CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/04/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02692624
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: April 25, 1952

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SECtJ INFORMATION
25 April 1952
Copy No. 52
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE /N CLASS.
1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T8 S Cvadt
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DATE-M. 1/i e? Fir:viFwrp �
AUTHAm' HIV 0.46.7.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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S9JMTY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
L British views differ on Korean POW repatriation (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. New Soviet oil field near Afghan border (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Indonesia may propose breaking embargo on rubber sales to
(page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4.
5,, Turkish abstention in Tunisian case causes domestic criticism
(page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. East German defector describes unity campaign as tactical (page 6).
7. East German Politburo charts action to culminate in May (page 6).
LA TIN AMERICA
8. Bolivian unrest affects South American stability (page 7).
* * * *
China
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GENERAL
1. British views differ on Korean POW repatriation:
The American Embassy in London reports th23.3(h)(2)
the Foreign Office has submitted a brief to
Foreign Secretary Eden recommending that
Britain insist that the United States yield on
the prisoner repatriation issue if necessary to keep the Korean truce
talks going. The Embassy in Washington is understood to have sought
an American commitment to consult the United Kingdom before negoti-
ations are allowed to break down on this issue.
According to the London Embassy, however,
Prime Minister Churchill is personally interested in the problem and
in informal ministerial discussion has maintained that under no circum-
stances should the prisoners held by UN forces be sent back against
their will "to face Communist reprisals."
Comment: Although previous indications of
British views on the Panmunjom talks have not revealed any special
concern over the American position, British officials apparently now
appreciate that the prisoner exchange issue is the key problem.
SOVIET UNION
2. New Soviet oil field near Afghan border:
Ithe Azerbajdzhan Technical
I Supply Trust had refused to ship equipment
reduired to shut off the gusher at Kaganovichabad, about 30 miles north
of the Soviet-Afghan frontier.
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Comment: This is the first evidence of a new
oil field coming into production in the Tadzhik SSR. Oil from older
fields in this area has been of relatively poor quality.
The interest of the Soviet Union in developing
the oil resources of this general area
the USSR was ready to help Afghanis-
tan exploit its oil deposits adjacent to the Soviet border.
FAR EAST
3. Indonesia may propose breaking embargo on rubber sales to China:
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The American Embassy in Djakarta has learned
that immediately prior
to the departure of the Indonesian delegation to
the Ottawa Rubber Conference, to be held in
May, the Foreign Office was considering breaking the embargo on
rubber sales to China.
In addition, Prime Minister Wilopo has been
publicly quoted as stating that the Indonesian Government is in contact
with India, Ceylon and Singapore for presentation at Ottawa of a united
stand on rubber exports to Iron Curtain countries. This stand, however,
is as yet undetermined.
Comment: Indonesia has complained that the
UN-sponsored ban on rubber exports to China, to which Indonesia re-
luctantly adhered, depressed rubber prices. During the past two months,
a further drop in prices and a seriously shrunken market for low grade
rubber have created a general demand in Indonesia for an expansion of
exports.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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5. Turkish abstention in Tunisian case causes domestic criticism:
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Turkish abstention in the UN Security Council3.3(h)(2)
vote on the Tunisian - French dispute has been
widely criticized in the Turkish press. A
Turkish Foreign Office spokesman told the
American Ambassador on 22 April that his country had taken this action
because it wished to maintain solidarity with the Western powers, and
that it would have voted for consideration of the Tunisian case if the
United States had done so.
Comment: This is the first time that Turkish
adherence to United States policy has aroused widespread criticism in
the press. Although the Turks have been uniformly critical of Egypt
and Iran in the disputes of those countries with Britain, there is apparently
considerable belief in Turkey that the Tunisian complaint is justified.
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WESTERN EUROPE
6. East German defector describes unity campaign as tactical:
The current Soviet unity campaign for Germany
is only a tactical maneuver, according to Gerold
Rummler, personal relations officer for East
German Foreign Minister Dertinger. Rummler,
who fled to West Berlin, about two weeks ago, asserted that East Ger-
man politicians were worried by the prospect of all-German elections
until informed by Russian Ambassador Pushkin that the Soviet Union did
not contemplate "sacrificing" the East German regime in free elections.
American observers in Berlin comment that
the East German tactics support R ummler' s
statements.
Comment: Rummler later stated publicly that
Dertinger does have plans for all-German elections, but that his plans
call for separate simultaneous elections in East and West Germany,
with the West German parties being excluded from East German election
lists.
This information may disillusion the one-third
of the West German populace which either supports the Soviet unity offer
or has not as yet been convinced of its insincerity.
' 7. East German Politburo charts action to culminate in May:
East German Premier Grotewohl and his
deputy, Walter Ulbricht, returned from
Moscow about 13 April and convened a meeting
of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) politburo to discuss action to be taken
should West Germany sign the contractual agreement prior to the hold-
ing of a four-power conference.
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The USSR will reportedly apply continuous
pressure for a four-power conference while the SED takes immediate
steps to mobilize the West German support. Through local action
groups the SED will try to swing the West German Socialist Party over
to the side of resistance before 1 May. The Communists plan May
Day demonstrations for unity along the inter-zonal border, where large
numbers of People's Police will be stationed.
The conference revealed that SED leaders
believe the contractual agreement will be signed by mid-May, whereas
the USSR believes it is still possible to "hinder" the signing.
LATIN AMERICA
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8. Bolivian unrest affects South American stability:
The Chilean Foreign Minister believes that the
Bolivian revolt was the "joint work of the Nazis,
Peronists, and Communists," and was part of
an over-all plan for South America. He states
that Presi ent az s enssoro is clearly not in control, since he cannot
persuade the "Communist" miners to surrender their arms.
The general belief of diplomats in Santiago is
that there must be an intensive investigation of the Communist and
Peronista threat to South America before Bolivia is recognized, and
that the United States decision on recognition will determine the immedi-
ate political future of South America.
Comment: Brazil also is not yet satisfied that
the Paz Estenssoro regime is stable and a high Foreign Office official
mentioned the possibility of an additional coup. Chile and Peru fear that
any new disorders in Bolivia might eventually spread to their countries.
Spain and Guatemala are the only countries
which have recognized the new Bolivian Government.
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