CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/11/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03003738
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 13, 1953

- Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
TOPS ET
SEC INFORMATION
13 November 1953
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. IW
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C -
NEXT REVIEW DATE. PO 09
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 2o/./2/9 REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
3.5(c)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AO,
TOP SINFORMA "ET
SECU /1#A,
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
Nave
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
1 Lt(t, I
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
1.
2. Britain presses sale of TV transmitters to USSR (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
SUMMARY
GENERAL
3. Bohlen interprets Soviet reception as effort to reassure West
(page 4).
Soviet submarine building program expanded (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Sordanian king rejects American irrigation plan (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
Pella suggests "preliminary" five-power conference on Trieste
(page 6).
2
TOP SECRET
13 Nov 53
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
I Ur 'Kt I
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
GENERAL
1,
2. Britain presses sale of TV transmitters to USSR
3.3(h
)(2)
The American embassy in London reports 3.3(h)(2)
that British officials have twice recently
stressed the importance their government
attaches to the proposed sale of over $500,000
worth of television transmitting equipment to the Soviet Union. The em-
bassy states that the government's concern apparently arises from the
increasing pressure on it to authorize the sale, and from the extended
period of disagreement with the United States over the policy and techni-
cal considerations involved.
3
TOP CRET
13 Nov 53
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 003003738
Approved for Release: 201-9/07/10 C03003738
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
Comment: All television transmitting
equipment known to be in operation in the USSR is of Western manu-
facture and obsolescent. This sale would provide new prototypes and
ease the problem of research and development in the Soviet electronics
industry, which is hard pressed to keep pace in both military and civ-
ilian fields.
Making this List I equipment available to
the USSR without unanimous approval in COCOM would constitute a
violation of the COCOM agreement. Although several COCOM members
have questioned the proposed deal, American opposition appears to be
the sole obstacle to the sale at this time.
SOVIET UNION
3. Bohlen interprets Soviet reception as effort to reassure West:
Ambassador Bohlen reports that Molotov's 3.3(h)(2)
arrangements at the Foreign Office reception
on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution
have caused lively speculation and considerable
resentment in the diplomatic corps. The three Western ambassadors, to-
gether with Ulbricht and the ambassadors from Communist China, Argen-
tina and Burma, were placed at the only seated table with top Soviet politi-
cal and military representatives. The other diplomats present were left
to fend for themselves.
Bohlen considers that the chief purpose of
the arrangement was to caution the West against giving too much impor-
tance to the Soviet refusals to negotiate and the sharpness of recent propa-
ganda attacks.
4. Soviet submarine building program expanded:
3.
3(h)(2)
4
P S
13 Nov 53
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
Comment: The expansion of production
indicates that the USSR has adopted the Gorki model as the principal
offensive weapon in building up a modern submarine fleet. This pro-
gram ends the relative inactivity in construction of new long�range
submarines since the war and will add significantly to Soviet offensive
capabilities.
Since late 1949, 14 to 20 submarines have
been built at Gorki. These four yards together could by 1956 produce
an estimated minimum of 16 to 20 per year.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
5
3.3(h)(
3.
3.
5
TOP RET
13 Nov 53
2)
3(h)(2)
5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
lir rcr, I
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Jordanian king rejects American irrigation plan:
King Hussain of Jordan told American
charge Lynch in Amman on 10 November
that there is no possibility now or for
years to come of any direct or indirect
Jordanian collaboration with Israel on the Jordan valley irrigation
plan sponsored by the United States. The king declared that even
the appearance of cooperation would result in his overthrow.
Lynch comments that this is the con-
sidered and final opinion of the king and his government.
Comment: This statement by the highest
Jordanian authority confirms previous expectations of Arab rejection
of the plan.
WESTERN EUROPE
7, Pella suggests "preliminary" five-power conference on Trieste:
In a note on the Trieste issue given to
Ambassador Luce on 10 November,
Italian premier Pella proposed that a
secret meeting of experts from the five
interested powers be held to "exchange views and establish the
agenda" for a subsequent conference at the highest level. The note
specified, however, that gradual implementation of the 8 October
declaration would have to begin before and continue during any such
preliminary meeting.
- 6 -
TOjA` CIEET
13 Nov 53
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738
NvP1
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
Following presentation of the note, Pella
told Ambassador Luce that parliament would under no circumstances
permit him to attend a conference without some prior and visible
implementation of the 8 October declaration.
Comment: Pella did not define the degree
of implementation necessary as a prerequisite for the preliminary
meeting. He has previously stated, however, that the minimum con-
ditions for his own attendance at a five-power conference were that
the Trieste harbor and police be turned over to Italian control beforehand.
Yugoslavia would probably refuse to attend a
meeting conditioned on any degree of implementation of the 8 October
decision. According to press reports, Tito's speech this week end will
contain strong statements unless some sort of proposal is presented
before then.
7 -
TOt
13 Nov 53 3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 C03003738