CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02929528
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 14, 1953

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14 June 1953
Copy No. f
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLE IN
DOCUMENT NO
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
%/France objects to limited scope of "greater sanctions" state-
iment on Korea (page 4).
Chinese Communists introduce new interpretation of Korean POW
agreement (page 4).
SOVIET UNION
3. Comment on Melnikov ouster from Ukrainian party position
(page 5).
4. Soviet high commissioner urges increased Western trade with
East Germany (page 5).
FAR EAST
VIapan desires participation in postarmistice Korean political
Atconference (page 6).
Sapan moving toward expansion of relations with Communist bloc
(page 7).
7. British freighter apparently violated restrictions on China
shipping (page 7).
8. Diminution of anti-American propaganda In China noted (page 8).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
9. Vietnamese officials fear impact of Korean armistice on
Indochina (page 8).
Comment on Cambodian iking's llght to Thailand (page 9).
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
11. Iraq requests US advice regarding Arab League defense proposals
(page 10).
12. Turkey and USSR reach agreement on joint irrigation project
(page 10).
EASTERN EUROPE
13. Finnish government crisis reaching climax (page 11).
WESTERN EUROPE
14. Orders for new East German propaganda line described
ve(page 12).
. Colombian k. y �ef i\ssumes kresidency (page 12).
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GENERAL
1. France objects to limited scope of "greater sanctions" statement
on Korea:
French undersecretary for foreign affairs
Maurice Schumann has made a strong
complaint to Ambassador Dillon in Paris
b ecause ;Southeast Asia is not covered in
the proposed statement by the sixteen powers with troops in Korea
threatening greater sanctions in the event of renewed aggression
following the armistice. He said that it would be "very difficult"
for France to agree to any statement which did not include Indo-
china.
Schumann said that the absence of such
a statement would be construed in France as an indication of
lessening American interest in Indochina, and would greatly
strengthen the arguments of those elements in the French assembly
which favor reducing the French effort or withdrawing from Indo-
china.
Comment: France has been pressing for
some means of connecting a Korean settlement with at least a
warning against greater Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh.
2. Chinese Communists introduce new interpretation of Korean POW
agreement:
Peiping's deputy foreign minister told the
Swedish ambassador on 10 June that the
phrase "neutral nations" in the prisoner
of war agreement means only the members
of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission (India, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland) and implied that these nations are obligated to admit
prisoners who desire entry.
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The United States has informed Sweden
that the matter has neither been raised nor discussed at Panmunjom.
Sweden will discuss the matter with India and Switzerland.
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Comment: The terms of the 8 June POW
agreement are sufficientlTr-TaiTious to permit a Communist attempt
to block a change in the prisoners' status. They specify that after
30 days of consideration by the political conference, the prisoners
unwilling to be repatriated "shall be changed from the POW status
to civilian status by declaration of the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission" and that those who choose to go to "neutral nations"
shall be assisted to do so by the commission.
SOVIET UNION
3. Comment on Melnikov ouster from Ukrainian party position:
L. G. Melnikov's removal as first
secretary of the Ukrainian Republic follows a two-week-old
Ukrainian press campaign directed against Stalinist Russification
concepts and harsh economic policy. In this respect, it is a
clear continuation of the new regime's ostensibly more liberal
policy exemplified in such measures as the amnesty of civil
prisoners and in a reduction in the MVD's power base.
The criticism of Melnikov makes it
likely that he will also be ousted from his higher position on the
All-Union party presidium. He was elected a full member of
the presidium at the October congress and was retained as an
alternate when that body was drastically reduced following
Stalin's death. It may be that his ouster has resulted from a
struggle between two possible factions in the Soviet leadership
with Melnikov identified with a minority favoring continuation
of Stalin's extreme emphasis on coercion.
4. Soviet high commissioner urges increased Western trade with
East Germany:
Soviet high commissioner Semenov ex-
pressed to the BeIgilm ambassador his
interest in closer commercial relations
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between East Germany and Belgium, which need not include strategic
goods.
He remarked that the new East German
Politburo and government decrees are a good indication of a number
of significant changes which are taking place.
Comment: This is a further illustration
of the strenuous Soviet bloc attempt to increase trade with Western
countries, in some cases with less insistence than before on the
inclusion of strategic goods. Semenov's remarks illustrate the
new atmosphere of conciliation and suggest that further moves along
such lines will occur.
FAR EAST
5. japan desires participation in postarmistice Korean political
conference:
Foreign Minister Okazaki has indicated
Japan's desire to participate as a member
or an observer in the political conference
following a Korean armistice. When
informed that Japan's nonbelligerent status and South Korea's
opposition seemingly preclude participation, Okazaki suggested
that Japan's interest in the future of Korea and its provision of
bases and facilities for UN operations should qualify it for at least
observer status.
The government's position is also supported
by both the Progressive and Rightist Socialist parties.
Comment: Japanese officials have
previously expressed their frustration over Japan's exclusion from
Far Eastern decisions of the Western powers which involve vital
Japanese interests. Premier Yoshida proposed in mid-February
that a tripartite conference between the United States, Great
Britain and Japan should be held to discuss major Far Eastern
issues.
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6. Japan moving toward expansion of relations with Communist bloc:
The Japanese government has recently 3.3(h)(2)
reversed several anti-Communist admin-
istrative policies, thus indicating a
growing trend toward placing its re-
lations with Communist-bloc countries on the same basis as those
with other nations and toward expanding orbit trade to the maximum
permissible limits. Significant policy changes include granting
passports to delegates to a Communist conference, admitting Soviet
technicians to supervise ship repairs, and issuing a public statement
that the government is considering sending a trade representative
to Peiping.
The American embassy comments that
sentiment for expanding relations with the Communist bloc once
the Korean war ends has broad political support and should not
be underestimated.
Comment: Japan has hitherto maintained
a higher level of export control on trade with Communist China
than any other major country except the United States and Canada.
7. British freighter apparently violated restrictions on China shipping:
The British ship Taichungshan, en route 3.3(h)(2)
from Swatow to Tientsin when intercepted
on 24 May by a Nationalist gunboat, was
carrying, among other cargo belonging
to the People's Bank of Swatow, 12 tons of steel, 53 empty POL
drums, and 337 empty oil drums.
Comment: The British voyage-licensing
system adopted on 31 March in Hong Kong prohibits British vessels
f rom carrying semifinished and finished iron and steel items to or
between Chinese Communist ports.
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8. Diminution of anti-American propaganda in China noted:
The Swiss consul general at Shanghai, whc3.3(h)(2)
left that city in late May, reports a marked
diminution of anti-American slogans beginning
last April. The American consul general
In Hong Kong, noting that an absence of
such, slogans was also reported by witnesses of the May Day parade
in Peiping, comments that this development is probably due to
Peiping's desire to end the Korean war and to fall in line with the
world-wide Communist "peace offensive."
Comment: Peiping Radio has also taken
a milder tone toward the United States during the "peace offensive"
and the Korean talks.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
9. Vietnamese officials fear impact of Korean armistice on Indochina:
The Vietnamese premier and finance m1n1ste3.3(h)(2)
have expressed apprehension that a Korean
armistice will result in an overwhelming
popular demand in France for a negotiated
peace in Indochina, according to the American embassy in Saigon.
In this connection, the embassy points
out that the Viet Minh could easily propose that a plebiscite be
held under neutral auspices to determine whether Vietnam remain
in the French Union or become an independent republic. An honest
election would undoubtedly result in a vote for independence and,
in effect, deliver the country to Ho Chi Minh.
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10. Comment on Cambodian King's Flight to Thailand:
The King of Cambodia's decision to seek
"asylum" in Thailand, professedly in order to make his position
better known outside his country, brings relations between France and
the Associated States much closer to a crisis. Unless the French
soon make some dramatic political concession, native support for the
war against Communism may be irretrievably lost could even be
diverted eventually to the Viet Minh,
The King, obviously dissatisfied with the
limited concessions recently offered by the French, has reiterated
the demand of Vietnamese Premier Tam for membership in the
French Union similar in status to that of the nations of the British
Commonwealth. While Tam criticized the King's flight, he undoubtedly
will exploit it in pressing the French to relinquish their controls in
Vietnam. Nationalist elements in all three Associated States will be
stimulated by the King's decision, thus increasing the urgency al-
ready felt by Indochinese leaders to move repidly toward complete
independence.
The King's flight will emphasize in the
French Assembly the need to agree quickly on a new Premier and
cabinet. In view of the rapidly increasing sentiment in France for
some means of relieving its burden in Indochina, it is likely that the
National Assembly will now be forced to accept broader concessions
to the Associated States. It is probable that for the moment France
will try to delay action, however, and that direct negotiations will
not be undertaken until after the July meeting of the Council of the
French Union.
It is now more possible that a definite
promise of independence, with dominion status and at a specific date,
will be forthcoming, but greater pressure for increased US financial
aid and possibly a plea for support by American troops can be ex-
pected to accompany any such concession.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
11. Iraq requests US advice regarding Arab League defense proposals:
Iraqi foreign minister Suwaidi has asked 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Berry whether Iraq should
support the Arab League Collective
Security Pact or whether it is better at
this time for the individual Arab states to develop bilateral agree-
ments with the Western nations. He said that Baghdad was pro-
posing an Arab meeting on area defense in Cairo for 22 and 23
June.
When Berry inquired'about the eXistence
of Arab jealousies which might prevent agreement, Suwaidi replied
that it was unrealistic to expect all the Arab states to join in
creating an area del ense system. He said that his government had
already received intimations that Egypt was interested'primarily
In an Egyptian-Iraqi defense agreement, to which other Arab
nations would later adhere.
Comment: Last March Iraq requested
substantial American and British assistance in building up its
defenses against the Soviet threat.
The Arabs generally have maintained
that their own pact is preferable to any Western proposal. Their
maneuvers in connection with the Cairo meeting again reveal,
however, the strong antagonisms which threaten to delay if not
prevent the realization of a joint Arab defense system.
12. Turkey and USSR reach agreement on joint irrigation project:
The Turkish minister of public works told
parliament on 10 June that his govern-
ment had agreed to accept a Soviet offer
allowing Turkey to use the facilities of
the Serdarabad dam on the Turkish-Soviet border. The dam
would help irrigate northeastern Turkey, and Ankara would pay
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one half of the construction cost, which the USSR estimated at
$400,000.
EASTERN EUROPE
13. Finnish government crisis reaching climax:
the president,
The likelihood of the early fall of the Finnish3.3(h)(2)
cabinet has sharply increased as a result of
the decision by Agrarian Party leaders to
reject final Social Democratic proposals
for a solution to Finland's current economic
problems. The Agrarians will support the
program suggested by Prime Minister
Kekkonen who, following conversations with
will hold a meeting on 15 June with the Council of State.
Comment: It is expected that the cabinet
crisis, which has arisen over proposed price and wage: reductions?
will reach a climax early this week. In the event the present govern-
ment resigns, it appears likely that Kekkonen will be asked to head
a new coalition government formed on the same basis -- Agrarians,
Social Democrats arid a minor_ party.
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WESTERN EUROPE
14. Orders for new East German propaganda line described:
East German editors have been
given new directives to bring propaganda
In line with current policy changes.
The Socialist Unity Party conference of
July 1952 which modified party directives in accordance with the
"rapid socialization" program is no longer to be mentioned, and
such terms as "socialism" and "socialistic" are to be replaced by
more innocuous words. Articles written to commemorate Walter
Ulbricht's birthday on 30 June are to be retracted. Sharp attacks
on Adenauer are to cease, and future criticism of the United
States is to be moderated.
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Comment: The effort to bring propaganda
speedily in line with the new policy suggests the degree to which it
is directed at Western opinion. The directives also suggest that a
basic departure from the policy announced last year may well be
intended.
15. Colombian Army Chief Assumes Presidency:
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Commanding 3.3(h)(2)
General of the Armed Forces, assumed
the Presidency of Colombia at 10 p. m,
o n 13 June. Reportedly he has the backing
of the armed forces, the police, and all elements of the Conservative
Party, save the die-hard clique of ousted President Laureano Gomez.
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In a midnight speech to the nation, Rojas
Pinilla announced that the army would take charge until a new govern-
ment is organized. He promised that free elections would be held and
that Colombia would honor its international obligations. He then
appointed an all-Conservative cabinet of three military men and ten
civilians, most of whom appear to be supporters of ex-President
Ospina Perez, leader of the moderate faction of the Conservative
Party.
Comment The coup was precipitated by
the sudden return to the Presidency by Gomez, who had been in re-
tirement because of his health since November 1951, and his firing
of General Rohas Pinilla. Thereupon, the army, remaining loyal
to the latter carried out a bloodless coup.
The Gomez clique, the dominant faction
in the Colombian government up to the time of the coup, represented
the extreme right wing of the Conservative Party and was hardly
representative of the Colombian people.
Rojas PintHa's assumption of the Presidency
appears to make Colombia's prospects for settling its guerrilla
problem, ending its state-of-siege, and returning to political nor-
malcy brighter than they have been at any time during the past three
and one-half years.
Rojas Pinilla, formerly Colombia's
representative on the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington,
and most of the members of his Cabinet are known to be pro-
American. This government can be expected to maintain the
Colombian battalion in Korea.
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