CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/04/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02893560
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: April 28, 1953

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28 April 1953
Copy No. 6 0
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLET
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLAS
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUVH: HR 70-2
0 AT 1),,at EV:EV/ER
" UOI
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
American Embassy in Moscow comments on Pravda editorial
(page 3).
V Molotov is noncommittal in interview with British Ambassador
(page 3).
3. Prisoners presumably released under amnesty being re-employed
locally (page 4).
0,01
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Chinese Communist drive 3.3(h)(2)
Into Southeast Asia (page 4).
5. Thai political refugee reportedly organizing Thai government-in-
exile (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Progress made toward settlement of Anglo-Saudi Arabian dispute
(page 5).
7. Egyptian Communists invite Wafd to join political united front
(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
Bidault believes USSR may permit free all-German elections
(page 7),
r Di153 Cff
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SOVIET UNION
1. American Embassy in Moscow comments on Pravda editorial:
Ambassador Bohlen reports that Pravda's
reply to President Eisenhower's speech and
the publication of the speech itself without
deletions or attempts to "soften the vigor
of the comment on Soviet policies" are unparalleled in Soviet history.
The main purposes of the article, according
to the Ambassador, are to avoid the appearance of rejecting the Presi-
dent's peace overtures and to shift back to the West the blame for world
tensions and the responsibility for initiating further conversations.
He comments that although the reply may have
been timed to coincide with the NATO meeting in Paris, a week could
easily have been devoted to its composition. It bears evidence of group
workmanship, and does not appear to have been prepared primarily for
propaganda purposes.
The American Embassy, in common with mem-
bers of the diplomatic corps consulted, feels that in the public exchange
the United States has come Tit distinctly the winner.
. Molotov is noncommittal in interview with British Ambassador:
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was non-
committal on specific issues in his 24 April
interview with the British Ambassador. The
discussion concerned safe conduct for one
British citizen and the Russian wife of another, denunciation by the
USSR of the Anglo-Soviet fisheries agreement, the pound-ruble rate,
and diplomatic travel restrictions.
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The British Ambassador received the
distinct impression that the new Soviet leadership had not yet
considered questions of this type, and that Molotov was clearly
unwilling to commit himself to anything which might serve as a
precedent for the future.
3. Prisoners presumably released under amnesty being re-employed
locally
4.
a group of people had
been "taken away from the construction" and
had been gathered together at the settlement
where "the order" was read to them. The official also said that "the
contract forms have already been drawn up and today we are beginning
to sign them on one by one."
Comment:
prisoners released under the recent amnesty proclamation will be
required to remain in the area of their former imprisonment and
continue to work at the same jobs.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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the 3.3(h)(2)
Chinese Communist drive into
Southeast Asia:
the invasion of Laos is directed
Peiping, and clearly connected with long- �
formulated Chinese Communist plans for a
drive into Southeast Asia. $with the large amounts of
American equipment now at hand, France and Vietnam have the
materiel to defeat the Communists in Indochina, but
there were no Vietnamese troops to use it.
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� Comment:
tl, Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh
1).�th reeenuy more min do in quantity and Chinese Communists
for a long time have been providing advice on strategy. So far, how-
ever, there is no evidence that the present campaign is a prelude to
a Chinese Communist invasion of Southeast Asia.
5. Thai political refugee reportedly organizing Thai government-in-exile:
Premier Pridi
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Tiang Sirtichan, an influential leftist politician 3.3(h)(2)
who fled from Thailand last December, is in
Rangoon organizing a Thai "government-in-
exile" consisting of supporters of exiled former
in addition to maintaining liaison with leftist
elements in Burma and Thailand, Tiang might be in contact with the new
"Free Laos Government." 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Tiang was arrested in 1948 on
charges of fomenting a separatist movement in northeast Thailand,
but was later released for lack of evidence. At the time of his dis-
appearance, the Thai police announced that Tiang had fled to Burma,
but later intimated that he may have gone to Indochina.
Tiang was a staunch supporter of Pridi, whose
name has frequently been mentioned in connection with Communist plans
to take over Thailand.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
. Progress made toward settlement of Anglo-Saudi Arabian dispute:
Saudi Arabian acceptance of arbitration as a
means of settling its dispute with Britain over
the Buraimi oasis is a step forward, according
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to the US Consul General in Dhahran. The Saudis have not specifically
referred to "arbitration," but clearly accept it in agreeing "to refer
the dispute to a body of competent neutral and unbiased persons."
The Saudi acceptance is embodied in a draft
statement agreed on by King Ibn Saud and the British Ambassador in
Riyadh; it is still to be approved by London.
Comment: Saudi objection to arbitration
and insistence on a plebiscite have been the main obstacles to settling
this dispute involving the Trucial Sheikhdoms on the Persian Gulf. �
The British Foreign Office is cautiously
optimistic, even though not completely satisfied with the statement.
7. Egyptian Communists invite Wafd to join political united front:
Yusuf Hilmi, head of the Communist-front
organization "Partisans of Peace," met on
24 April with Wafd leaders to discuss forma-
tion of a political united front of Wafdists,
ommunis s and others opposed to the Nagib regime,
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Comment: Egyptian Communists, number-
ing but a few thousand, have not exerted much influence in the past.
They participated in anti-British guerrilla activity in 1951-52 in the
Suez Canal Zone when they associated themselves with other extremists,
including some Wafd adherents.
Their current effort will probably not result
in an alliance, but it may bring about public demonstrations; and at this
critical point in the Suez negotiations, Nagib and his associates are
greatly concerned over public opinion and inclined to follow it,
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Bidault believes USSR may permit free all-German elections:
At the 25 April tripartite meeting in Paris,
French Foreign Minister Bidault said he
feared that the Soviet Union may accept the
Allied proposals for free all-German elec-
tions. This, he warned, would make it difficult for the French Govern-
ment to deny public demands for accepting the Soviet position that a
unified Germany be neutralized.
Bidault urged that the West forestall such a
Soviet move by submitting early offers for four-power talks with
disarmament first on the agenda, followed by the Austrian and then
German questions. A cessation of hostilities in the Far East would
be a pre-condition for such talks.
Comment: There has been no hint of a
change in the Soviet position on Germany.
The USSR never replied to the Allied pro-
posal of last September calling for a four-power conference to dis-
cuss the single issue of the formation of an impartial commission to
investigate the feasibility of free all-German elections.
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