CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/09/27

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02869417
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 27, 1953

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INFORMATION
SECU 7
27 September 1953
3.5("y
Copy No, 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO if r7
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T$ S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2003
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 12edr.2_ REVIEWER.
3.5(c)
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Diplomat hints at possible Soviet attitudes (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Taipei remains firm on removal of troops from Burma (page 4).
3. Indonesia reportedly concerned over loyalty of army unit in
North Sumatra (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Israeli defiance of UN authority continues (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Implications of the French UN delegate's 25 September speech
(see appended Intelligence Note).
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GENERAL
I. Diplomat hints at possible Soviet attitudes:
The first secretary of the Soviet embassy
in London told an American official on
25 September that there seemed to be no
obstacle to the meeting proposed by the
Western powers at Lugano, provided there was some modification in
the agenda suggested by the Western powers. However, he said that
the Soviet government would much prefer a conference with a minimum
of participants and no formal agenda, as advocated by Churchill last
May.
The Soviet spokesman further said that he saw
little prospect for a favorable outcome of the Korean political conference
if the "two-sided aspect" is insisted upon and if India is excluded from
participation. He prophesied that failure to reach a settlement would
mean the indefinite division of Korea along the armistice line. He fore-
saw no particular objection to Japan's participation as a counterweight
to India, but emphatically stated that Moscow and Peiping would not
accept the Chinese Nationalist government as a participant.
Comment: This is the first diplomatic hint
of favorable Soviet reaction to the Western invitation for a four-power
meeting in Lugano on 15 October to discuss free elections in Germany
and an Austrian peace treaty. In previous exchanges of notes the USSR
has balked at discussion of German elections as the first order of
business.
The diplomat's remarks on the Korean problem
are consistent with Communist demands for an enlarged, round-table
conference. Like other Communist spokesmen, he avoided threats of
a boycott if these demands are not met.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Taipei remains firm on removal of troops from Burma:
In a memorandum of 26 September approved 3.3(h)(2)
by President Chiang Kai-shek and presented
to the American embassy in Taipei, the
Chinese Nationalist government states that its
previous estimate of the number of Nationalist troops which can be evac-
uated from Burma "represents the maximum effort which the Chinese
government can make."
Comment; The commitment approved by
Taipei was for the evacuation of up to 2, 000 troops. This proposal was
regarded as inadequate by the American negotiators and was not trans-
mitted to Burmese officials.
Ambassador Sebald in Rangoon reported on
26 September that any statement by Taipei offering to evacuate less than
3, 000 would be of little value. Sebald confirmed the statement of Burmese
leaders that their government was under increasing pressure to cease
action against the local Communists and accept their offer to join a coal-
ition government for a united effort against the Chinese Nationalists.
3. Indonesia reportedly concerned over loyalty of army unit in North
Sumatra!
The rebellion in the Atjeh area of North
Sumatra, which broke out on 21 September,
is expanding,
Indonesian
ml t.ary ea.ers are reportedly becoming concerned over the loyalty
of government troops in that area.
Comment: Press reports have referred
to the defection of one Indonesian .rmy company. The Atjehnese
revolt is largely motivated by strong Moslem sentiment and is re-
portedly being aided by the Darul Islam, an insurgent Moslem organi-
zation in lava. The predominantly Moslem Indonesian troops may be
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reluctant to take action against fellow Moslems and there may be
some infiltration of the army units in North Sumatra by the Darul
Islam.
Recent reports have also linked the Darul
Islam with rebellious groups in Borneo and the Celebes.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Israeli defiance of UN authority continues:
Israel is currently resisting the United
Nations on three issues affecting the Arabs: diversion of the upper
Jordan River, occupation of the Egyptian-Israeli demilitarized zone,
and obstruction of a UN investigation of Mt. Scopus in the Jerusalem
area.
This Israeli get-tough policy stems largely
from a pressing need for water and economic development as well
as from disappointment with American policy in the Middle East.
It has inflamed Arab and Israeli public opinion.
Neither the Arabs nor Israelis are likely
to resort to war, but Israeli harassing activities will probably re-
sult in retaliatory Arab raids.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Implications of the French UN delegate's 25 September speech:
(See appended Intelligence Note)
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OCI No. 8461
Copy No.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
26 September 1953
Implications of the French UN Delegate's
25 September Speech
The French Foreign Ministry announcement that Maurice
Schumann's 25 September speech to the UN General Assembly
represents no departure in French policy is borne out by
fuller excerpts from the speech itself. In context, the
items played up by the press are not startling in the
light of earlier French requests for discussion of the
Indochina question at the Korean political conference; and
there is no intimation that France is not going to imple-
ment the Navarre plan in Indochina.
Schumann's remark probably should be considered more
in relation to the internal French political scene than to
international problems. If Laniel and Bidault are sincere
in their protestations to American officials that ratifi-
cation of the EDC treaty is to be pushed this year, Schu-
mann's speech could be an attempt to gain the broadest
possible public and parliamentary support in France. The
hint of additional guarantees against German militarism
and the appeal for an over-all settlement with the USSR,
coupled with a strong defense of European integration
tend to bear out this interpretation, though possibly
pointing to further delay in the government's efforts to
obtain EDC ratification. Frenchmen can be expected
to respond to an appeal to end the Indochina war, con-
trol German resurgence, relax the cold war, and above all,
to applaud any move reasserting French claims to leader-
ship on the continent. The timing could be an effort to
counterbalance parliamentary preoccupation with the eco-
nomic issues facing the National Asembly when it re-
convenes on 6 October.
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On the international level, France may be trying to
reestablish confidence in its leadership in Europe by the
suggestion that it is considering its own version of the
Churchill and Adenauer proposals for a Locarno type solu-
tion to the German problem. In view of Chancellor Ade-
nauer's electoral victory and Germany's growing promi-
nence on the continent, the French may feel impelled to
take the diplomatic initiative. A bold diplomatic step
could also serve as a basis for bargaining with France's
allies.
Schumann's speech could serve a double purpose in
regard to the Orbit. It challenges Moscow to demon-
strate Soviet sincerity on European negotiations and
makes a similar challenge to both Moscow and Peiping
on Far Eastern questions. The speech could also be a
move to capitalize diplomatically on the Navarre plan
now rather than run the risk of having to negotiate
from a greatly weakened position if the plan fails. In
particular, France may be hoping that the Communists
see a parallel to the Korean situation in the present
status of American aid to Indochina.
In Indochina, however, any hint that the French
might negotiate a settlement of the Indochina war
tends to raise the fear among supporters of the Bao
Dai government that they will be sold out and in-
creases the difficulty that government faces in at-
tracting popular support. Schumann's specific refer-
ence to the governments of the Associated States, their
link with France and recognition by other powers will
nevertheless serve to minimize these adverse reactions.
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