CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/10/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02970161
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 25, 1953

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 38
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
CI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED 'TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: .PaO 9
AUTH. HR 70-2
DATE: r-V/2/7_9 REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP JECRET
SECUIfY INFORMATION
25 October 1953
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W SECURITY INFORATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Macao removes official restriction on trade with Communist
China (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
L-.2( Viet Minh attack on northern side of Tonkin delta suggested
(page 3).
vIS: France may be forced to reconsider Indochina policy (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Comment on Arab-Israeli troop movements (page 4).
3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE
Conant sees USSR emphasizing role of East German government
(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
t-� Italian troop movements into Zone A unlikely without Allied
approval (page 6).
Early French Assembly vote on Saar convention feared (page 7).
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Sire SECURITY INFORMATION
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FAR EAST
1. Macao removes official restriction on trade with Communist China:
China.
The governor of Macao recently admitted
to an American consul from Hong Kong
that he was no longer restricting the re-
export of strategic goods to Communist
In fact, he said, the colony's depressed finances forced him
to encourage,ttade.
The governor also stated that Chinese
pressure to buy petroleum and other goods is now negligible and
implied that Macao will have to promote sales to keep from being
bypassed entirely.
Comment: The Chinese Communists,, who
have been increasingly successful in procuring their strategic im-
ports directly from Western countries of origin or from the Soviet
bloc, are also bypassing Hong Kong. Despite the reduced importance
of the colonies to Peiping as sources of strategic supplies, there is
no indication of military moves against either.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Vipt Minh attark on nnrthprn SidP of Tonkin &Ilia suggested?.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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Comment: 3.3(h)(2)
the enemy was reconnoitering the northern flank of the delta and had
placed the above units under a single operational command. A Viet
Minh attack from the north would bring a quick end to the present
French operation designed to engage enemy forces to the south. General
Cogny, the French commander has stated, however, that his reserves
are sufficient to hold a thrust A-om the north while he redeployed units
now in the south.
t), France may be forced to reconsider Indochina policy:
A French Foreign Ministry spokesman told 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Dillon on 22 October that Paris
will be compelled to reconsider its Indochina
policy if Vietnam is determined to reject the
French Union in its present form. He added that France contemplated
no change in the form of the union when it issued the 3 July notes to
the Associated States.
Comment: The interest of both the French
and Vietnamese governments ffinaintaining a working relationship
Is such that some formula acceptable to both will probably be worked
out without any drastic revision of French Indochina policy. Negotia-
tions, however, can be expected to be protracted and complicated.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Comment on Arab-Israeli troop movements:
Despite the charges and countercharges of
excessive military activity, caused by troop movements on both sides
of the Arab-Israeli frontier, there is no indication that either the
Arabs or the Israelis soon intend to engage in open warfare,
Israeli army maneuvers have resulted in
the deployment of five brigades in the coastal area near the central
Jordanian frontier, thoughnot in Jerusalem or in the corridor leading
to it. Arms and ammunition have reportedly been dropped to
Israeli troops on the demilitarized Mt. Scopus area, which thus be-
comes a new point of tension.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
On the Arab side, the US Army attache in_
Damascus reports that by 24 October the bulk of the Syrian .a.rmy was
expected to be in positions near the Israeli frontier. Since the Kibya
Incident on 14 October the Arab Legion has moved considerable ground
support to West Jordan. The embassy in Amman points out, however,
that these troops are too far removed from the frontier and the dis-
puted Mt. Scopus area outside Jerusalem to represent any threat to
the armistice agreement.
- There is no evidence that Iraq has sent
any forces to Jordan.
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SECURITY INFORMATION Nor
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EASTERN EUROPE
6. Conant sees USSR emphasizing role of East German government:
Ambassador Conant points out that the
increased emphasis on the role of the East
German government, apparent in recent
Soviet notes on a four-power conference,
Is reflected a159 in communications delivered to Western authorities
in Berlin. Conant belives that these tactics are designed to confront
the Allied and West German authorities with the need of dealing directly
with the East German government and that any refusal to do so will be
exploited as proof of a deliberate attempt to block progress toward
German unification.
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: This trend can be traced back
to 17 August when Soviet officials authorized the East German govern-
ment to issue West Berlin trade permits. On 1 September and 3 October
Soviet High Commissioner Semenov, proposed direct East-West German
discussions for abolishing interzonal passes, and on 16 October came
a :S oviet antOuncement that the East German government had been
authorized to issue such passes.
Finally, Soviet officials on 21 October answered
a Western proposal that East-West Berlin telephone communications be
resumed with the suggestion that the two city governments discuss the
issue.
WESTERN EUROPE
L-71---"Italian troop movements into Zone A unlikely without Allied approval:
According to US military officials, the 3.3(h)(2)
British in Trieste have been approached by
Italian officials to determine whether Anglo-
American forces would defend Zone A against
Italian troops entering without prior agree-
ment. The head of military intelligence of
the Italian V Corps visited Zone A in civilian
clothes on 21 October.
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Comment It is unlikely that Italy would
move its troops into Zone A without specific permission from Britain
and the United States, since such a move would Jeopardize its chances
of a favorable settlement of the Trieste issue.
No reports of violations of the frontier by
the Yugoslays have been received from non-Italian sources.
LA" Early French Assembly vote on Saar convention feared:
Ambassador Dillon in Paris reports that
ratification of the French-Saar conventions
by the National Assembly on 10 November
would hamper subsequent French-German
negotiations on the Saar. Although Premier Laniel agrees that
action should be postponed, Foreign Minister Biclault, who wields
the greater influence, reportedly believes that the conventions
represent a move toward Europeanization of the Saar and that inter-
ference with this scheduled Assembly debate would damage the govern-
ment's effort to obtain EDC ratification.
Dillon adds that both Laniel and Bidault are
too harassed at present by the Indochina debate to devote attention to
the Saar question.
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Ratification of the French-Saar
conventions within the next two weeks would cause a considerable
anti-French reaction in Germany, especially among prominent members
of Adenauer's coalition. This would tend to limit Adenauer's ability to
offer concessions in the coming Saar talks.
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