THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786544
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 16, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top Secret
Reo'
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
127
16 February 1968
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Information as of 1600
16 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
Scattered fighting and shelling continues in
I Corps and low-level reports continue to point
to another round of attacks. Enemy tanks have
been observed in the eastern part of the Demili-
tarized Zone for the.first time.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Enemy tanks were reported in the Demilitarized Zone
north of Con Thien on 16 February. Sharp skirmishes
have taken place in several parts of the I Corps
area during the past few days, and enemy attacks
in the Quang Tri city area may come soon (Paras. 1-8).
(Paras. 9-12). National Police Director Loan warns
that the Communists may be planning another wave
of attacks (Paras. 13-14). Two allied airfields in
Phong Dinh Province in the delta were shelled on 16
February (Paras. 15-16).
Political Developments in South Vietnam:.
Captured, documents underline a Communist intent to
enOge in a long-range campaign to build their strength
in the cities (Paras. 1-5). Progress is slow in
opening roads to bring food supplies into Saigon,
although stocks are adequate and prices are falling
(Paras. 6-7).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nOthing. of significance to .report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The first
high-level Communist analysis' of the 'Tet Offensive was
published .in the North Vietnamese Army daily on 11
February (Paras. 1-5). Routine'Communist propaganda .
begins to emphasize the need for, a'long-term struggle
(Paras. 6-8). .The Poles are stepping up political
support for the Liberation Front' (Para.'9)
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. North Vietnamese forces have intensified
their shelling of allied stkongpoints from Khe
Sanh eastward along the Demilitarized Zone to
the South-China Sea. They have also brought in
armor, first employed against Lang Vei on 6
February, to the Con Thien area. Meanwhile, at
least two regiments of North Vietnam's 324 "B"
Division are continuing battlefield preparations
near Quang Tri city. Elsewhere in the northern
provinces, the battle for Hue entered its 19th
day on 16 February with enemy forces still en-
sconced within the walls of the Citadel.
2. Most urban areas of II and III Corps
remained under firm allied control on 16 February.
New attacks against Nha Trang Airfield and a
district town near Tay Ninh city, however, may
portend renewed major attacks against the capitals
of Khanh Hoa and Tay Ninh provinces.
3. Although enemy pressure on the Saigon
area has eased considerably, police director
Loan �has warned that a second wave of Communist
attacks involving the northern provinces and
Saigon may come as early as 18 February.
4. With the exception of renewed attacks
against two airfields in Phong Dinh Province
and sporadic fighting on the outskirts of Can
Tho city, the over-all military situation in IV
Corps was quiet on 16 February. Allied sweep
forces continued to press a series of operations
designed to deflect reported Viet Cong plans for
further widespread attacks against heavily popu-
lated urban areas in the delta.
16 February 1968
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I Corps
5. Three enemy tanks were observed in the
Demilitarized Zone approximately five miles. north-
east of Con Thien on 16 February. At last report,
US Marine tanks were preparing to fire on the
enemy tanks and air strikes had been requested.
There has been no word on the results. The North
Vietnamese would most likely employ the light,
amphibious PT-76-type tanks in the Con Thien area.
These were used successfully by the Communists in
their attack on the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp.
The amphibious capability of these tanks would
enable them to cross the tien Hai River.
6. North Vietnamese gunners continue to shell
allied positions along the length of the Demilitarized
Zone. The base at Khe Sanh'was hit by 14 heavy rockets
and over 100 mortar rounds. on 15-16 February. Two
Marines were killed and 28 wounded. Other outposts
in northern Quang Tri Province reported nearly 100
'rounds of incoming mortar and artillery fire.
7. Allied forces continueto press. operations
in the Citadel area of Hue. Heavy air strikes and.
naval gunfire are supporting the attack. Enemy
resistance has been stiff. US Marines.and.infantry-
men have also reported,numerous small-rscale but
bloody actions down the.length of I Corps during the
past few days. On 14 FebrUary 12 US troops were
killed and. over 100 woundecIin an ambush fives miles
west of Camp Carroll. Sharp skirmishes have also
been reported southwest of Quang Tri city, on. the
outskirts of Hue, and south of Da Nang along, the
Quang Nam - .Quang Tin border.
Enemy Threat in Quang Tri City Area
8.
the North Vietnamese may be preparing large-scale
coordinated attacks in the Quang Tri city area.
Extremely detailed reconnaissance reports and other
offensive preparations have been noted for some days
by the 812th Regiment. It now ap-
certain that the 803rd Regiment has crossed
the Cua Viet River and joined the 812th east of Quang
Tri city.
pears almost
next few days.
attacks may come within the
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II Corps
9. Early on 16 February the Nha Trang Air-
field was hit by 14 rounds from 82-mm. mortars.
The barrage resulted in no allied casualties and
only minor damage.
10. An unconfirmed report made available
by South Vietnamese police officials
claims that Viet Cong main force and
rilla units are positioned several miles west
the provincial capital city of Nha Trang. These
forces are reportedly awaiting orders for a new
large-scale attack on the city to be staged in
conjunction with massive mortar attacks on mili-
tary and administrative headquarters in and near
the city.
guer -
of
11. This report is similar to a flurry of
others suggesting that renewed enemy attacks on
major urban areas may be imminent. Many of these low-
level reports are undoubtedly intended to alarm the
populace and confuse the cities' defenders. Never-
theless, the potential threat of further attacks
poses a serious problem to the key military and civil
targets throughout the country.
III Corps
12. In Tay Ninh Province, an estimated force of
300 to 400 attacked the Phu Khuang district town, early
on' 16February. A sector headquarters.; two' South
Vietnamese 'outposts, and a training center were the
targets of the attack which lasted for' more than four
hours and included more than 50 rounds of B740 rocket
fire. Preliminary reports show 21 South Vietnamese
wounded and two Communists killed and eight weapons
captured.
Saigon
13. Although the Saigon area has seen a sharp de-
cline in enemy pressure during the past few days, Na-
tional Police Director General Loan warned on 16 Feb-
ruary that a second wave of Communist attacks involving
Khe Sanh, the Demilitarized Zone area, Quang Tri city,
Hue, and Saigon could break as early as 18 February. Loan
reportedly based his warning on information derived from
the interrogation of prisoners, some of whom were re-
cently apprehended while en route from neighboring Long An
Province to Saigon.
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14. Loan further. estimated that it would re--
quire three. months. to restore the security situa-
tion in Saigon to its. pre.,-Tet level. In view of
this, he strongly -argued that .three South Viet-
namese battalions, in:addition to his police units,
shoulabe:Ipermanently based inside the.capital
to share responsibility for the city's security.
IV. Corps
15. Phong Dinh. Province, some. 100 miles
southwest. of. Saigon, was the focal point of the
most significant-Communist.military activity re-
ported in. delta. on 16 February. The allied
airfields at Binh Thuy.and Can Tho were shelled
by enemy mortar, rocket, and recoilless rifle fire
for the fourth and fifth times, respectively,
since the_CoMmunistTet_offensive began on 29
January. AiIied.casualties and aircraft damage
resulting from. the attacks were minimal. Both'
airfields remain operational..
16.
Meanwhile, allied forces
reported several heavy
clashes on 15 February three miles southwest
of Can Tho, which resulted in 54 Viet Cong killed.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Communist Plans for Action in the Cities
1. Recently available texts of captured docu-
ments confirm that the Communists have a long-term
plan to build up their strength in the cities. It
thus seems likely that the Viet Cong will follow
the recent Tet offensive with continuing political
and military pressure against the urban areas.
2. Documents discussing a.step-up in activ-
itiesAm the, cities have appeared frequently over
the.past. years; late last summer, however, they
began. to increase.gradually in number; apparently
as the Communists began preparations for their
offensive against urban centers. Long aware.of
their neglect- of. this area, they acknowledged that:
"in many. cities and towns, (party), committee cadre
have .not given proper attention to...carrying out .
the revolution's policy." But..."cities, in par-
ticular', are the enemy's, last sanctuaries, and
should be destroyed at any cost.... We must desig-
nate Weak areas. and cities and strongly develop-
our-guerrilla warfare.to strike regularly in 'those
places.".
3. Detailed instructions for Viet Cong agents
being sent into the cities were captured near �
Saigon last June. Methods for infiltrating and
exploiting labor unions and other organizations
were spelled out. An indoctrination lesson captured
in I Corps in December called for "more emphasis
on cities and towns to develop political struggle
movement and armed actions therein." A Viet Cong
directive of 20 November called for city units in
Pleiku Province to use secret guerrilla cells to
"prepare the battlefield" inside the city and create
favorable conditions there to "bring troops inside
for operations," presumably with the Tet offensive
in mind.
4. Assuming that some urban centers would be
liberated, a directive of 16 November probably
issued from Military Region 5 Headquarters instructs
Viet Cong units on how to behave. The civilian
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population and,private property were to be protected.
Looting and drinking were prohibited. South Vietnam-
ese military personnel and civilian officials, pre-
sumably excepting "traitors and tyrants," were to be
propagandized, but not ill-treated.
5. The Communists in their Tet offensive failed
to enlist widespread popular support, but their di-
rectives suggest a longer term effort to� get at the
population in cities and towns.
Economic Conditions
6. Food prices in Saigon fell approximately
six percent by 14 February, but they remain 60-65
percent above the pre-Tet level. According to the
US Embassy, shipments of some foods are slowly begin-
ning to arrive in the capital, but other foods are
becoming more scarce. The road situation does not
appear to have improved appreciably. A boatload of
shrimp arrived from Nha Trang on the 14th and one
or more trucks of fish were delivered, probably
from Vung Tau. A convoy of foodstuffs was also re-
ported to have arrived in Saigon from the Mekong
Delta, but it never reached the markets, apparently
because all of it went to the government and other
priority consumers. Pork and poultry are in par-
ticularly short supply in the city because of in-
secure road conditions and a lack of proper feed.
7. Route 4, the principal land artery to the
delta, has been passable between My Tho and Saigon for
some time, but police and army checkpoints hinder the
movement of food supplies. As of 14 Fepruaryi trucks
carrying food were being required to unload outside
Saigon. The supplies were then loaded onto much
smaller commercial vehicles. Route 15 to Vung Tau
is open, but travel is recommended only in convoy.
8. Reports from the delta point to widely vary-
ing economic conditions. Commercial activity in My
Tho and Can Tho is near normal, but Vinh Long city
reported on 13 February that the market was closed
and commercial activity was almost at a standstill.
Similarly in Ben Tre, where the marketplace was com-
pletely destroyed and numerous shops and small in-
dustries severely damaged, almost no economic ac-
tivity has been reported.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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4. Another interesting aspect of Binh's article
is the polemical language he uses. The use of such
language usually indicates disputes among the hier-
archy itself or jibes by the Vietnamese Communists
at foreign Communist powers. In Binh's article,
the jibes appear to be aimed at Peking and Chinese
military doctrine, although the possibility of internal
disagreement among the North Vietnamese leadership it-
self cannot be ruled out. There are two polemic ref-
erences in the article. The first characterizes the
attack on the cities as a wholly new and brilliant
strategy which the "southern leadership" was able to
devise because they are not "bound by outmoded ex-
periences."
5. The second reference to the same issue
says, "the facts emerging during the past few days
have clearly proved that the view held by the south-
ern revolution is extremely clear-sighted.... The
war is not like any war in history." Both references
could clearly be considered insulting to the Chinese,
but they could also refer to disagreements within the
the Vietnamese Communist leadership.
6. Communiques from several of the Viet'Cong
regional commands reviewing the military situation
since the Tet offensive are also beginning to take
the line that the "victories" achieved in the past
two weeks lay the groundwork for a more intensive
period of fighting ahead.
7. Communiques from the Communist commands
in the highlands and in the delta claimed the
"victories" recorded in the offensive produced
"favorable conditions" for an advance toward "still
greater victories." An editorial in the Hanoi
party daily broadcast on 16 February followed the
same line. It claimed that the recent fighting had
"smashed the enemy's grip on the countryside and
loosened allied control in the urban areas." These
successes, it claimed, have tipped the balance of
forces in favor, of the Communists and created fav-
orable conditions for their "advancing toward total
victory."
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8. While promising new and greater victories,
current Communist propaganda is also pointing out
that such successes will be costly. The Liberation
Radio, in analyzing the "successful struggle" in
Saigon in a 14 February broadcast, pointed out that
"no fierce difficulties, hardships, or sacrifices"
can slacken the surging thrust of the people of the
capital city. Other, statements using the well-worn
Communist theme that the greater its defeat the
more fiercely the US will struggle have warned of
increased difficulties, but guarantee that perseverance
will bring victory.
Polish Support for the Viet Cong
9. Liberation Front representative in Warsaw,
Tran Van Tu, met with Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz on
16 February, according to a Polish announcement cited
by Reuters. No details of the meeting were made
public. Warsaw radio made a similarly uninformative
announcement on 15 February that Tran Van Tu had met
with Foreign Minister Rapacki three days earlier.
10. The Polish press in the last two weeks has
given front page treatment to the "heroic" Viet Cohg
offensive, and almost daily meetings of Front repre-
sentatives with various Polish groups have been
dutifully reported. It is possible that Tu's
progress up the ladder of Polish officialdom is in
line with this propaganda, and that it may lead to
an enhancement of the Front's status in Warsaw.
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