CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/08/15

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973591
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: August 15, 1952

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SECURITY FORMATION
15 August 1962
Copy N. 57
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUME747NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AVM: HR 70-2
OATE:itiik07, Office of Current Intelligence REVIEWER: 3.5(c)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Turkish Ambassador approves British views on NATO commands
(page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Chinese artillery unit in Korea anticipates "long war" (page 3).
3. New trade procedure indicates Peiping's economic links to Orbit
(page 4).
4. British military in Singapore concerned over Communist terrorism
in Sarawak (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Clash between Egyptian Army clique and Wafd Party reportedly
imminent (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Albanian Communists reportedly dissatisfied with Hoxha regime
(page 6).
7. Comment on election of Hungarian Premier (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Soviet officials in Berlin protest alleged air corridor violations
(page 7).
9. French believe that American intervention will prevent breakdown
of Saar talks (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
10. Chilean President alarmed at possible Communist and Argentine
intervention in elections (page 8).
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GENERAL
1. Turkish Ambassador approves British views on NATO commands:
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The Turkish Ambassador in London reported
to Ankara on 31 July that the British reser-
vations on the NATO Southern Europe Com-
mand are to Turkey's advantage. He had
learned informally from the Foreign Office
that Britain wants a command for Southeast Europe set up directly
under SHAPE and separate from the Southern Europe Command. The
Foreign Office felt that such a command,composed of Turkish and
Greek land and air forces, would facilitate NATO cooperation with the
proposed Middle East Defense Organization, and stated that the reser-
vations might be discussed after the organization had been established.
Comment: Turkey has already agreed to
the recent modification in the Southern Europe Command separating
Greek and Turkish from Italian forces but continuing their sub-
command status. Before learning the details of the British reser-
vations made at that time, Turkey was preparing to protest them.
Now, however, Ankara is likely to support a future British request
for a reconsideration, and also to look more favorably upon Britain's
present proposal for a Middle East defense organization.
FAR EAST
2. Chinese artillery unit in Korea anticipates "long war":
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The Chinese Communist 1st Artillery Division
in combat in western Korea on 10 August
ordered one of its regiments to refrain from
using a certain type of ammunition now "in
a icipa ion o a ong war."
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Comment: While this
does not necessarily reflect Communist strategy in
Korea, it suggests that the Chinese plan an indefinite stay in Korea
under combat conditions.
3. New trade procedure indicates Peiping's economic links to Orbit:
International letters of credit are normally
no longer to be used in trade transactions
between China and East Germany,
from Communist
China's central bank to Berlin. Sellers are
simpty to transmit bills through their central
bans to castomers for collection.
Comment: This collection system is already
in use for internal Soviet trade and for trade between the USSR and
Eastern European Satellites. Recently it was also adopted for Sino-
Soviet trade. Its extension to China's trade with one of the Satellites
underscores the progress attained in tightening Peiping's economic
links to the rest of the Orbit.
4. British military in Singapore concerned over Communist terrorism in
Sarawak:
nesiaryiiorneo,
become a "focus
There is a large
Government has
area.
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Although British Commissioner General 3.3(h)(2)
MacDonald has not shown alarm at the recent
Communist act of terrorism in the British
colony of Sarawak, British Army headquarters
in Singapore views the incident seriously. It
points out that the city of Pontianak in Indo-
00 miles south of the Sarawak border, could easily
of infection," from which Sarawak could be harassed.
Chinese population in Pontianak, and the Indonesian
resettled several hundred armed dissidents in a nearby
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The American Military Liaison Officer in
Singapore comments that although the Communists do not have the
capacity to threaten the British position in Sarawak, a Communist
operation could develop which would force an expenditure of govern-
ment resources out of all proportion to the Communist investment, as
in the case of Malaya.
3.3(h)(2)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Clash between Egyptian Army clique and Wafd Party reportedly imminent:
3.3(h)(2)
i"all
evidence" points to an early showdown between
Egvntian Army commander Nagib and the
powerful Wafd Party. the probable arrest and
possible deportation of ex -rime minister Nanas Pasha, Wafd leader,
and Fuad Serageddin, Secretary General of the Wafd Party. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Although there are indications
that relations between the army and the Wafd are strained, there is no
other evidence that a showdown between the army and the Wafd is
imminent.
The army-sponsored reform program, if
carried out, will directly affect many prominent members of the Wafd.
The army's continuing interest in political affairs and its apparent de-
termination to effect reforms may induce it to take strong action0
leaders support Nagib.
It is not known how fully the various military
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EASTERN EUROPE
6, Albanian Communists reportedly dissatisfied with Hoxlia regime:
A member of the anti-Communist resistance
who left Albania in June 1952 reported that
ninety percent of the population, including a
majority of the Communists, will support
any serious attempt to overthrow the present government.
The Communists have adopted this attitude
because of their disappointment with the Hoxha regime and their be-
lief that the USSR would not risk a general war to save Albania after
a political coup. Probably no more than one quarter of the police
units are loyal to the government.
Comment: Reports over the past six months
reveal that increased corruption and disaffection in the Albanian state
apparatus have resulted in the arrest of many secondary Communist
officials, that the army is unreliable, and that resistance bands from
Yugoslavia have stepped up subversive activity.
7. Comment on election of Hungarian Premier:
The election by the Hungarian National
Assembly of Communist Party leader Matyas Rakosi as Premier re-
sembles recent moves in Rumania and Czechoslovakia which also had
the effect of combining the top party and government functions in one
person. These changes in Rumania and Czechoslovakia were accom-
panied by high-level purges and an intensification of the communization
program.
A step-up in Hungary's communization pro-
gram has already been noted, and Rakosi's selection as Premier may
indicate that a purge will follow. There have been numerous rumors
that Erno Gero, the party's second ranking leader and president of the
People's Economic Council, and party theoretician Sozsef Revai are
slated for purging.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Soviet officials in Berlin protest alleged air corridor violations:
On 11 and 12 August the Soviet controller of
the Berlin air safety center lodged three
oral protests on alleged American over-
flights of East German territory. The
incidents, involving two commercial aircraft and one fighter, are
being investigated by American authorities in Berlin.
Comment: The series of protests of air
corridor violations which began last May could be designed to build
up a record for any future action to interfere with Allied use of the
corridors. These latest protests assume particular importance in
view of current Soviet harassment of traffic to Berlin.
3.3(h)(2)
9. French believe that American intervention will prevent breakdown of
Saar talks: 3.3(h)(2)
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Chancellor Adenaueris current
efforts to settle the Saar controversy would
be impeded by the opposition of conservative
elements in his coalition. However, these
conservatives, "who need Washington and New York credits," would
be responsive to American advice.
American authorities will intervene to prevent the talks from failing.
rommpnt- This report,
suggests that American inter-
vention will be requested early in the negotiations.
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Meanwhile the West German press has adopted
a severely critical attitude toward any German concessions on the issue.
If this trend persists, Chancellor Adenauer's capacity to negotiate will
become increasingly circumscribed.
LATIN AMERICA
10. Chilean President alarmed at possible Communist and Argentine
intervention in elections:
President Gonzalez Videla has informed 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Bowers that the democratic
parties of Chile are "deeply alarmed" over
the prospects of former dictator-president
Ibanez in the 4 September presidential elections. He attributed much
of Ibanez' strength to Argentine financial support, and believes that
the 13 August strikes in the copper, coal, and nitrate mines were
manifestations of Communist alignment with Ibanez.
The President mentioned his hope that the
United States Government will "permit" American companies in Chile
to give financial help to the rightist or center-left forces.
Comment: Although Ibanez does not have
the support of large, organized parties, he does have wide popular
appeal and might well command not only the Communist vote but also
considerable support from parties now aligned behind other candidates.
It is likely that Ibanez has been receiving
support from Argentina, but there has been little definite information
to indicate its nature and extent.
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