CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/07/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973569
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: July 22, 1952

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SECURITY FORMATION
22 July 1952
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
bOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DEOLASSiRED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUtH HR 70.2
DATE:/P2T
Sc
REVIEWFR
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
I. Soviet Union again shows lack of interest in trade with France
(page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Peiping allegedly ties Korean truce to UN membership and
Formosa settlement (page 3).
3. Fighting in Tibetan border area confirmed (page 4).
4. Rubber sale confirmed between Indonesia and Communist China
(page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on the Iranian situation (page 5).
6. Comment on new Egyptian Government crisis (page 6)b
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Soviet officials may change position on Berlin boundary controls
(page 6).
8. West German "Defense Minister" favors conscription this year
(page 7).
9. France hopes for temporary agreement with West Germans on
Europeanization of Saar (page 7).
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GENERAL 3.3(h)(2)
1. Soviet Union again shows lack of interest in trade with France:
iSoyuzkhimeksport,
the Soviet chemical export corporation, is
now not interested in obtaining specialized
raw materials and pharmaceutical products
from France,
3.3(h)(2)
Soyuzkhimeksport 3.3(h)(2)
itself had solicited these commodities during the Moscow Economic
Conference and now merely indicates that the situation has changed
since then,
Comment:
Soviet unwillingness even to receive the repre,
sentative of a French textile firm interested in doing business with the
Russians, despite France's expressions of interest in improving trade
relations with the Soviet Union.
FAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
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2. Peiping allegedly ties Korean truce to UN membership and Formosa
settlement:
the Peiping regime has decided not to sign
a "Korean truce" unless it is seated in the
United Nations and the status of Formosa is
settled satisfactorily. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: It is not clear whether "truce"
refers simply to a cease-firei=to an over-all peace settlement.
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Peiping's stated terms for a settlement, prior
to the truce talks, included demands for admission to the UN and aban-
donment of American "neutralization" of Formosa.
Peiping has not introduced these demands
during the talks as necessary conditions for a cease-fire. Its propa-
ganda has suggested, however, that they will be brought foward in the
political discussions which would follow a cease-fire.
3.3(h)(2)
3. Fighting in Tibetan border area confirmed:
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: The heavy airlift of food and
ammunition in the past three weeks from Chengtu to troops in the
Tibetan border area, and the current delivery to Chengtu from Man-
churia of six fighter aircraft and six bombers, the first combat planes
in western China to be mentioned in intercepts, are unprecedented
3.3(h)(2)
measures by Peiping in the suppression of internal opposition.
4. Rubber sale confirmed between Indonesia and Communist China:
the sale of 7,000 tons of
Indonesian rubber to China. Five thousand
tons of rubber will be bartered for 45,000
ons rice, eremaining rubber to be paid for in sterling.
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Comment: An Indonesian Government spokes-
man stated officially on 3 July that the government had "no information"
about any discussion with China on rubber sales and reiterated Indo-
nesia's decision to honor the UN-sponsored embargo on strategic rrn-
terials to China. 3.3(h)(2)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on the Iranian situation:
National Front opposition and the Shah's un-
willingness to give full support to Ahmad Qavam prevented his for-
mation of a government.
Widespread civil disorders were coupled with
a shutdown of railroads, telegraph, and many private businesses. The
National Front urged its supporters to overthrow. Qavam, and his
assassination was threatened. Mullah Kashani, the influential re-
ligious leader, on 20 July publicly appealed to the armed forces to
refuse hith. support. The Communist-dominated Tudeh, in an appar-
ent bid for leadership of the anti-Qavam agitation, made common
cause with the National Front and extensive anti-government plans
were reportedly being drafted.
Qavam was prepared to meet these various
threats with force. He had reportedly asked the Shah for approval of
his plan to arrest Kashani and had recommended the temporary sus-
pension of Parliament. The Shah could not make up his mind.
Qavam appears to have lacked an organization
and a specific program. The developments leading up to his resig-
nation, however, indicated that any new Prime Minister will have to
meet the approval of the National Front. Having forced out an able
and resolute politician, the Nationalists are now in a position to be
even more uncompromising.
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6. Comment on new Egyptian Government crisis:
King Farouk's request to Hilali Pasha to
assume the Egyptian premiership after Sirry Pasha's resignation
represents a new effort to halt the steady deterioration of the
Egyptian political situation. The recall of Hilali offers Egypt a new,
if slim, opportunity to solve its domestic difficulties, as well as
its long-term dispute with Britain. The King's action also repre-
sents a new attempt to oppose the return of the nationalistic WaId.
If Hilali succeeds in completing his
cabinet, there is a prospect that Egypt will once again have a
relatively strong and honest government. The able Maraghi Pasha,
who prevented the January riots from spreading to Alexandria and
who has often been mentioned as a candidate for the premiership,
is scheduled to assume the important posts of Interior and War and
Marine once again. But even a strong government must face the
basic issue of accord with Great Britain, on which neither side has
yet been able to compromise.
A factor in Sirry's resignation was his
differences with Farouk over the issue e/i Palace interference in
army affairs, but his second-rate cabinet had little hope of progress
on internal or external problems. Even Hilali will face the same
issues: corruption in high places, Wald Party antagonism, and the
Anglo-Egyptian dispute, which caused his resignation less than three
weeks ago.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Soviet officials may change position on Berlin boundary controls:
In a note of 20 July Soviet General Dengin, 3.3(h)(2)
representative of the Soviet Control Com-
mission in Berlin, states that the strengthen-
ing of the guard at the outer boundaries of
greater Berlin is a provisional measure which will be rescinded after
agreement on free all-German elections.
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The High Commissioner's office in Berlin
notes that this statement may be significant in that Soviet officials
previously indicated that the "protective" measure would be continued
until unification, while Dengin suggests that the Soviet authorities may
be prepared to reconsider their position before unification is actually
put to a vote.
8. West German "Defense Minister" favors conscription this year: 3.3(h)(2)
heodor Blank, West German "Defense Mini-
ster," strongly favors the passage of selective
service legislation by the Bundestag as early
his fall as possible, in contrast to the govern-
mentTs present p an to wait until after the 1953 elections. The legis-
lation would not be implemented until all countries had ratified the
European defense pact.
The present intention of the government is to
ask the Bundestag this fall only for legislation to recruit volunteers
for the cadres, which will comprise one third of the total force.
Blank argues that delaying conscription would give the opposition Social
Democrats a chance in 1953 to tell the voters, "If you want to be con-
scripted, vote for the Adenauer coalition."
Meanwhile, American officials in Bonn,
stressing the temporary non-Cabinet nature of Blank's office, note
that the build-up of German forces may be delayed for many months
if there is not a considerable improvement in the coordination of Bonn's
military and economic planning.
9. France hopes for temporary agreement with West Germans on
Europeanization of Saar:
Some Quai d' Orsay officials hope that a
temporary French-German agreement on
the Europeanization of the Saar will be
reached this week by Foreign Minister
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Schuman and West German Chancellor Adenauer. These officials
believe that a temporary agreement would enable Schuman to tell the
French Assembly that the future German peace treaty would merely
confirm the Europeanization of the Saar, while Adenauer could tell
the Bundestag that provisional Europeanization left room for change
at a later time.
Comment: Though originally proposed by
Adenauer, the Europeanization of the Saar is not at the moment
politically acceptable to his coalition government.
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