THE SITUATION VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786539
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 19, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top Secret
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
128
19 February 1968
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Information as of 1600
19 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
No new Communist attacks were reported during
the past 24 hours, although enemy forces pose A
threat to several urban areas.
1. The Military Situation in South. Vietnam:
There were no new major'Communist-attacks reported
in South Vietnam on 19 February.: Enemy resistance
continued in some urban centers, and a flurry of
reports and rumors suggested renewed Communist at-.
tacks_in several parts of the country (Paras. 1-21).
Political Developments in-SOpth. Vietnam.:
Vice President Ky has not yet acted on-his decision
to resign as chairman of the Vietnameae task force
(Paras. 1-3).-
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is further evidence of North Vietnamese
preparations for offensive air operations in the
southern part of North Vietnam (Paras. 1-3). The
possible presence of a new attack aircraft is
discussed (Paras. 4-7).
IV. Other Communist Military. Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Hanoi
attacks the San Antonio formula (Paras. 1-2) and
singles out fighting in Quang Tri Province as
especially significant (Paras. 3-4). Peking again
registers its disapproval of third party efforts
to get negotiations going (Paras. 5-6).
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I. �THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
I Corps
1. Communist military activity decreased
on 19 February. Enemy efforts consisted largely of
light, sporadic artillery and mortar attacks directed
against allied positions strung along the Demilitarized
Zone.Ground contacts in northern Quang Tri Province
were limited to light skirmishes.
2. In Hue; allied forces reported little
progress against firmly entrenched enemy troops. There
continue to be indications that the Communists may
initiate- major new actions in the. Hue area:possibly-
reinforcing enemy troops in the city. or launching
new attacks.
3. If new enemy activity materializes in
Hue, it may involve elements of the 812th North Viet-
namese Arm Re iment.
the 812th headquarters
and at least four supporting companies were possibly
attempting to move southward from the Quang Tri city
area to Hue. It appears the deployment of this enemy
task force was at least temporarily halted, possibly
because of allied forces positioned on the route of -
movement, It is
not clear whether the three infantry battalions of the
812th were also to move .to the Hue area.
suggests the 812th task
force may have progressed to a point midway between
Hue and Quang Tri city by the 18th.
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4. With the attention of parts of the 812th Regi-
ment apparently focused on Hue, the Communist threat to
Quang Tri city has probably decreased slightly.
5. Farther north, it appears elements of the 320th
North Vietnamese Division have moved into the Con Thief!
Gio Linh area recently vacated by major elements of
the 324B Division. A captive from the 48th Regiment of
the 320th stated on the 13th his battalion was moving
into the Gio Linh area. On 19 February, an unidentified
320th subordinate was located some six miles southwest
of Con Thien. Continued Communist pressure on friendly
positions in the eastern Demilitarized Zone area can
be. expected, but this apparent move by elements �of the
320th should decrease enemy pressure against Camp Carroll.
II Corps
6. Enemy ground action continued in Phan Thiet
during 19 February. By 6:00 p.m. (Vietnam time), Commu-
nist forces were in control of the provincial hospital
and had igurrounded the Binh Thuan Province interroga-
tion center. The enemy force in Phan Thiet has been
initially identified as the Viet Cong 840th Main Force
battalion, one of the Communist elements involved in
the January attack on Phan Thiet.
7. Interrogation of several enemy captives indi-
cates the Communists have made plans for additional
attacks against military positions and urban areas in
the western highlands. A large-scale rocket attack
on Pleiku city is reportedly scheduled for 23 February.
Another prisoner indicated the Da Lat military academy
is to be attacked.
have asserted that "there will be no let-up in the
activities." This appears to refer to actions by
elements of the B-3 Front.
III Corps
8. With the exception of Phuoc Long Province, where
an estimated two Communist battalions remain entrenched
wit.hin the capital city of Song Be, III Corps reported
a general easing of enemy pressure on 19 February.
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Preliminary interrogation Of seven enemy
prisoners captured during the initial phase of the
18.Februararasauit'againstSong Be indicates that
the. Communists intend to make a determined effort
tor-:gain complete control of. Phuoc Long Province.
ThaTrovince.ohief, who is deeply troubled by the
deteriorating security situation, believes that
the-Liberation Front wants to occupy one province
alOng. the Cambodian border where it". could either
establish a coalition government or negotiate from
a'pOsition of strength. He also feels that the
government forces in- the northern provinces may
inCrease enemy pressure throughout III Corps.
' 10. The attack against Song Be, according
tcithe seven captives, was :scheduled to last seven
days unless it tell sooner Their specific tission
was .to destroy South Vietnamese installations in
thatown. Interrogations indicate the attacking
force :at Song Be ,consisted of two battalions from
the .52nd Regiment/7th North Vietnamese' DivisiOn.
The- prisonera claimed that the two battalions were
replacement personnel :who had only recently arrived
from:North:Vietnam.
11
approximately half of the houses in Song Be
have been destroyed since the attacks began on 18
February. An estimated 3,000 refugees have report-
edly congregated at the north end of the city near
the provincial headquarters and the MACV compound.
The Saigon Area
12. An uneasy calm prevailed over the Saigon
area on 19 February, as.mortar, rocket, and small
arms fire continued within the city proper and near
Tan Son Nhut Air Base. No major enemy ground
assault against the capital has materialized.
19 February 1968
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13. A flurry of unconfirmed rumors and reports
suggest, however, an early increase in Communist hos-
tilities against the capital. One report claims an
enemy force is planning to cut the main road between
Saigon and the US base at Bien Hoa to restrict US
reinforcements. The main South Vietnamese Army hos-
pital near Gia Dinh city is reportedly also an enemy
target; the enemy would attempt to seize the building
and use it as a headquarters to direct an attack against
the South Vietnamese Army Joint General Staff head-
quarters in Saigon. The Viet Cong have also report-
edly distributed leaflets in some areas of the capi-
tal advising residents to evacuate because of im-
pending attacks purportedly on the night of 19-20
February.
14. In addition, an unevaluated South Vietnam-
ese estimate indicates that the second major phase of the
Communist Tet offensive is scheduled to start 20 Feb-
ruary and that, in preparation for this, the Viet Cong
-have infiltrated some 2,000 a day disguised in South
Vietnamese uniforms into the outlying districts of
Saigon. The estimate concludes that the Communists
have the mission of seizing Tan Son Nhut Air Base
�at any cost.
15. Interrogation of a prisoner, who claims
to have been the executive officer of a battalion sub-
ordinate to the military affairs section of the Sai-
gon-Cholon forces, provides sketchy information on
the organization and preparation for the enemy's gen-
eral attack phase.
16. According to the prisoner, if the first attack
was unsuccessful, the Viet Cong would send armed propa-
ganda cadre into the capital to build a low-level uni-
fied base of authority. The first phase also called for
"youth and student forces" to replace all sapper groups
that were destroyed. They would continue to destroy,
assassinate, and create disturbances.
17. In phase two, large Communist forces are to
enter Saigon a second time for a general offensive,
coordinate with the political elements, and take con-
trol of the government. According to Viet Cong head-
quarters (COSVN) if the first phase does not succeed,
the second phase will start in April.
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18. The prisoner also stated that Communist �
Military Region 4 in the Saigon area had been dis-
banded and replaced by six subregions commanded
directly by COSVN's forward he.4dquarters. The
eight districts in the capital were reorganized into
the Saigon-Cholon committee which included military,
political, and rear service elements.
19. The failure of the enemy's initial attack,
and the continued presence of main force elements in
the general area, together with recently captured
documents outlining the Military Region reorganiza-
tion, lend support to the plan outlined by the cap-
tured officer.
IV Corps
20. The latest Communist outburst against wide-
spread urban areas and allied military installations
in the delta appears to have slackened on 19 February,
although multibattalion Viet Cong forces remain near
the beleaguered provincial capital of Vinh Long city.
Late reports indicate that South Vietnamese 9th Divi-
sion forces have regained control of the cathedral
and most strongpoints within the city.
21. Reports of Viet Cong plans, to continue wide-
spread offensive operations against heavily populated
provincial and district towns in IV Corps continue to
be received. the Viet
Cong have moved into the second phase of the "general
offensive" in order to set up a so-called "revolutionary
government" in Can Tho, the capital of Phong Dinh
Province. The "general offensive" in Can Tho will
allegedly be "fulfilled and completed" in three days
beginning 18 February. No .major ground attacks have
been reported against Can Tho during the latest wave,
although nearby airfields and outlying defensive
positions have been hard hit by mortar fire.
19 February 1968
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Vice President Ky has apparently decided
either to remain as the Vietnamese task force
chairman.or to defer his resignation until later.
On 16 February task force coordinator General
Thang told an American participant in the group
that he had recommended to Ky that the task force
continue under Prime Minister Loc and that Secretary
to the Prime Minister Doan Ba Cang take over Thang's
duties. An announcement of this change was to
have been made on 17 February. It never came, and
Ky presided at all sessions on the 17th and the 18th.
2. Cang, should he take a leading role in the
task force, will probably prove effective. Americans
on the task force report that he is the committee's
"brightest light." He has apparently taken a tough
line with slackers on the task force and has been
quick to see that Orders get carried out.
3. The greatest problems facing relief opera-
tions in Saigon and throughout the country are the
continuing curfew and its varying applications
country-wide. The curfew is restricting travel and
the movement of supplies. It is hampering port
operations, the work of the government and other
essential business. On 17 February, General Thang
appealed to Capital Military District Commander
Khang, who is in charge of security, for a reason-
able relaxation of the curfew restrictions. Khang
would not hear of it. Vice President Ky agreed on
18 February to a country-wide 7 p.m. - a.m. curfew
but had to refer the matter to Khang and Joint
General Staff Chief Vien for a final decision. A
favorable verdict is not likely now, in view of
the renewed Viet Cong attacks. Refugees as of
18 February totaled 411,000, with 128,000 in
Saigon.
19 February 1968
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. There is further evidence that North Viet-
nam is developing a capability to undertake offensive
air operations in areas south of the Hanoi-Haiphong
region.
2.
,radar stations are being established in
southern North Vietnam. This type of radar is im-
portant for enemy air controllers if logistic or ground
attack missions are �to be flown south of the Demilitarized
Zone. It would be mandatory for successful North Viet-
namese MIG intercepts �of US aircraft, such as B-52s bomb-
ing near Khe Sanh.
3.
in the southern portion of North Vietnam--
Bai Thuong, Vinh and Dong Hoi--indicates that they have-
been prepared to support at least limited operations
by propeller-driven tactical and transport aircraft.
Repeated US air strikes on these bases deny their u7e
by jets,
the enemy can repair runway damage well enough to permit
frequent AN-2 and IL-14 flights to these fields.
New Attack Aircraft?
4. North Vietnam may also be introducing a new
aircraft to improve its ground attack capability. On
15 February extremely unusual terminology was em-
ployed by North Vietnamese fighter pilots as they
conducted high-speed, low-level flights in two un-
identified aircraft. The flights could have been
tests of newly assembled or repaired aircraft.
5. On the other hand, the nature and explicit
detail of the information passed between the pilots
and ground controllers suggested that they were
dealing with an aircraft with which both were un-
familiar.
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6. The low altitude at which the flights
were conducted and the range of speeds indicated--
326 to 543 knots--suggests:that.a modern ground
attack aircraft was involved. Both MIG-17s and
MIG-21s can carry out this .sort of mission, and it
is possible that these aircraft, perhaps with modi-
fications., made the flights. Neither, however,
are.used extensively in a ground attack role by
the Soviet Union, which .uses the SU-7. In the
light of Hanoi's apparent neuCinterest-in offen-
sive air operations, it is possible that SU-7s have
been delivered to North Vietnam.
7.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
19 February 1968
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V. CoMMUNIST. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Hanoi party daily on 18 February issued
one of the Communists' most direct and lengthy rejec-
tions of the San Antonio formula. Calling the formula
a "double-dealing trick," the paper promised that Hanoi
would reject any "other US moves for reciprocity."
2. The commentary also-went back to earlier and
tougher language demanding that the US must stop the
bombings "definitively and unconditionally." North
Vietnam has omitted the word "definitively" in impor-
tant policy statements in recent months and has used it
only infrequently in more routine propaganda commentary.
Its reappearance in this article does not appear to
represent a stiffening of North Vietnamese demands for
a cessation of bombings. On more authoritative levels
and through diplomatic channels Hanoi continues to in-
sist only on an "unconditional" cessation.
Communists Single Out Quang Tri Front
3; In another propaganda statement on the mili-
tary situation in the northern part of South Vietnam,
the Viet Cong radio on...18 February described the "Quang
Tri. Front" as. "a giant noose, that is tightening around
the necks of UStroops." The commentary singles out
Khe-Sanh-as a,.place where the US is worried about a
"new Dien Bien Phu -. type battle." It draws.the most .
direct.paraIlels between. Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh
yet.noted.in..Communist.propaganda, but it does. not
limit. the Communist threat to that area.. The broadcast
claims that Communist. actions in Quang Tri Province
since the opening of -the Tet- offensive have driven
allied forces into "a state of complete.encirclement"
from the coastal area to the mountains around Khe Sanh.
4. It takes note of one of the principal elements
of enemy strategy in-saying main force units are being
used to disperse and tie down allied troops, while lo-
cal and guerrilla forces intensify their activities
throughout the province. It claims the action so far
has created favorable conditions for dealing the US
"new decisive blows." It concludes by praising Commu-
nist forces and says their activities will be .the fore-
runner to "a new Dien Bien Phu - type of heavy defeat
for the enemy."
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Peking on Negotiations
5. Peking has once again repeated its op-
position to third-party efforts to obtain a
negotiated settlement in Vietnam. A New China
News Agency broadcast on 19 February asserted
that the recent overseas trip of UN Secretary
General Thant as well as Prime Minister Wilson's
visit to .the US and the Soviet Union were part
of the alleged US effort to intensify the "peace
talks fraud" in "collusion" with the USSR. The
broadcast did not mention Widely publicized
North Vietnamese contacts with Thant, but it
predicted that the Vietnamese would not be
fooled by the "trick" and would continue fight-
ing until the US was defeated.
6. The broadcast is part of Peking's in-
creased propaganda commentary on Vietnam. Last
week the volume rose to the highest level in
three years. The bulk of it is devoted to hail-
ing alleged Communist "victories" in Vietnam.
There hag keen no significant departure from
previous Peking positions.
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