CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/12/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02693996
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: December 24, 1952

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24 December 1952
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO,
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: 70-2
DATE: /REVIEWER:
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Disillusionment prevalent at Vienna Peace Congress (page 3).
2.
FAR EAST
3. Completion of Chinese Nationalist army reorganization reported
(page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
4. Pakistan reportedly would accept invitation to join MEDO (page 4).
5. Prime Minister Nehru opposes arming of Pakistan by MEDO -
(page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6.
7.
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Comment on the fall of the Pinay government (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
9.
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GENERAL
1. Disillusionment prevalent at Vienna Peace Congress:
Vienna Peace Congress
attendance of delegates at
congress meetings was poor, much to the
consternation of the Communist organizers.
Delegates criticized the repetitious speeches, the lack of constructive
results and the absence of discussion committees.
Comment: In attempting to pursue the
Kremlin directive for a "mass organization," the organizers appar-
ently kept the agenda vague in order to win support from the largest
possible number of non-Communists. Consequently, the Congress
suffered from lack of purpose. Satellite delegates were criticized
for treating the occasion as a shopping opportunity, while certain
non-Communists, whose attendance had been encouraged, were not
deterred from making outspoken attacks on Soviet policies.
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FAR EAST
3. Completion of Chinese Nationalist army reorganization reported:
The combat effective ground strength of the
Chinese Nationalist Army has now com-
pleted reorganization into ten armies of
two divisions each and one separate division,
It will be July 1953, however, before
any of the new armies has completed "large-unit exercise training. "
A Chinese Nationalist training directive has ordered three divisions
to receive'amphibious training in 1953, but American officials in-
dicate that it is "still uncertain" when this training will start or
whether it can be completed in 1953.
The report states that the equipment
planned to be delivered to these armies is an "austere minimum"
for the defense of Formosa and emphasizes that for offensive opera-
tions much additional equipment will be required.
SOUTH ASIA
4. Pakistan reportedly would accept invitation to join MEDO:
According to its Acting Foreign Secretary, 3.3(h)(2)
Pakistan would "jump at the chance" to
participate in MEDO. The Secretary stated
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TPBECEIET
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that, in addition to the general approval which would be given to such
an invitation, the support of reactionary religious elements could be
won by arguing that Pakistan would be helping to defend the Moslem
world, Only the Communists would try to prevent acceptance.
Comment: The Acting Foreign Secretary's
views may be more optimistic tha,n those of his superiors.
Pakistan has always expressed an interest
in MEDO, but until recently has stated that its commitments in
Kashmir prevented it from contributing to Middle Eastern defense. It
appears that deteriorating economic conditions may have changed
Pakistan's attitude and that it might now accept an invitation, provided
it was accompanied by an offer of substantial military assistance.
5. Prime Minister Nehru opposes arming of Pakistan by MEDO:
Indian Prime Minister Nehru told Ambas- 3.3(h)(2)
sador Bowles on 20 December that if
Pakistan's military strength were increased
as a result of participation in MEDO, India
would be forced to increase its own armaments. Even though the arms
were honestly intended for use in "another direction," the instability
of the Pakistani Government and the strong reaction to be expected
in India would vastly increase the danger of an "explosion" in South
Asia.
Comment: India's ability to withstand the
pressure to solve the Kashmir issue would be adversely affected by
strengthening Pakistan militarily. Aside from the outcry to be ex-
pected from government spokesmen and the press, however, it is
doubtful that India's attitudes on other international questions would
change sufficiently to produce a serious deterioration of relations
either with Pakistan or the United States.
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Ti.ECRET
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Comment on the fall of the Pinay government:
French Premier Pinay's resignation will
affect American security interests primarily by the inevitable blow
to his vital anti-inflation program. The severity of the blow to the
program will depend largely on the length of time needed to find a
new premier, inasmuch as the preponderance of power in the next
government almost certainly will again lie with the "hard money"
rightist deputies.
The next regime is not likely to be less
favorable to American interests. Unfriendly Gaullist influence is
likely to be greater on the next government, but had already become
an important factor in Pinar s foreign policy despite Foreign Minis-
ter Schuman's friendly attitude. Because a working majority in
the National Assembly cannot be found without Foreign Minister
Schuman's Popular Republicans, his basic policies will be continued
even if Schuman himself is excluded.
Although rumors are current in the Assem-
bly that Pinay expects to return to power in a few months, the American
Embassy in Paris states that by walking out he has embittered Many
supporters, and this may be a grave blow to his political future,,
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LATIN. AMERICA
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