THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786688
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 27, 1968

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� Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secrct
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27 February 1968
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� Information as of 1600
�27 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
No significant large-scale enemy attacks oc-
cured in South Vietnam on 27 February, but the
Communists directed mortar and artillery fire at
several key installations. Communist forces have
dug trenches in the immediate vicinity of the Khe
Sanh base and have even dug under the base's
defensive wire barrier.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Airborne observers in the Khe�Zanh atea'repott
that enemy forces have dug trenches in the im-
mediate vicinity of-the US Marine strongpoint
(Paras. 1-:2). The North Vietnamese 320th Divi-
sion is 'shifting eastward (Paras. 3-5). There
are tenuous indications that elements of the
29th Regiment have moved to the Hue area (Paras.
6-8). The Viet Cong are consolidating forces
under new battalion and regimental headquarters
(Paras. 9711). New attacks are possible in
the Central Highlands -(Paras, 12-17). Enemy
harassment continues in the Saigon area (Paras.
18-20). Elements of the 5th and 9th divisions �
continue to threaten Saigon (Paras. 21-23).
Armored vehicles. have been:encountered in Tay
Ninh Province (Paras. 24-25), Two battles were
rePorted in the delta on 26 February (Paras. 26-
27
) �
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Viet Cong attacks
in Hau Nghia Province have succeeded in undoing
much of the. work accomplished by the Revolutionary
Development program (Paras. 4-6). The city of
Da Lat appears to be well on the road to .recovery,
but the formerly complacent population has suffered
a serious psychological blow (Paras. 7-8).., Of-
ficials in Vinh Long Province are turning in an
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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Although no significant large-scale enemy
ground attacks were reported on 27 February, Com-
munist forces continued to shell allied bases and
installations near the Demilitarized Zone in the
western highlands and in the Saigon area.
Khe Sanh
2. in the Khe Sanh area
enemy forces have dug trenches in the
immediate vicinity of the US Marine strongpoint.
On 25 February an observer saw an enemy trenchline
that came within 50 meters of the east end of the
airstrip. Extensive trenchworks were also noted
within 100 meters of the southwestern perimeter of
the base. At two points Communist trenches now
extend under the base's defensive wire barriers.
North Vietnamese 320th Division Shifts Eastward
3. There are indications that the North Viet-
namese 320th Division is assuming control of enemy
operations in northeastern Quang Tri Province.
This area, which includes the allied strongpoints
at Con Thien, Gio Linh, the "Rockpile," Camp
Carroll, and Dong Ha, had generally been the re-
sponsibility of the North Vietnamese 324B Division
before major elements of that unit moved south
early this year to the Quang Tri city area.
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4.
small elements of the 320th Divisions 's 64th Regiment
were to participate in an attack near Dong Ha on 27
February. This is the first indication that the
320th intends to operate this far east. The Dong
Ha base did come under a heavy mortar, artillery,
and rocket barrage on the 27th. American casualties
were relatively light, but there was extensive damage
to equipment. Several weeks ago a North Vietnamese
prisoner reported that elements of the 320th Divi-
sion's 52nd Regiment were also shifting eastward
toward Gio Linh.
5. The headquarters of the 320th Division and
a third regiment, probably the 48th, remain in north-
central Quang Tri Province. This force, in coordina-
tion with the North Vietnamese 27th Battalion, con-
tinues to pose a threat in the area of Con Thien.
Camp Carroll, and Khe Sanh.
tne recent mortar,
artillery, and rocket attacks on Camp Carroll were
intended to "create tension," probably to divert
allied 175-mm. fire support from the Khe Sanh area.
Hue
elements of the 29th Regiment,
North Vietnamese 325C Division, may have moved south-
east from the vicinity of Khe.Sanh to the Hue area.
Tactical messages which previously were identified
as Originating', from the North. Vietnamese 6th Regiment
now appear to serve the 7th-and 9th battalions of
the 29th Regiment.
7. It has been suspected for some time that
the 6th Regiment was reinforced by other units in
the recent fighting in the Hue area. The presence
of the 29th Regiment in Hue, however, has not been
confirmed by prisoners or captured documents.
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8. It is possible that a newly infiltrated group
of North Vietnamese troops was sent to take part in
the battle for Hue. Documents and a prisoner recently
captured near Hue refer to a "24th Regiment." This
could be the 1,000-man force trained by the 350th Divi-
sion in North Vietnam and known to have infiltrated
into southern Quang Tri Province in November 1967.
Viet Cong. Battalion_and Regimental. Headquarters
9.- A number of reports from.various intelligence
sources over, the past:few months- indicate .that the Com-
munists have been consolidating existing Viet Cong dis-
trict companies into battalions and existing battalions
into new regiments. This provides the, enemy with an
improved command control capability and probably ac-
counts for some of the success which the Communists
have had in recent weeks in coordinating attacks over
widespread 'areas..
10. Two recent examples of new headquarters groups
being aimed have been reported in the southern I Corps..
In Quang Tin Province, a prisoner reports that three
Viet Cong district companies Were consolidated into a
74th Battalion late.last month. The 74th Battalion in
turn reportedly has been grouped with the 72nd Local
Force and the 70th Main Force battalions to form a regi-
mental-size entity designated the ."Quang Tin Provincial
Force." All three battalions in this force participated.
in a cOordinated attack on Tam Kyi the Quang Tin pro-.
Vinaial capital, during the initial Tet.offensive.
11. Captured documents indicate that the enemy
has also formed anew regiment, designated the 328th,
in Quang Ngai Province. The regiment consists of the
formerly independent 38th Local Force Battalion, the
81st Main Force Battalion, and two separate Viet Cong
companies. The 328th Regiment is believed to have
coordinated with the 401st Sapper Regiment in the
30 January attacks on Quang Ngai city.
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The Western Highlands
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12. Mortar and rocket attacks on 26 February
against Camp Holloway Airfield at Pleiku and against
South Vietnamese Army headquarters installations
at Kontum, coupled with sharp enemy ground probes
near Dak To and Ban Me Thuot, support indications
of another round of im-
pending Communist offensive activity in the
western highlands.
13. Elements of the 1st North Vietnamese
Division are continuing tactical reconnaissance
and battlefield preparation activity in the Dak
To/Ben Het/Tan Canh area of western Kontum
Province,
The enemy troop concentration includes combat
maneuver elements of the division's 66th and
32nd regiments, supported by the 40th Artillery
Regiment which recently shifted from Cambodia
to fii-ing positions southwest of Ben Het. The
recent unusual move of the 1st Division head-
quarters element to the 66th Regiment headquarters
area northwest of Ben Het--the first time since
prior to the November 1967 battle for Dak To--
provides further evidence of impending enemy offen-
sive activity in this area.
14. An offensive thrust by North Vietnam's
1st Division against allied positions in western
Kontum would probably be designed to tie down
allied garrison troops in defensive positions
and to draw allied reinforcements from nearby
district and provincial towns, thereby enabling
other elements of the B-3 Front to attack heavily
populated urban areas to the south.
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15. The present deployment of all three battalions
of the 1st Division's 174th Regiment midway. between
Kontum and Pleiku cities suggests that this may indeed
be the enemy's intention. Other B-3 Front forces
available for operations against the provincial capi-
tals of Kontum and Pleiku include elements of the 24th
and 95 "B" Regiments and three Viet Cong sapper, bat-
talions.
16. Meanwhile, in western Pleiku Province,
intensified recon-
naissance and preparations for artillery or mortar at-
tacks against allied bases at Plei Djereng and Le Thanh,
possibly on 27-28 February.
17. the
southward Move of a probable battalion-size subordinate
of North VietnaM's_32nd Regiment from the Dak To. area
to northernparlac Province,. From its current-lOca-
tion-thit unit could either move eastward to 'reinforce
the 5th Division or southward to reinforce the 33rd
Regiment The recent shift of the 33rd Regiment head-
quarters from the Ban Me Thuot area northward suggests,
however, that it may link up with this battalion.in
joint offensive activity against the Darlac prOvincial:
Capital.
Harassment of the Capital Continues
.18,. Communist artillerymen launched a series:of-
rocket and mortar attacks in the Saigon area on 27 and
28 febtuary: At least nine 122-mm. rockets .struck Tan
Son Nhut Air Base causing minor- damage to 12 Air Amer-
ica,planes and one building. A.number-of small-scale
mortar barrages- were directed against .selected targets
within' the capital, such as the New' Port area, the..head7
quarters of the Saigon. military governor, and several
housing. areas.
,19. 'Interrogation of prisoners captured. during the
Tet offensive against Saigon has revealed some of the
routes used by the enemy to infiltrate the city. A .
number of enemy units:are currently.believed to be. in
the. generalarea of these. approach routes,
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20. The major identified routes are clustered to
the west and southwest of the city and only a few lead
directly frOm the north, northeast,. and south. The ma-
jority-of located Communist units are. currently situated
within 7-10 miles of the outskirts of the capital city
and are generally closer to the city than the staging
areas for most of the enemy units which infiltrated
Saigon for the Tet attack.. .
23. The 274th Regiment, a subordinate of the Viet
Cong 5th Division, has been noted in extensive and de-
tailed reconnaissance activity near US and South Viet-
namese base camps at Xuan Loc and Suoi Ram as well as
in the Bien Hoa area. An unidentified element of this
division, possibly from the same regiment, was ordered
by its headquarters to continue planning for an artil-
lery attack on the Bien Hoa Air Base on the night of
27 February. A rocket attack was reported at the Bien
Hoa Airfield early on 28 February (Saigon time).
Twelve Americans were killed and several aircraft and
buildings were destroyed. The field remains fully
operational.
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Armored Vehicles in Tay Ninh
24. Late on 26 February a US Special Forces
patrol near the Cambodian border some 13 miles west
of Tay Ninh city clashed with an estimated battalion-
size enemy force which was reinforced by four tracked
vehicles. Thirty enemy were killed when one of the
vehicles blew up after being hit. The vehicle may
have been transporting ammunition or explosives.
25. The vehicles have not yet been identified.
It is more likely that they are half-tracks or ar-
mored personnel carriers than tanks, although the lat-
ter possibility cannot be ruled out. If they are
tanks, it would be the farthest south such vehicles
have been used by the enemy. Soviet designed PT-76
tanks were used against Lang Vei several weeks ago.
Cambodian forces are known to have light tanks and
half-tracks in the area adjacent to the border.
The Delta Provinces
26. Two significant engagments between allied
and Viet Cong forces occurred in the delta provinces
of Phong Dinh and Vinh Long on 26 February. Eighty-
three Viet Cong were killed in battles fought just
outside the cities of Con Tho and Vinh Long. A num-
ber of other recent clashes near provincial capitals
in southern IV Corps area means that the Communists
are continuing to maintain pressure in the vicinity
of major urban areas of the delta.
27. The new South Vietnamese IV Corps commander,
Major General Nugyen Duc Thang, is reportedly pre-
paring a plan to combat the Viet Cong in the delta.
Thang's plan, which will be called Operation COUNTER-
ATTACK, is to assign specific attack missions to
every armed South Vietnamese unit for a 15-day pe-
riod. The primary targets will be local guerrillas
�and their lines of communication and supply bases.
Enemy concentrations nearest the major cities will
be hit first and subsequent attacks will move out
from the urban areas in all directions.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Aftermath of the Tet Offensive in Hau Nghia
4. The Communist Tet'offensive in Hau Nghia,
Province has clearly set back the Revolutionary Devel-
opment program. The full extent of the recession is
as yet not known because of the inability of officials
and advisers to get into many villages. The judgment
of US observers, however, is that the Communists have
dealt. the Revolutionary Development effort at least
a severe "psychological" blow.
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5. Local officials in Hau Nghia are reported to be
so unnerved from the Tet attack and so fearful of an-
other onslaught that their effectiveness has been im-
paired. Most officials are now back on the job, ex-
cept in Cu Chi District, but the, are dragging their
feet on a recovery program. The provincial recovery com-
mittee, for instance, cannot agree on how to assist
some 2,800 homeless in the province, let alone make
plans to handle the thousands who fled to safer areas
and who will need assistance when they return.
6. Although Hau Nghia has historically been hos-
tile toward. the Saigon government, the pacification
effort had appeared to be yielding results in some
parts of province. During the Tet attacks,.how7
ever, it:was-apparent that much Of the local populace
was-cooperating.with the Viet Cong. Since the Tet of-
fensive, at least five outposts have fallen through.
treachery and one district headquarters narrowly missed
-
a similar fate. US officials believe that it is im-
possible to. judge now whether local.inhabitants and
members Of the army cooperated with the Communist Tet
offensive out. of fearor out of commitment, but provin-,
cial.attitudes are presently a source of concern to
the government. It is believed, however,-that there
would have been far more popular assistance for the
Viet Cong had it not been for the Revolutionary Devel-
opment work carried on during the past two years.
Situation in Da Lat
7. The recovery effort in Da Lat appears to be
moving ahead efficiently, according to US observers,
but the psychological impact of the Viet Cong attack
has probably been greater here than in many other
areas of the country. Da Lat had long been South
Vietnam's most tranquil city. Observers now report
that, although popular morale is not particularly
low, the people have lost confidence in the govern-
ment's ability to withstand further attacks.
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8. The Tuyen Duc Province chief, Lt. Colonel
Nguyen Ngoc Bich, showed himself unable to cope with
the crisis and unwilling to cooperate with senior
military officers in the city during the attack.
Other local officials, however, were more efficient.
Da Lat's mayor has organized a refugee committee
which coordinates municipal services and private
volunteer assistance, and the municipal council chair-
man has mobilized a Da Lat Citizens' Committee. This
group has collected donations, arranged for the trans-
port of supplies from other areas of the country, and
assisted in the distribution of supplies to refugees.
As of 21 February, the 20,000 refugees in camps in
the city comprised approximately 25 percent of the
population. Only an estimated 5,000 of these, however,
were homeless.
Situation in Vinh Long
9. Local officials in Vinh Long appear to be
taking an uninspired approach to the problems facing
them. Americans characterize their performance in
the recovery field as adequate. Much of the problem
results from the fact that the province chief, who
was wounded in early January, is still confined to
a wheelchair. His deputy is reportedly competent,
but has not provided good leadership. Other offi-
cials are described as lethargic.
10. There are approximately 15,000-20,000
refugees in camps in Vinh Long city, and US ob-
servers report that few civilians have made an ef-
fort to start rebuilding or even to reopen their
shops. Apparently little has been done to assess the
damage done to the Revolutionary Development program
throughout the province. Plans are being made to
move teams back out to the hamlets, but military
forces have not been actively pursuing the Viet
Cong. One American observed that it appears gov-
ernment officials are just hoping the Communists
will go away.
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