CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/11/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003734
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 5, 1953

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Copy No. 84
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 47
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. Eoo_9
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:2342/79 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
r'Soviet note reveals inflexible position on Germany (page 3).
Western officials comment on Soviet note (page 3).
. Soviet IL-28's visit East Germany in apparent air exercise
(page 4).
FAR EAST
4.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
lo Chiang reportedly urged to expand influence in Burma (page 5).
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SOVIET UNION
1. Soviet note reveals inflexible position on Germany:
The Soviet note of 3 November represents
the strongest indication yet that the USSR is unwilling to discuss the
German question while its bargaining position remains weak. The
note makes it clear that a conference on Germany is possible only
in conjunction with a five-power discussion on the reduction of inter-
national tension.
The note goes beyond its predecessors in
clarifying the Soviet standpoint that ratification of EDC "would make
impossible the restoration of Germany as a unified state and thereby
render pointless also the consideration of the German question."
In the first official comment on Western
proposals for a European security pact, the note affirms that only
the Soviet formula for German unity can guarantee security. A pref-
erence for bilateral pacts rather than a broad security arrangement
is evident in the reference to the existing pacts with Britain and
France. To avoid appearing negative, however, the USSR leaves the
door open to further discussion by stating a vague readiness to "take
into account existing new possibilities for ensuring security in Europe."
2. Western officials comment on Soviet note:
In Ambassador Bohlen's opinion the latest
Soviet note indicates that the position of
the East German regime is still too shaky
for the USSR to risk any form of discussion
on Germany.
He feels that the note reflects the stand-pat
position of Soviet foreign policy based on a
determination to maintain control of areas
acquired since the war while seeking to
undermine EDC and achieve its other ob-
jectives through Communist and front
through serious negotiations.
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The Soviet demand for inclusion of
China in a conference has become a definite position from which
Moscow is now unwilling or unable to withdraw. If maintained,
this demand means that no conference of any kind on a major
question is possible in the foreseeable future.
Officials in both London and Paris
agree on the "extreme rigidity" of the Kremlin approach although
the Foreign Office was loath to comment fully in view of Foreign
Secretary Eden's impending parliamentary speech on foreign
affairs. A prominent official of the Qiiai d'Orsey regards the
obvious appeals to France, such as references to Southeast Asia
and the Franco-Soviet pact, as too vague to be of much use to
French advocates of a five-power meeting.
3. Soviet IL-28's visit East Germany in apparent air exercise:
Comment This is the second time
since the withdrawal of IL-28 aircraft from East Germany in late
June that the advanced bases there have been used in redeployment
exercises by jet light bombers stationed within the USSR. The fact
that the IL-28's did not return to the same bases in the USSR sug-
gests a more extensive exercise in tactical mobility.
Annual air maneuvers involving all
major components of the Soviet air force were apparently in
progress during the latter part of October and revealed a higher
level of training than noted in previous years.
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4.
FAR EAST
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5. Chiang reportedly urged to expand influence in Burma:
Chiang Kai-shek has not changed his
policy maintaining a maximum number
of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma,
he Chinese forces
are strong enough to repel any Burmese attack and that, if given
time to extend their control over local forces, they could hold
most of Burma.
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Comment: Taipei has promised to
evacuate a minimum of 2,000 troops and to disavow the remainder.
The Burmese, however, have indicated that they are dissatisfied
with this plan and suspect that the main body of troops is being
deliberately left behind.
The Nationalists for some time have
been expanding their influence in eastern Burma by cultivating
various ethnic minority groups, particularly the Karens. This
development has been the main reason for Burmese threats to
seek Chinese Communist assistance in dealing with the Nationalists.
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