CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/07/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872245
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 24, 1953

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24 Iuly 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SEC i INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
Comment on Pravda's rejection of Western terms for conference
(page 3).
SOVIET UNION �
2. Comment on Soviet prospects of fulfilling current Five-Year Plan
(page 3).
3. MIG-17's replacing MIG-15's in Soviet Far East (page 4).
FAR EAST
4. Heavy Chinese Communist concentration indicated in central
Korea (page 4).
5.
6. Chinese Nationalist raid on Tungshan reportedly unsuccessful
(page 6).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
7. Reynaud's views on Indochina crisis (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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8. Iranian referendum reportedly to be held within two weeks (page '7).
9. Turkey plans firm reply to Soviet protest over visits of Western
warships (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
10. Bulgarian premier reportedly to purge Interior Ministry (page 8).
11. Polish premier promises concessions to individual peasants (page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
12. Costa Rican 26 Ally election may end in revolt (page 9).
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Pravda's rejection of Western terms for conference:
A 22 July Pravda editorial, highly criti-
cal of the tripartite Washington Conference decisions, foreshadows
a Soviet refusal to attend a four-power meeting on Western terms.
It implies that the Soviet Union prefers a loosely organized four-
power conference which it could use as a propaganda forum.
The specific Pravda comments on Germany
followed the standard propaganda line, reflecting Moscow's conscious-
ness of the weakness of its present position in Germany and suggesting
that the USSR is not yet prepared to meet Western demands for free
elections. The USSR will probably maintain its position favoring talks
on the entire question of a German peace treaty rather than on free
elections,
The virtual omission of Austria from the
editorial reflects both the Soviet Union's belief that this issue is
completely subsidiary to the German question and the limitations
on its bargaining position on that issue.
The familiar Soviet effort to foster dissension
in the West was visible in the allegation that under US pressure the
United Kingdom and France retreated from the type of conference sug-
gested by "the proposal previously made by Churchill and supported by
public opinion." Similarly, Pravda charged that Britain and France were
compelled to abandon their reservations concerning US policy toward
Rhee and had sacrificed their "vital interests," which require normal
relations with Communist China.
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Soviet prospects of fulfilling current Five-Year Plan:
Analysis of official Soviet plan fulfillment
figures for the first two and a half years indicates that unless the
rise in labor productivity and investment can be stimulated, the USSR
will probably not meet the 1955 goal of its fifth Five-Year Plan. Thus
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the new regime is faced with industrial production problems at a time
when other serious political and economic problems demand solution.
The reported gains in the first half of this
year of five percent in labor productivity and four percent in capital
investment are considerably below those required for fulfillment of
the Five-Year Plan. Therefore, the growth of industrial output,
though still high, will fall short of the 1955 goal of a 70 percent in-
crease over 1950 unless capital investment is sharply expanded.
Such an investment increase would necessarily take place at the
expense of planned defense expenditures, since the new Soviet govern-
ment has already allocated additional resources to consumer goods
output. �
3. M1G-17's replacing MIG-15's in Soviet Far East:
3
the initial appearance of the newer jet fighters at at least
three fields during this period, probably indicates' a large-scale re-
equipment program for regiments in this area.
Comment: Late-model MIG's were noted
for the first time in the Soviet Far East in January 1953, although
they had appeared earlier in the Baltic and Black Sea areas. All
four major air commands in the Soviet Far East appear to be receiv-
ing the newer fighters�
FAR EAST
4. Heavy Chinese Communist concentration indicated in central Korea:
3.
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two recently captured prisoners 3.3(h)(2)
report being told that the 15th Army left the
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Wonsan area in late June and was now located somewhere near
the central front.
Comment:
The movement of the
tztri ana nth Armies to tne central tront places three Chinese
armies close enough to the front to exploit a break-through.
The 54th and 16th Armies were first
reported moving to the central sector about 24 June. Since
mid-June, therefore, two and possibly five Chinese Communist
armies have apparently moved into the central sector between
Chorwon and the Pukhan River, a distance of approximately 40
miles, to augment the four armies already there.
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6. Chinese Nationalist raid on Tungshan reportedly unsuccessful:
The American naval attache at Taipei
has received reports from usually re-
liable sources indicating that Chinese
Nationalist casualties in the 16-17 July
raid on Tungshan Island, just off the
sou n u len coas , exceeded 50 percent, and that the raiders
were forced to evacuate within 28 hours rather than after three
days as planned.
Nationalist reconnaissance reportedly
gave the Communist defenders of Tungshan ample warning of
the airdrop. The paratroopers, caught in artillery crossfire
from the moment of landing, were unable to achieve their ob-
jectives. Amphibious forces, landed at other points, also failed
in their major objectives, with the result that the paratroopers
had to fight their way out.
Comment: About 600 paratroopers
and 6,000 ground troops were employed in this raid, the largest
operation undertaken by the Nationalists since 1949. Preliminary
reports had indicated that all planned objectives had been accom-
plished.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
7. Reynaud's views on Indochina crisis:
According to Deputy Premier Reynaud,
the French cabinet considers the recent
Washington talks a failure, since the
United States did not offer the necessary
funds for Indochina and France does not have the means to carry
on. In conversation with Ambassador Dillon and Adlai Stevenson,
he asked whether it would not be easier for the United States to
make funds available directly to Vietnam.
There is little or no chance that General
Navarre will get the 12 additional battalions he has requested, ac-
cording to the deputy premier. Reynaud feels that the only key to
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success in Indochina is the creation of a strong Vietnamese army
with a nationalistic spirit. French troops would then be gradually
withdrawn.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
8. Iranian referendum reportedly to be held within two weeks:
Prime Minister Mossadeq plans to hold
a national referendum by 5 August,
The referendum will reportedly
determine whether the present Majlis will continue to exist and
whether the shah will be permitted to retain any political power.
Mossadeq as "one hundred percent sure" that the referendum will
approve dissolution of the Majlis and removal of all political au-
thority from the shah. Within two months after the referendum,
the prime minister allegedly plans to organize his own political
party and call for new elections.
Comment: This is the first clear
statement of the timing and scope of Mossadeq's proposed ref-
erendum and his plans for the future. It was rumored on 20 July
that he would refer to the people only the question of Majlis disso-
lution.
9. Turkey plans firm reply to Soviet protest over visits of Western
warships:
The Turkish government will reply
immediately to the 20 July Soviet pro-
test that the forthcoming Istanbul visits
of American and British warships are
a demonstration of force, according to the American embassy
in Ankara. The Turkish note is expected to be brief, pointing
out that they are courtesy visits and in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Montreux convention.
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Comment: The Soviet protest may
have been intended to contrast Western "warlike actions," as
shown by the movement of naval forces, with the recent os-
tensibly friendly gestures of the Soviet Union. The protest
was transmitted six days after delivery of the short and non-
committal Turkish reply to an earlier Soviet note aimed ap-
parently at encouraging bilateral discussion on the Straits.
EASTERN EUROPE
10. Bulgarian premier reportedly to purge Interior Ministry:
US Emb London -333
22 July 53
CONFIDENTIAL
The British minister in Sofia informed
his Foreign Office on 15 July that Premier
Chervenkov reportedly had returned from
Moscow with instructions which included
the dismissal of all three assistant ministers of the interior.
Comment: If a purge of the Bulgarian
Ministry of Interior is imminent, it would be the first instance
of a Moscow-directed purge of a Satellite security organ since
Beria's downfall. No firm information is available on the assist-
ant ministers of the interior, their relationships to the leading
Bulgarian Communists, or their connection with the Soviet secu-
rity services.
Chervenkov, Czech president Zapotocky,
and Bulgarian premier Gheorghiu-Dej were all rumored to have
gone to Moscow early in July.
11. Polish premier promises concessions to individual peasants:
In a major policy speech on 22 July,
Polish National Liberation Day, Premier
Bierut stated that the government would
provide more assistance, equipment and
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supplies to individual peasant farmers. He stated that legislation
is in progress to provide aid to peasants stricken by "natural
calamities" or in financial difficulties.
Comment: Such concessions would
constitute an abrupt change from the heavy emphasis during the
past year on collectivization � They will be the first major step
taken by the Polish government in line with the recent adoption
of more moderate internal policies in the Orbit.
LATIN AMERICA
12. Costa Rican 26 July election may end in revolt:
resort to violence,
Should the conservative candidate,
Fernando Castro, appear to be winning
the 26 July presidential election in Costa
Rica, the opposing Figueres forces may
President Ulate reportedly now fears
that most of the Civil Guard, Costa Rica's only armed force,
would support a Figueres revolt.
Comment: In view of the present public
apathy tqward the election, a light vote, which would favor the well-
organized, radical Figueres forces, appears likely.
Ulate has previously been reported confi-
dent that there would be no major revolt and that he has taken suf-
ficient special precautions to control the expected minor flare-ups.
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