconsistent with Soviet propaganda
ridiculing any form of East-West security agreement, and it is un-
likely that the USSR would actually agree to any of the security
arrangements that have been suggested in the West.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. French now expect main Viet Minh effort against northwest Tonkin:
e main Viet Minh effort
will be against Lai Chau, 200 miles northwest
of Hanoi, rather than the delta (see map, p. 4).
The French expect a secondary effort into Laos
opposite Vinh, designed to cut their communications between upper and
lower Laos.
3
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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The Lai Chau operation will be undertaken
by the bulk of three divisions, the 316th, 308th and 304th, plus the
148th Regiment and regional forces. Advance units of this force are
expected to assemble at Tuan Giao on 10 December. The thrust into
Laos will be made by the 325th Division and one regiment of the 304th
The American army attache comments that
such a plan would be realistic from the Viet Minh viewpoint since its
success would severely damage French prestige among the Thai minority,
whose capital is Lai Chau, and deny the French an important base for the
guerrilla operations which are now gaining momentum. He points out,
however, that the recent seizure by the French of Dien Bien Phu, some
50 miles south of Lai Chau, should disrupt the Viet Minh timetable.
3. Bao Dai insists on revision of French Union:
Bao Dai told Ambassador Heath on 24 No- 3.3(h)(2)
vember that he was content to await some
sign that the French intend to liberalize the
French Union structure, or at least to make
some gesture in that direction, before resuming negotiations with them.
He insisted that the Vietnamese people are unwilling to be members of
any French Union which implies inequality or French overlordship.
Bao Dai was convinced that any succeeding
French government would be no more difficult to deal with than the
present one, and was "not much worried" by French statements about
negotiating with the Viet Minh.
Comment: Bao Dai's policy of "patience"
is gradually meeting with success, from the Vietnamese standpoint,
and it is unlikely that he can be persuaded to abandon it.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Chthese troop movements reportedly under way in Tibet:
major
Chinese troop movements have been taking
place in Tibet since the last week of October.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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Over half of the Chinese garrison in Lhasa, as well as some other
troops, have been shifted toward the Indian frontier opposite Assam.
Troops from posts on the eastern Nepalese border have been trans-
ferred to positions near Rudok in northwestern Tibet near Kashmir.
Comment: The troops reportedly involved
in these movements are to5-17vrt�o be employed for an invasion of either
Assam or Kashmir, and in any case there is no evidence of Chinese Com-
munist preparations for a new military venture at this time.
There have been indications since last spring
that southern Tibet would suffer a severe food shortage this winter. It
is possible that Chinese troops in the area are being moved east toward
Sikang and northwest toward Sinkiang to alleviate the food supply problem.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. British views on role of Iranian armed forces:
The British Foreign Office believes that the
Iranian army should be organized to fulfill
two primary functions. One compact group
would be trained and equipped for mountain
and guerrilla warfare and stationed in northwest Iran near the Soviet
frontier. A second force stationed elsewhere in Iran would be used
chiefly for internal security.
Comment: The shah has urged an early
decision by the United States and Britain on the future role of the
Iranian armed forces.
He has expressed a desire for medium and
heavy equipment which would enable his army to fight a delaying action
against any Soviet invasion.
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EASTERN EUROPE
6. Yugoslavia offers Greece full use of Vardar Valley in war:
Greek officials are elated over Yugoslavia's
proposal to give Greece details of all its
fortifications and demolition plans for south-
west Yugoslavia and to allow the Greek army
freedom in that area in the event of Soviet aggression. Yugoslavia made
its proposal following the submission of a relatively modest Greek plan
calling for permission for a single Greek division to operate in the highly
strategic Vardar River Gap area.
Comment: The breadth of this proposal is
striking evidence of Belgrade's interest in strengthening the Balkan pact
as an effective organ for the defense of the area. Belgrade's cooperative
attitude may also have been intended to influence decisions on Trieste by
demonstrating to the Western powers the potential value of Yugoslavia to
Mediterranean defense planning.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Assembly vote leaves French government without clear mandate:
The French National Assembly's 275-241 vote
in favor of Premier Laniel's foreign policy resolution gave him only a
technical victory, since he had threatened earlier to resign unless he
got a clear majority of the 627 deputies. His decision to remain in of-
fice probably was influenced by his candidacy in the presidential elec-
tion scheduled for 17 December as well as by his desire to avoid pre-
cipitating a government crisis on the eve of the Bermuda conference.
On 26 November, a Foreign Ministry spokes-
man had told American minister Achilles that if the government fell,
there would probably not be a serious effort to form a new cabinet before
the presidential election, and that even if the assembly were dissolved,
its successor would differ little from the present one. The official
added that the prospect of Bermuda had become a nightmare for the
French, who at best would be there in an impotent and humiliating
position.
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In putting the resolution, the government
blundered by permitting extraneous political considerations to split
the pro-EDC forces which had enough votes to carry a satisfactory
resolution. While this vote does not kill the EDC's chances in France,
it encourages opposition forces to press their advantage when the issue
is finally decided next year. The Soviet attitude may then be the deter-
mining factor.
8. Bidault surprisingly optimistic on Saar settlement:
9.
Foreign Minister Bidault told the American
embassy in Paris that as a result of the
final talk between Chancellor Adenauer and
High Commissioner Francois-Poncet, he is
optimistic of a settlement of the Saar question. He hopes to reach a
broad agreement at The Hague, with the details to be worked out by
experts.
Bidault said that agreement on important
political items was reached during the preliminary talks, and that the
French realize they must give Adenauer "something politically acceptable"
to overcome the major remaining economic obstacle. He believes this
could be done on the basis of specific commodity quotas for Saar-German
trade.
Comment: This is the most optimistic
evaluation yet made of the progress achieved during the preliminary
talks. It may be overly so, in view of the long history of difficulties
in the past.
LATIN AMERICA
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