CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/08/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05973596
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: August 21, 1952

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C 1Uk S ithl.
SECURIT FORMATION
21 August 1952
Copy No. 57
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECUTY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Kennan comments on visit of Chinese delegation to Moscow
(page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Moscow's announcement of a party congress (page 3),
FAR EAST
3,
4. Burmese have evidence of Chinese Nationalist-Karen cooperation
(page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5. Chinese troops reportedly encamped inside Bhutan (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Tudeh reportedly campaigns against the Iranian Army (page 6).
7. Soviet Embassy said to be supporting Tudeh Party (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Yugoslavia judged better able to cope with drought (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. Kennan comments on visit of Chinese delegation to Moscow:
Ambassador Kennan believes that the pri-
mary reason for the current Sino-Soviet
talks in Moscow is the Korean situation,
which will be affected in a "major way."
e considers that Chinese requests led to the meeting, which ap-
parently will center around military aid.
Whether the USSR agrees to continue sup-
plying China at the present level or to meet demands for increased
deliveries, Moscow would expect, in Kerman's view, to obtain im-
portant political concessions, perhaps involving the Chinese role in
the Korean war, or possibly the Port Arthur naval base area, from
which Soviet forces are scheduled to be withdrawn by the end of 1952.
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Comment: The circumstances surrounding
the conference and the composition of the Chinese delegation suggest
that the talks are concerned more with long-range Soviet economic
and military assistance than with the immediate issues of the Korean
situation. Provision of such aid is expected to ensure Peiping's ad-
herence to its commitment in Korea and to common policies toward
Japan and Southeast Asia.
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on Moscow's announcement of a party congress:
The Kremlin's decision to reorganize the
top administrative apparatus of the Soviet Communist Party at an
All-Union Congress on 5 October appears to be primarily a recogni-
tion of administrative changes since the last such meeting in 1939.
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3.
The substitution of "Presidium" for "Politburo"
may well be designed to give the impression of greater party democrati-
zation, an aim which is apparent in changes in the wording of the preamble
to the party statutes. The proposed change in the Secretariat's functions
emphasizes the widespread powers over Soviet internal affairs which
this body, presumably under Malenkov, already enjoys. 3.3(h)(2)
Inclusion on the congress agenda of the 1951-55
P an indicates that its revision is finally completed.
This will be the first Orbit-wide Five Year
Plan, and will include increased exports of industrial products to and
imports from the Satellite countries and Communist China. The over-
all plan is in line with the increased emphasis on planned military ex-
penditures as revealed in the published 1952 budget.
FAR EAST
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4. Burmese have evidence of Chinese Nationalist-Karen cooperation: 3.3(h)(2)
the Karens have arrived at an "under-
standing" with the Chinese Nationalists and
are exchanging food and tungsten for arms
and ammunition. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: This is the first indication that
the Burmese Government has" what it considers convincing evidence of
Chinese Nationalist cooperation with the insurgent Karens.
Chin se Nationalist couctooration witn tne Insurgent
Karens might prejudice US-Burmese relations because of the belief in
Rangoon that the United States is involved with the Nationalists. The
fears that Nationalist support of the Karens would seriously
impede the government's campaign to suppress the Communist rebellion.
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SOUTH ASIA.
5. Chinese troops reportedly encamped inside Bhutan:
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Chinese Communist troops encamped inside
Bhutan along a line some 30 to 50 miles south
of the Tibetan frontier.
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carts, tents, and a Chinese flag flying over one encampment, 3.3(h)(2)
the Indian. Government has
aerial photographs of the troops.
Comment: This information is the most
specific yet received on Chinese penetration of the eastern Himalayan
borderlands. Maps now published in China vary considerably from
Western maps in locating the southern borders of China.
It is common practice for Chinese troops to
patrol up to 50 miles inside the northern frontier of Kashmir, until
they meet Indian and Pakistani outposts.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Tudeh reportedly campaigns against the Iranian Army:
uncomfirmed Tudeh
-Plans for activity within the army. Tudeh
members were instructed to join the armed
forces and to establish good records. At the same time they were to
create friction between civilians and the military.
Comment: The Tudeh has used nationalist
attacks on the army to further its own efforts to weaken the latter.
The government, alarmed by a series of minor Tudeh disturbances,
reimposed martial law in Tehran on 20 August following a Tudeh-
nationalist clash. Fifty Tudeh members have reportedly been arrested,
congress is scheduled to meet in Tehran soon.
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a Tudeh
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'7. Soviet Embassy said to be supporting Tudeh Party:
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the Soviet Embassy in Tehran is engaged in
logistic and financial support of the Tudeh,
but that its activities are conducted indirectly
through Iranian agents. Subversive agents,
Inc u ng a ew u mans, continue to cross the Iranian frontier.
Clandestine arms traffic in Tehran is in-
creasing. There are some Soviet arms shipments across the north-
western border to tribesmen and Azerbaijan Democrats, but the
weapons available to the Tudeh in Tehran come from illegal local
stocks.
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Yugoslavia judged better able to cope with drought:
American officials in Belgrade believe that
Yugoslavia is better able to offset this year's
drought damage than in 1950. The Tito re-
gime is attacking the problem energetically,
but is probably relying on additional foreign aid coupled with reduced
capital imports to tide it over.
Comment: The Yugoslav Federal Economic
Council estimates the damage to crops to date at approximately
$300,000,000. The government has taken steps to cut imports, in-
crease certain exports, and restrict exports of critical agricultural
products. The Yugoslav economic situation is chronically poor, how-
ever, and consequently a bad crop inevitably produces severe reper-
cussions.
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