CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02929530
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 18, 1953

VA7 /j-Vr"" fitr.etl)eag'e: "AT
Z/Z1'Z SECURI INFORMATION
c02150)7 "77/ /
ft%
18 June 1953,
Copy No. 81
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHAN'SEL) TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DA-i E:
AUTH:
DATE1221W-173.BEVIaWt:-.Fi:
3.5(c)
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1/3717/1/".4
TOPS RET
SECU INFORMATION
3.5(c)
/0,
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
rApproved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
I
'Nforl SE ITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
SUMMARY
GENERAL
3.3(h)(2)
2. French COCOM delegate states France will refuse Soviet request
for embargoed ships (page 3).
3. Rumors of Soviet-Austrian bilateral talks discounted (page 4).
SOVIET UNION
4. Comment on Ehrenberg's speech to World Peace Council (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5.
WESTERN EUROPE
..Comment on East Berlin rioting (page 5).
US officials in Bonn comment on recent Soviet tactics in Germany
(page 6).
8. Bidault reaffirms support for current French policies on Indochina
and EDC (page 6).
* * * *
To5i 1>9.BeRET
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
,-Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
J 1\1:,1
+4..1
CURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
GENERAL
2. French COCOM delegate states France will refuse Soviet request
for embargoed ships:
France will refuse to deliver any tankers
or cargo ships of 8,000 to 10,000 tons to
the Soviet Union, according to the French
delegate to COCOM He also told Ambas-
sa or Dillon t a u imate action on the Soviet request for 5,000-ton
cargo ships would be in accordance with COCOM advice.
- 3 -
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
1 Ur ixi, i.
URITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
3. Rumors of Soviet-Austrian bilateral talks discounted:
Ambassador Bohlen comments that Deputy
Foreign Minister Gromyko in a conversation
with the Austrian charge in Moscow, as re-
ported by the latter, made no mention of
bilateral Soviet-Austrian talks, as had been rumored.
The charge interpreted Gromyko's reference
to the desirability of Austria's being a link between East and West as
an oblique reference to the concept of a neutralized Austria.
Comment Recent Soviet propaganda has
suggested the need for the Austrian government to follow a policy of
neutrality.
SOVIET UNION
4. Comment on Ehrenberg% speech to World Peace Council:
Speaking to the World Peace Council
meeting in Budapest, Soviet delegate and well-known Communist
propagandist Ilya Ehrenberg appeared to be outlining a Soviet plan
for a period of negotiations and relaxed tensions between East and
West. Treating the Korean truce as almost a faWaccompli, Ehrenberg
called for negotiations in Korea to be followed by "other negotiations."
Ehrenberg's thesis that the security of indi-
vidual nations could best be maintained by bilateral nonaggression
pacts which were "not contrary to the spirit of the UN" seemed de-
signed to strengthen Moscow's present diplomatic gestures to indi-
vidual countries outside the Orbit.
- 4 -
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
rApproved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
1A-1-;� I I
41.01
CURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
5,
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
WESTERN EUROPE
3.
6. Comment on East Berlin rioting:
The unprecedented uprising of some 100,000
East Berliners on 16 and 17 June, requiring intervention by Soviet
troops, reveals the artificial character of the regime at the very time
it is endeavoring to prove its right to speak for all "democratic" Germans.
Although East German officials appeared stunned
at the extremes to which the demonstration went and quickly promised
concessions to popular demands, the regime appears to be in no immediate
danger. What apparently began as a controlled demonstration designed to
- 5 -
TOP ET
3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
,Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
i Lir (
RITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
permit the government to announce a reduction in work norms without
losing face flared up into a near revolt in which the demonstrators
clamored for abolition of the regime itself and called for free all-
German elections.
The rioting will probably cause West Germans
to demand greater efforts at unification by the Bonn government. The
West German insistence on free elections as a prerequisite will be but-
tressed by the similar demands of the demonstrators.
The East Berlin rioting will probably cause
the Kremlin to review the future course of the "softer" foreign policy
which began after the death of Stalin.
7. US officials in Bonn comment on recent Soviet tactics in Germany:
American officials in Bonn do not believe that 3 3,
. 01)(2)
the Western defense build-up is menacing enougn
yet to have forced the Kremlin to sacrifice its
position in East Germany in exchange for unifi-
cation of the country. They point to the serious implications such a
sacrifice would have on the Satellites. Nevertheless, these officials
are concerned over the effects of the unity campaign on Western opinion.
The two immediate Soviet objectives are ap-
parently to diminish public confidence in Adenauer's policy and to prepare
the ground for unification talks, possibly on the high commissioner level.
Additional minor concessions in Germany are also expected.
8. Bidault reaffirms support for current French policies on Indochina and
EDC
French foreign minister Bidault told Ambassador3.3(h)(2)
Dillon on 15 June that he would not support any
government failing to pledge continuance of cur-
rent French policy in Indochina and support of
NATO objectives, including the European Defense Community. He had
vigorously opposed Mendes-France's plan to tell the United States at
Bermuda, "we can no longer carry the burden in Indochina; what do you
want to do about it?"
6
TOP ET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
rApproved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530
o .LA.L, 1
URITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
Comment: The importance the French
attach to the prospective Bermuda conference will probably result
in Bidault's return as foreign minister in the next French govern-
ment. His record suggests, however, that he might later bend his
f �reign policy views with prevailing political winds, particularly
under a left-center regime based on Mendes-France's policies.
- 7 -
T,0)� C (T
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2929530