CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/12/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03169429
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: December 1, 1953

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1 December 1953
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 67
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
D DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 20 -
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 4/1.9 REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
SOVIET UNION
New tvne of Soviet let observed (naae 31.
Ambassador Bohlen comments on Soviet note (page 4).
FAR EAST
Rhee repudiates agreement on observers at political conference
(page 5).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Comment on victory of pro-Egyptian party in Sudanese elections
(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. French reaction to Ho Cht Minh's statement on negotiations
(page 7).
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1.
GENERAL
SOVIET UNION
2. New type of Soviet jet observed
recently obser3.3(h)(2)
two jet aircraft of a new type at Kazan airfield
about 450 miles east of Moscow. These air-
craft were apparently twin-jet light bombers
with an over-all length of approximately 65
feet, and had swept-back wings and tail sectton.
Comment�, The Soviet Union has been ex-
pected to develop an aircraft to replace the IL-28 and TU-14 jet light
bombers. The swept wings indicate that the new plane has higher pre-
fOrmance capabilities than the older types and is therefore less vulnerable
to interception.
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4. Ambassador Bohlen comments on Soviet note
Ambassador Bohlen believes that the
Soviet note of 26 November represents
an important shift in the tactical handling
of the German question and the general
subject of negotiations with the West. There is no reason to believe,
however, that the basic Soviet policy of supporting the East German
regime has changed. World reaction to the note of 3 November has
apparently convinced the USSR that its refusal to confer was more
disadvantageous to its position than the risks of a discussion on
Germany.
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Bohlen believes that the stated intention to
call for a five-power conference is a sop to the Chinese, who must
have been displeased by the four-power meeting proposal.
Comment: The note represents a tactical
shift on Germany but no retreat from the familiar Soviet demand for
Chinese participation in a conference. Verbose arguments to support
this demand and the insistence on discussing bases and disarmament
would probably be used to forestall substantive discussion of the German
issue in a four-power meeting.
FAR EAST
5. Rhee repudiates agreement on observers at political conference:
6.
According to Ambassador Briggs, President
Rhee now says that at the 26 November cabinet
meeting he did not authorize inviting nonvoting
observers to the Korean political conference.
Briggs fears that the South Korean government may issue a public state-
ment opposing such participation very soon.
Comment: Ambassador Dean had reported
complete oral agreement in the 26 November meeting by both Rhee and
the cabinet on inviting observer nations and on authorizing him to make
the proposal to the Communists. He notes that Foreign Minister Pyun
gave a statement to that effect to the press on 27 November.
It appears that Rhee has again resorted to his
familiar tactics of backtracking on agreements already made.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. Comment on victory of pro-Egyptian party in Sudanese elections:
The National Unionist Party's decisive
victory in the Sudanese elections is a serious setback to the inde-
pendence movement in the Sudan and a triumph for the supporters
of union with Egypt. The victory is also a direct reflection of the
strength of the anti-British sentiment.
While Britain will continue to furnish
much of the apparatus for governing the country during the three-
year L'ansition period to independence, the elections make it clear
that it will experience increasing obstructionism from the pro-
Egyptian faction.
Cairo may now be expected to expand its
activities in the Sudan aimed at promoting union with Egypt. The
vote, however, may have been more anti-British than pro-Egyptian,
and the National Unionist Party, a newly formed coalition lacking
experienced leadership, may not hold together.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. French reaction to Ho Chi Minh's statement on negotiations:
French government spokesmen and the
French press have been very circumspect in their reaction to the
ostensible peace feeler from Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh. Premier
Laniel withheld comment until the cabinet could discuss the subject.
Laniel stated in last week's foreign policy debate, however? that France
was willing to accept any offer from the "adversary" to negotiate, and
assured the National Assembly that he intended at Bermuda to seek
general pacification of Asia through negotiations.
Within the National Assembly there is now
little organized opposition to the basic concept of a negotiated settlement.
Although the French public will recognize as propaganda Ho's alleged
reference to American pressure to ratify EDC, the mere announcement
of the "offer" will hurt ratification prospects. Anti-EDC foyces will
seize on Ho's statement as further evidence that the geneyal relaxation
of East-West tension makes German rearmament unnecessary.
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