CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/01/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02046526
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: January 17, 1952

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SEC INFORMATION
17 January 1952
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CLAS
I DECLASSIFIED
- CVO
CLA si t. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH
DATE 40 _ 411_ REV;Z:',V7
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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'SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Communist aircraft strength in China-Manchuria-Korea increased
to 1700 (page 3).
2. Chinese Nationalist forces from Burma reported in clash with
Chinese Communists (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Iranian insurgents in the USSR return to Tehran (page 4).
4. Mossadeq cOntinues adamant on the oil dispute (page 4).
5. Egyptian Government confident of victory over British (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Hungary negotiating for Iranian oil (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on German inter-zonal trade (page 6).
8. Churchill still opposes NATO plans for Atlantic Command (page 6).
9. Comment on Spanish reaction to anticipated US aid (page 7).
NORTH AMERICA
10. Canadian Cabinet rejects NATO request for economic aid to Europe
(page 8).
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FAR EAST
1. Communist aircraft strength in China-Manchuria-Korea increased to 1700:
US Air Force yeace.,:a�r- A US Air Force estimate states that there is
16 Jan 52 sufficient evidence to justify the upward re-
SUEDE vision of Communist military aircraft strength
in the China-Manchuria-Korea area to 1700.
It had been carried at 1450 since November. The new figure includes 900
jet fighters. and 240 TU-2 light bombers and represents an increase of 100
jet fighters, 80 light bombers, and 50 transport aircraft. Communist air
strength in Manchuria is estimated at 1000, including 600 jets and 160 light
bombers.
Comment: This increase occurred entirely in
China proper. Combat aircraft strength in Manchuria has actually declined
slightly since November, because of the movement of several units from
South Manchuria to the Nanking-Shanghai area.
The increase of light bombers and transports
in China is due to the transfer, since the last estimate, of TU-2' s and
transports from the USSR to China proper. The upward revision of jet
fighter strength is accounted for by the identification in December of two
additional jet fighter divisions at Hankow and Peiping.
2. Chinese Nationalist forces from Burma reported in clash with Chinese
Communists:
Chinese Nationalist forces suffered 300
casualties on 11 January in heavy fighting
with the Chinese Communists in
the Burma border,
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Meanwhile
3.3(h)(2)
in Rangoon informed
Saigon of a Burmese request to the French and
Thai Legations that visas be refused to the
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Nationalist General Li Mi in order to prevent his return to Burma. The
reported serious Burmese concern over the situation.
that the Chinese
Nationalist troops in Burma were being supplied by air directly from
Formosa and had recently been reinforced by 900 non-commissioned
officers, which seemed to indicate an intent to resume operations.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iranian insurgents in the USSR return to Tehran:
Iranian military intelligence has received
detailed information that "a large number" of
insurgents who were in Soviet territory have
entered northeastern Iran and are now assem-
ing in Tehran. Iranian dissidents inside Iran are also gathering in Tehran
and are possibly "being trained for a dangerous operation."
Comment: This information is unconfirmed.
When the Soviet-supported Kurdish and Azerbaijan republics which had been
created in northwest Iran collapsed in December 1946 after a few months of
tenuous existence, hundreds of Iranians directly involved fled across the
frontier. Since then there have been.various rumors that these insurgents,
some of them avowed and trained Communists, would come back. The re-
turn of sizable numbers of such individuals could result in the formation of
the nucleus of a hard-core terrorist or revolutionary organization.
4. Mossadeq continues adamant on the oil dispute:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Prime Minister Mossadeq has indicated that 3.3(h)(2)
he considers politically inadvisable the ac-
ceptance of any solution to the Anglo-Iranian
dispute proposed by the International Bank which ,
does not represent a clear-cut victory for Iran over the British.
he believes that his victory in
current elections will force the British to accept Iranian terms.
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Comment: Mossadeq is aware that his political
stature depends on an unqualified victory for Iran in its oil dispute. His
recent demand that the British close their consulates in Iran indicates that
he intends to use his anti-British stand to secure a vote of confidence at the
Parliamentary interpellation on 22 January. Although he is genuinely con-
cerned over the serious financial condition of his government, there is no
indication that he will agree to any compromise on the oil dispute.
5. Egyptian Government confident of victory over British:
3.3(h)(2)
According to the American Ambassador in Cairo,
the Wafd government is becoming more confident
each day that the Present Egyptian commando
tactics in the Suez Canal zone will eventually
force the British to withdraw from the country. Even the King is being in-
fluenced by this attitude.
The Ambassador reiterates that a compromise
must now be made on the Sudan issue. He states that ex-Prime Minister
Sirry Pasha has warned that if matters continue to drift as they are, even
recognition of the-litte of King of the Sudan will not "buy" Egyptian accep-
tance of the Western defense proposals.
Comment: The type of reasoning indulged in
by the Wafd government has induced even the more moderate leaders to
refuse to take action to stop deterioration in the internal situation.
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Hungary negotiating for Iranian oil:
3.3
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Hungarian petroleum production has declined
steadily in the postwar period, and wasteful pratices preclude any sizable
increase in the output of the known fields. In 1950, 500, 000 metric tons
of crude oil were produced, whereas the Hungarian refineries have an
annual capacity of one million tons.
�
WESTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on German inter-zonal trade:
Allied officials in Germany are now considering
whether or not to extend the present virtual embargo of interLzonal German
trade adopted in retaliation against Soviet harassing of Berlin trade. The
Soviet interference has been gradually reduced, particularly since early
November, to a point where it now consists only of slow handling of Berlin
export permits. West Berlin firms do not appear to be suffering from the
present restrictions, and American officials feel that current airlift oper-
ations can be reduced and possibly soon ended.
British and French officials have indicated their
desire to permit the West Germans to renew trade with East Germany, and
recently, United States officials in Germany have suggested that the Allied
embargo might now be dropped. They stress that it has become less and
less effective because of the Soviet expectation that it will be of short dur-
ation, and because of the apparent East German ability to procure needed
materials from other Western countries.
8. Churchill still opposes NATO plans for Atlantic Command:
Expressing his continued opposition to the 3.3(h)(2)
existing agreement for an American Supreme
Allied Commander in the Atlantic, Churchill
told Canadian officials in Ottawa that he would
take up the matter again on his return to Washington, and requested support
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for his stand. He stressed Britain's greater experience in dealing with
convoy problems and maintained that the command question was a matter
of "British life blood" as against American and Canadian inconvenience.
The Canadian Chiefs of Staff still favor the
United States' view for technical military reasons. External Affairs
Minister Pearson and other political leaders, however, believe Churchill
may propose a compromise and hope the United States can accept it, feeling
that the political gain might offset the technical loss.
9. Comment on Spanish reaction to anticipated US aid:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
The US State Department has expressed interest
Fei3o.its- that the Spanish Government is misrepresenting the motives and
conditions of proposed American aid to Spain and that the Spanish people are
not being informed as to American objectives in seeking a military arrange-
ment with Spain.
Spanish propaganda has treated impending
American aid and military negotiations as a personal victory for Franco
and as vindication for his intransigent refusal to alter the internal policies
of his regime, as well as overdue recognition by the United States of the
military value of Spain. The controlled press has strongly implied that
economic aid will not necessarily depend upon military considerations and
that every sector of the country's economy will receive immediate aid in
major proportions.
The emphasli s on economic aid and official
expressions to American representatives of impatience over its delay re-
flect the political importance to the regime of concrete evidence of US
assistance and may result in serious disappointment with the results of
future negotiations.
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NORTH AMERICA
1-0. Canadian Cabinet rejects NATO request for economic aid to Europe:
3.5(c)
The Canadian Cabinet on 12 January rejected 3.3(h)(2)
the recommendation of the Temporary Council
Committee that Canada extend 200 million dollars
in economic aid to Europe in 1952. Minister of
External Affairs Pearson was unable to override the opposition of the Minister
of Finance, whose views were accepted with little debate.
The Cabinet has Indicated that Canada might
provide some additional military aid to Europe out of its 2.5 billion dollar
defense budget for the fiscal year 1952-1953. The American Embassy in
Ottawa points out that this suggested transfer would mean only the diversion
of some defense production to NATO without any increase in the Canadian or
the total NATO effprt.
Comment: This unexpected action may be a
government attempt to frustrate opposition efforts to make mounting domestic
inflation a major political issue in a year which may see a general election.
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3.5(c)
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