CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/01/18

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02046527
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: January 18, 1952

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TOP SECflET ftaP-
SEC Y INFORMATION
18 January 1952
copy NO. 4.3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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� Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP
ET
SEC INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
USSR
1. Comment on new travel restrictions in the USSR (page 3).
2. New indications of TU-4' s or jet bombers in the Soviet Far East (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Chinese Communist food production reportedly increased (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. American Ambassador in Cairo opposes dispatch of US military
assistance to Canal zone (page 6).
5. Italians reportedly seek deal with British regarding recruitment
of workers for Suez (page 6).
6, Greek Deputy Prime Minister expresses preference for American
command (page 6).
7, Greek Marshal Papagos urges new elections (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Niemoeller limits scope of Moscow discussions (page 8).
9. Belgium takes firm stand against Temporary Council recommendations
(page 8).
LATIN AMERICA
10. Outlawed Venezuelan party reportedly purchasing arms in Paris age 9).
* * * *
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USSR
1. Comment on new travel restrictions in the USSR:
The Soviet Government has enlarged the
restricted travel area for foreign diplomats to include key localities
in the vicinity of Moscow as well as twenty-two cities in European
Russia and Siberia. This action has the effect of further limiting
foreign knowledge of defensive installations surrounding Moscow. Five
of the cities are located on the Trans-Siberian railroad west of Lake
Baikal. With these additions to previous restrictions, all possibility
of observing this main artery for the supply of war materials and in-
dustrial goods to the Far East and the Korean front is eliminated.
(See map on following page.)
2. New indications of TU-4's or jet bombers in the Soviet Far East;
3.3(h)(2)
indicate; the probability that TU-4 (B-29 type)
aircraft or jet bombers, or both, are present
in the Soviet Far East. Since 19 November,
at least six aircraft subordinate to the Third Long Range Air Army at
Khabarovsk have displayed flight characteristics resembling those of the
TU-4. 3.3(h)(2)
On 14 January, an aircraft flying in the Kha-
barovsk-Vladivostok area, using communications procedures usually
associated with bombers and transports, reported that it was flying at
altitudes up to 29, 000 feet and attaining speeds of approximately 400 miles
per hour. The same aircraft reported an altitude of approximately 26, 000
feet six minutes after taice.thf. This suggests a very high-performance
jet type, although the indicated rate of climb may be the result of an error
in transmission.
3
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3.
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3(h)(2)
FAR, EAST
3. Chinese Communist food production reportedly increased:
3.3(h)(2)
The preliminary Communist estimate of food
production in China during 1951 is 130, 065, 000
tons, or ten million tons higher than the 1950
output,/
/final figures will not be available until the levy of farm taxes is corn-
pleted in March 1952.
Comment: Increasedefood production would
indicate that Communist China's economy, which is predominantly agri-
cultural, has not been critically affected in spite of the strains of the Korean
conflict. Although final figures will probably vary from the preliminary
estimate given above, the Chinese Communists appear to 4ave been success-
ful in at least maintaining the 1950 level of agricultural output, from which
Peiping was able to export over a million tons.
TC$1 EC1E
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. American Ambassador in Cairo opposes dispatch of US military assistance
to Canal zone:
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According to the US Ambassador in Cairo, the 3.3(h)(2)
dispatch of American warships or other military
contingents to the Suez Canal zone in compli-
ance with the British request for assistance would
endanger the establishment of the proposed Middle East Command.
Comment: The Egyptian Government has already
publicly warned that it would consider foreign military assistance to the
British authorities in the Canal zone as a "hostile act."
5. Italians reportedly seek deal with British regarding recruitment of workers
for Suez:
The Italians are reportedly trying to arrange a 3.3(h)(2)
deal whereby the British will be allowed to re-
cruit semi-skilled Italian labor for the Suez
Canal zone on condition that Britain import
Italia orke s r its coal mines.
Comment: The British would like to obtain
14, 000 semi-skilled Italian workers forthe Canal area. The Italians, how-
ever, in view of their large unprotected minority within Egypt and
their desire to maintain good relations with the Arab states, are not likely
to permit the British to recruit any considerable number of workers in
addition to those already in the Suez area.
6. Greek Deputy Prime Minister expresses preference for American command:
3.3(h)(2)
Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos stated that
the Greek Government preferred .American to
British command over its defenses since "it
would be more rafional that orders should be issued by the same authority
which assures the supply of equipment and provisions. "
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3.3(h)(2)
7. Greek Marshal Papagos urges new elections:
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Marshal Papagos, leader of the opposition in 3.3(h)(2)
Parliament, has reiterated to the American
Ambassador his determination not to collaborate
with Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos, whom he
distrusts. The present government, Papagos believes, is damaging Greece
by its release of dangerous Communists, by political meddling in the army,
and by failing to deal with pressing economic problems. Papagos urged the
Ambassador to use his influence with the King for the dissolution of Parlia-
ment and for holding new elections on the majority system.
Comment: Marshal Papagos has steadily
opposed collaboration with any other party and has continued to call for new
elections. Recent governmental moves, replacing pro-Papagos army
officers and pressing for an investigation of the rightist officers' organi-
zation, have apparently strengthened this attitude and there is little hope
for effective cooperation between Papagos and Venizelos. While the govern-
ment has Obviously been lax in its screening of the political prisoners it
has released � possibly a thousand persons have been set free � Papagos
has exaggerated his criticism in the hope of enlisting the Ambassador's
support.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Niemoeller limits scope of Moscow discussions:
Pastor Martin 3.3(h)(2)
Niemoeller, during his recent visit to Moscow,
concentrated his attention on church matters
and the question of German prisoners of war.
He refused to have high-level political talks except for a discussion with
Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin.
Bishop Otto
Dibelius, top German Protestant leader, feels that the Western Powers
have not taken sufficient interest in promoting talks on unity between the
East and West Germans. The Bishop points out that the strongest anti-
Communist element of a united Germany would be found in East Germany.
3.3(h)(2)
Comment: Dibelius' recent statements on the
Niemoeller trip and the question of German unification have not been con-
sistent. Although he first indicated that he agreed with some of the criti-
cism of Niemoeller's mission to Moscow, he later publicly defended the trip.
On the issue of German unity, Dibelius has
told Adenauer that he approved in general of the Chancellor's policy of
placing West German integration ahead of German unification. This 1atf3st
report of his support of unity discussions suggests a lack of strong con-
victions on the subject
9. Belgium takes firm stand against Temporary Council recommendations:
Belgian Foreign Minister van Zeeland has 3.3(h)(2)
refused to consider withdrawing his country's
note rejecting the NATO Temporary Council
Committee's recommendations for increased
'Belgian defense expenditures. Claiming domestic approval, he reiterated
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Belgium's opposition to the Committee's procedures and stated that his
country was not alone in thinking that the rights of the smaller countries
were at stake. Van Zeeland suggested that the only solution would be for
another group of twelve representatives to discuss comparative national
contributions.
Comment: Belgium's intransigent attitude on
this question and on the European Payments Union may be extended to its
position on the European Defense Community, .notwithstanding the recently
announced modification of the Dutch stand.
LATIN AMERICA
10. Outlawed Venezuelan party reportedly purchasing arms in parts:
two former high officials of the out-3.3(h)(2)
lawed Democratic Action Party of Venezuela
are negotiating for contraband arms in Paris.
One consignment of arms was reportedly shipped, or about to be shipped,
on 7 january.
Comment: One of the Democratic Action
officials went to Paris in November 3.3(h)(2)
to present "the case against the Venezuelan dictatorship" to the United
Nations. This report may represent merely an erroneous interpretation of
his presence in Paris.
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