CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/26

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02872222
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
July 22, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 26, 1953
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15671699].pdf236.93 KB
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I ,79/2, Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222, ET TOP S SECUR INFORMATION 26 June 1953 Copy No. 67 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 5 DO0'..i:7;�.;0. IN CLASS, TO: TS AuTH: 1ff' 70 LATEV" _ _REVIEWER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOPS" RET SECU INFORMATION 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 1 VI- ki _EVE. 1 IOW SEtXYRITY INFORMATION NEW 3.5(c) SUMMARY FAR EAST I. Polish and Czech governments' attitude on Korean truce unchanged tna an RI 2. 3. South Korean assembly questions Rhee's prisoner release (page 4). 4. Chinese Communists augment front-line troops in Korea (page 4). SOUTHEAST ASIA NO( Significant increase in Chinese aid to Viet IVIinh reported (page 5). 6, Planned Indonesian cabinet would depend on Communist support (page 5). EASTERN EUROPE /Comment on Hungary's modification of crop collection decrees (page 6). WESTERN EUROPE 8. Adenauer opposes joint Allied consultations with Semenov (page 6). 2 TOP ET 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 vet, 1 Li1 3J iIVL 1 SEQ6RITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) FAR EAST 1. Polish and Czech governments' attitude on Korean truce unchanged: 2. he Polish government informed the Swedish mbassador in Warsaw on 22 Rine that, while resident Rhee's release of North Korean risoners violated the repatriation agreement, Warsaw nevertheless hoped that the governments on the neutral nations repatriation commission would "not spare their efforts" for successful conclusion of their task in Korea. The Czech government told the Swedish charge in Prague that the prisoner incident had not changed its attitude concerning the armistice. Comment: This information strengthens the belief that the Communists desire a truce in Korea. 3.3(h)(2) the US army attache in Warsaw that the Polish truce team was already in Korea. 3.3(h)(2) -3 TOP S ET 3.3(h )(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 _ 1'.J[ 3.5(c) �use R1TY INFORMATION 3. South Korean assembly Luestions Rhee's prisoner release: American officials in Pusan report that the South Korean National Assembly has asked leading cabinet officials to appear on 27 June to explain why the recent prisoner of war release was effected without consultation with the UN Command. While the assembly debate was described as "cautiously noncommittal," Assemblywoman Pak Sun- chon told the press that it was "national suicide" to thwart a cease-fire and "foolish" to attempt to stop it. Comment: Legally, no action can be taken against a legislator while the assembly is in session. Opposition party leader Chough Pyong-ok, who is not a member of the assembly and who voiced similar criticisms, was severely beaten by Rhee followers and is now reportedly under arrest. Ambassador Briggs has previously reported that opposition leaders, who are opposed to Rhee's extreme antiarmi- stice stand, now may have concluded that the time is ripe to speak out for moderation. 4. Chinese Communists augment front-line troops in Korea: 3.3(h)(2) The Chinese Communists have, at least 3.3(h)(2) temporarily, augmented their front-line strength in Korea by approximately 115,000 troops, 3.3(h)(2) The 21st Army may be in immediate reserve on the west central front and the 16th and 54th Armies are moving to the central and east central fronts. It cannot now be de- termined whether these movements represent a reinforcement in the area for offensive purposes or a routine relief of front-line units. rnrnmcent � there is no evidence of planning for iarge-scale offensive action. vrisoners captured during the past week have indicated that only limited objective attacks had been planned by their units, 3.3(h)(2) 4 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 1 Nee SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) SOUTHEAST ASIA 5. Significant increase in Chinese aid to Viet Minh reported: 'Communist Lima has significantly ncreased its shipments of military aid to the Viet Minh. During the first ten days of June, 1,720 tons of supplies were delivered, includ- ing large quantities of gasoline, machine guns, rifles, trucks, and several Russian 37mm antiaircraft guns. 3.3(h)(2) Monthly deliveries, which averaged 200 tons last winter, had quadrupled by May From 3.3(h)(2) 700 to 800 trucks are being utilized in the current supply effort, as compared with approximately 300 last winter. Comment: Chinese deliveries to the Viet Minh have averaged 400 to 500 tons per month over a period of a year, with monthly totals subject to considerable fluctuations. It appears that China has initiated another summer program to resupply Viet Minh forces for next fall. In view of reliable reports that both Chinese and Viet Minh transport capabilities have recently undergone considerable improvement, however, the recent increase may forecast a sustained higher level of aid. 6. Planned Indonesian cabinet would depend on Communist support: The latest Indonesian cabinet organizer, Mukarto of the National Party, is apparently planning a cabinet which would depend on the support of the Communist bloc and small center parties, but would d exclude the anti-Communist Masjumi and Socialist parties. In order to keep center party support, however, he would include Communist Party members in the cabinet. Thus, the Communists would hold a whip hand over the cabinet in parliament without having to assume any responsibility. - 5 - TOP SECRET 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 Nom" SE CITY INFORMATION The embassy believes that Mukarto may be successful and comments that although a cabinet which excluded the Masjumi might be short-lived, it undoubtedly would accelerate Indo- nesia's leftward drift. Comment: The former cabinet, based on a Masjumi-National Party coalition, fell when the Masjumi, Indonesia's largest party, withdrew its ministers in protest against the National Party's increasing cooperation with the Communists. Although President Sukarno reportedly is perturbed over the Communists' emergence in the present crisis, there is no evidence that he is interfering with Mukarto's plans. EASTERN EUROPE 7. Comment on Hungary's modification of crop collection decrees: The Hungarian government's modification on 24 June of the terms of this year's crop collection decrees, which follows by two days a similar measure in Albania, suggests an easing of internal policies, as has occurred in the USSR and East Germany. This change contrasts markedly with the unpopular crop collection methods of last year. The decree was preceded on 21 Stine by an editorial in the official party newspaper which criticized high govern- ment and party officials and trade union leaders as "opportunistic right- wing deviationists" and charged them with neglecting the welfare of the workers. Also on the 24th the Budapest press gave large play to the East German announcement of 21 June of new concessions to the workers. WESTERN EUROPE 8. Adenauer opposes joint Allied consultations with Semenov Chancellor Adenauer has urged that the Allied high commissioners refrain from any joint meetings with the new Soviet commissioner - 6 - TOP ET 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 I VI 01: "%ere viler SEC TY INFORMATION 3.5(c) in East Germany. He is convinced that such meetings would be interpreted by Moscow as a confession of weakness. Adenauer also strongly hinted to High Commissioner Conant that his personal appeal on 21 June to the heads of the French, British, and US governments for interven- tion on behalf of the East Germans was an election campaign move which should not be taken to mean that he has relaxed his opposition to a top-level four-power conference at this time. Conant accordingly advised the chancellor that the Allied commissioners were considering meeting their Soviet counterpart separately, but planned to restrict their discus- sions to deploring recent events in East Germany. - 7 - TOP SF2RET 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222 Nam. ....0_�fri B ARTICLES, Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2872222