CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/08/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872262
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 21, 1953

_ Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872262,
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SEC INFORMATION
21 August 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. _
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
610ler SOVIET UNION
. Possible implications of the Soviet atomic tests (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Aircraft probably introduced into North Korea since truce (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
3.3(h)(2)
(page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
Comment on conclusion of Indo-Pakistani prime ministers' talks
on Kashmir (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
IAT(Royalist success in Iran achieved by exploitation of mass uprising
(page 5).
ifVeComment on the removal of the sultan of Morocco (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Hungary takes initiative to re-establish full diplomatic relations
with Yugoslavia (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Vienna prepares bid for participation in Austrian treaty negotiations
(page 8).
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SOVIET UNION
1. Possible implications of the Soviet atomic tests:
12 August,
enhances the USSR's war potential cannot be determined at this
time.
The degree to which the Soviet test of
The wording of the Kremlin's communique
of 20 August suggests a continuation of Moscow's present moderate
foreign policy. The statement that "there exist no reasons for
alarm" implies that the Kremlin is not considering a sabre-rattling
campaign. Instead, the Soviet leaders are likely to continue their
arguments that other nations should meet the USSR halfway in its
efforts to settle outstanding disputes. The Soviet Union will also
utilize its newly demonstrated capabilities to dispel any impression,
at home or abroad, that peace overtures reflect Soviet weakness.
The Kremlin is likely to make new propa-
ganda proposals at the UN on disarmament and may hope that its
progress in thermonuclear development will enhance its efforts to
draw the support of other countries away from the US on this and
other international questions.
FAR EAST
2. Aircraft probably introduced into North Korea since truce:
Aircraft, possibly North Korean, may
have been operating on 15 August from
the Namsi airfield approximately 15
miles north of Chongju on the west coast,
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Comment:
Re-
cent returning American war prisoners reported that on 15 August
they saw twin-engine jet bombers and jet fighters in an air show over
the North Korean capital.
The armistice agreement
signed on 27 July prohibits the reinforcement of combat aircraft in
Korea by either side except for the replacement of damaged or worn-
out aircraft.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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SOUTH ASIA
4. Comment on conclusion of Indo-Pakistani prime ministers' talks
on Kashmir:
Despite optimistic press reports suggest-
ing that a solution of the Kashmir question is imminent, prime
ministers Nehru of India and Mohammad Ali of Pakistan have
apparently failed to reach agreement on the major points of dif-
ference between the two countries.
None of the decisions reportedly made
differs materially from those which the two countries accepted
as early as 1948. The minor changes announced on 19 and 20
August were presumably made to permit the Pakistani prime
minister's return to Karachi with a statement that progress had
been achieved. His report will probably temporarily allay much
of the anti-Indian feeling now existing in Pakistan.
There is as yet no sign that a decision
was taken as to the number and nature of troops to remain in
Kashmir during a plebiscite, the most important point on which
the two countries have been deadlocked for five years. Until
this question is settled, other agreements are academic and no
plebiAcite can be held.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Royalist success in Iran achieved by exploitation of mass uprising:
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the 3.3(h)(2)
Iranian royalist movement of 19 August
began as a spontaneous mass demonstra-
tion, and pro-shah military leaders assumed
control only after it gained momentum. Gen-
eral Zahedi reportedly manned a tank as a
rallying gesture to the army and people during
the early stages of the demonstration.
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Ambassador Henderson in a report on 20
August also emphasized the popular character of the uprising by
pointing out that at an early stage the leaders of the mobs were
primarily civilians. He noted further that apparently the Tudeh
and Prime Minister Mossadeq had broken their entente on 18
August because of the Communist demonstration that day. As a
result, security forces adopted a tougher attitude toward the Tudeh,
an attitude which then changed to direct support of pro-shah elements.
Comment This information confirms the
Impression left by press reports that the successful countermove
against the Mossadeq faction was unplanned and completely unex-
pected. It assumed the proportions of full-scale action only when
the opportunity presented itself to the opposition leadership, which
then exploited it at the strategic moment
In spite of apparent popular support, Zahedi
will probably be forced to conduct his government as a military dic-
tatorship until his position is firmly consolidated and he can develop
a program which will generate popular support The allegiance of
most of the tribesmen and some of the army units in outlying prov-
inces is not yet clear.
Tudeh demonstrators apparently disappeared
when security forces began determined efforts to suppress their activ-
ities. There is no evidence that the Tudeh has been seriously disorgan-
ized, but it is unlikely that it can launch a successful coup against the
royalists at this time.
6. Comtnent on the removal of the sultan of Morocco
Immediate and extensive security action
is required to prevent widespread violence in Morocco following
the removal of the sultan by the French government on 20 August.
The French security forces are probably adequate to handle the
situation without large French reinforcements. The sultan's re-
placement by a figure more amenable to the French and more
acceptable to El Glaoui will not solve France's problems in the
area.
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In removing the sultan, the French govern-
ment eliminated a ruler who was respected by the majority of his
subjects, Berber as well as Arab. Many will probably now turn to
the Istiqlal, the Moroccan nationalist movement. The nationalists
have been notably moderate but the present development may en-
courage them to resort to sabotage and assassination.
The removal will create strong resentment
in the Arab and Moslem world, with agitation for UN action certain.
The prestige of the United States will
probably suffer throughout North Africa and the Near East because
it will be assumed that the US supports French policy. American
treaty interests in Morocco, including military bases, are now
threatened.
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Hungary takes initiative to re-establish full diplomatic relations
with Yugoslavia:
According to the chief of the political
section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,
Hungary requested agrement on 10 August
for a minister to Belgrade, but Yugoslavia
has not yet replied. He also commented to US legation officials on
the cordial personal contacts established by him with Yugoslav dele-
gates at the recent Danube conference.
Last April the same official denied that
there was any possibility of improved relations with Yugoslavia,
remarking that "one cannot have good relations with bandits."
Comment: This is the first move by a
Satellite to follow the Soviet 1777--lim's lead to re-establish full diplo-
matic relations with Yugoslavia. Belgrade is expected to approve
the Hungarian request and name a Yugoslav minister to Budapest,
in accordance with the policy established in June when it accepted
a Soviet ambassador.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Vienna prepares bid for participation in Austrian treaty negotiations:
The Main Committee of the Austrian lower 3.3(h)(2)
house on 19 August passed a resolution
calling on the government to request direct
participation in future negotiations on the
Austrian state treaty.
� Foreign Minister Gruber has advised
Ambassador Thompson that, since parliament will not convene
until October, the government does not intend to act on the reso-
lution until after the Soviet Union has replied to the Western and
Austrian notes of 17 and 19 August.
Comment: The resolution of this committee,
which acts for the parliament when the latter is not in session, appears
to represent the current position of the Austrian government though it
contrasts with Chancellor Raab's recent assurances that the question
of Austrian participation would not be pursued. Austrian representation
at the conference table would probably facilitate Soviet attempts to block
revision of parts of the old draft treaty.
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