CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192653
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 22, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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22 March 1968
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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
iNrector of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense,.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminaiy views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
lop-Swat-
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22 March 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Israel-Jordan: The Israeli troops have pulled out and
the border is quiet. (Page 3)
Czechoslovakia: Novotny may be ready to quit. (Page 5)
Poland: Gomulka apparently is unable to calm fac-
tional struggles in the party. (Page 7)
Burma: White Flag Communists are planning a ter-
rorist campaign. (Page 8)
Panama: The legislature is set to oust Robles soon.
(Page 12)
Mauritius: Ties with Moscow and Peking (Page 13)
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*Vietnam
South Vietnam !The tempo of military activity
picked up slightly on 21-22 March.
In Hau Nghia Province, US and South Vietnamese
forces engaged a battalion of the 272nd Viet Cong Regi-
ment in a seven-hour encounter and reported killing
142 of the enemy. Allied forces also fought Commu-
nist troops near Ban Me Thuot and in the I Corps coastal
area between Hoi An and Tam Ky. Enemy rockets and
mortars hit several allied airfields, including Tan Son
Nhut, but casualties and damage were relatively light.
Communist forces now appear to be pulling back
slightly from several areas in South Vietnam which
had been indicated as primary attack objectives.
A partial withdrawal, or at least a lessening of
interest, has been noted in the Khe Sanh, Hue, and Da
Nang areas in I Corps and near Dak To and Ban Me
Thuot in II Corps. Certain enemy main force units
also appear to be moving away from Saigon.
These movements are probably selective and of a
temporary nature since there is a continuing sense of
urgency in the message activity of high level Commu-
nist echelons. Moreover, the enemy forces which
have withdrawn to more secure areas are still in posi-
tions from which strikes could be launched against
strategic allied positions with a minimum of prepara-
tion.
The apparent pullback could be an attempt by the
enemy to evade the widespread sweeps which allied
forces have launched since the Tet offensive. The
Communists could also be regrouping and resupplying
their forces prior to launching the next phase of the
winter-spring campaign.
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LFJ. LA-1J I.
North Vietnam: There are more signs that a sub-
stantial number of infiltration groups are en route to
South Vietnam.
North Vietnamese AN-2 aircraft are apparently
preparing for flight operations within the next few days
near the Demilitarized Zone, possibly in the Khe Sanh
area.
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*Israel-Jordaru Israeli troops have withdrawn
from Jordanian territory and the border is quiet after
the most serious military operations since the June war.
Accurate figures are not available but casualties
appear to be fairly substantial on both sides. Israel
claims to have killed 150 "saboteurs" and inflicted sub-
stantial losses on regular Jordanian Army units. Tel
Aviv admits to 21 killed and 70 wounded, but these
figures may be low, as helicopter traffic carrying
wounded troops to Jerusalem's largest hospital during
the fighting was "brisk." The Israelis have admitted
the loss of one aircraft and several armored vehicles.
Apart from the Jordanians, Arab reaction to the
Israeli attack was rather subdued. The Iraqi and Saudi
military forces stationed in Jordan apparently did not
engage in the fray.
a 20 minute Egyp-
tian-Israeli artillery duel across the Suez Canal took
place during the afternoon of the fighting. Damascus
radio played martial music.
King Husayn's call for an Arab summit confer-
ence has been accepted by Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen
and Lebanon. Although no date has been set, it will
probably be convened soon.
Nasir's acceptance of the call for a summit
meeting reflected his increasing pessimism over chances
for a peaceful settlement to the current impasse with Is-
rael. "Attempts for a political solution, have so far
brought no result," the published text quoted Nasir as
saying, so "it is now necessary that we prepare the field
to achieve victory through a joint Arab effort."
Soviet Defense Minister Grechko is currently in
Iraq, and the Israeli attack may tempt Jordan to invite
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him to visit Amman. Moscow's reaction will be to
cite the Israeli attack as the prime cause of the Jar-
ring mission's failure, and use it to buttress its of-
fers of military aid to Jordan. Izvestia noted yester-
day that Jordan was attacked only 12 hours after Jar-
ring left Amman, and that Israel has steadfastly re-
fused to implement the Security Council's November
resolution. Soviet news media have automatically
added that responsibility for the clash must be "shared
by Tel Aviv's American and British patrons."
In the UN, Jordan has urged the Security Council
to invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to end the Is-
raeli attacks. This provides for punitive measures
such as economic sanctions and even the use of force.
Although the council is more pro-Arab than last year
and sentiment is running against Israel in the case of
these attacks, it is unlikely that the council would take
such punitive action. However, the council may con-
demn all breaches of the cease-fire from any side and
demand strict implementation of past UN resolutions.
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*Czechoslovakia: President Novotny has said he
is ready to throw in the towel.
On 22 March the presidium of the party central
committee announced that in agreement with his re-
quest Comrade Novotny will be released from the func-
tion of president of the republic ostensibly because of
his health. Following this powerful push, Novotny will
probably attend to the formalities very soon. Josef
Smrkovsky, a leading exponent of "democratization,"
is most frequently mentioned in Prague as Novotny's
successor.
According to a Prague newspaper, he told official
visitors on 20 March that "he would always abide by
decisions of the Communist Party and that now, at the
age of 63, he no longer has any personal ambitions."
Novotny apparently believes that to delay his resigna-
tion any longer would cause serious disruption. He was
quoted as saying, "all that matters to me is the party
itself."
The timing of Novotny's resignation seems to
have been affected by the visits to Moscow on 19 March
of Deputy Premier Cernik, who is Czechoslovakia's top
economic planner, and of Major General Egyd Pepich,
chief of the Army Main Political Administration. Both
are Dubeek's men, and Cernik may eventually become
premier.
Presumably both went to the USSR to discuss with
Soviet government and military leaders forthcoming
changes in the regime's hierarchy
Cernik may also have had an additional mission, to sound
out the Russians on the possibility of a loan to tide Czecho-
slovakia over its economic difficulties. He conferred
with his Soviet counterpart Baibakov, and with Premier
Kosygin, then went home on 20 March. Pepich stayed on
until the following day for conferences with military
leaders.
(continued)
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The Soviet response to Cernik's visit was cool,
suggesting that Moscow still intends to keep its options
open. Press coverage of his talk with Baibakov makes
no mention of any understanding, while the coverage
of his visit to Kosygin says merely that a "friendly
discussion" took place. If indeed Cernik asked for
credits, he was probably put off.
*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense.
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Poland: Gomulka's efforts to calm the factional
struggles in the party apparently have not succeeded.
The equivocal reception of Gomulka's speech on
19 March by at least some in the audience of party
activists suggests that his attempt to project a middle-
of-the-road image may not have satisfied either the
party's hard-liners or its moderates. Indeed, there
are now some signs of differences between Gomulka
and other top party leaders.
The politburo reportedly is, or will soon be, in
session to map out the party's future course, and there
are rumors that a central committee plenum will be
convened in the next few weeks. The intervening pe-
riod is likely to be one of intensified factional maneu-
vering.
Meanwhile, the majority of Warsaw students ap-
parently did not participate in the 48-hour sit-in strike
which began on 21 March. Most of them stayed home,
defying stern warnings by university authorities threat-
ening "serious consequences," including expulsion, to
those who did not resume their studies.
There are reportedly signs of weariness among
the students, and there may be some indecision over
what course to take in the wake of Gomulka's speech.
While most students are resentful that Gomulka failed
to address himself to their demands, they are said to
have been relieved that his tone was milder than they
expected.
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Burma: The Communist Party of Burma (White
Flag) has called upon its members to mount a terror-
ist campaign on 28 March.
The campaign, set to
begin on the 20th anniversary of the party's going un-
derground, may be partly in response to an increased
government offensive begun early this year. In addi-
tion, the White Flags may hope to exploit popular re-
sentment over the Burmese Government's recent re-
strictions on rural rice sales.
Although terrorist activity probably would be re-
stricted to rural areas of southern Burma--where most
of the approximately 4,000 White Flag Communists are
located--isolated acts could also be directed against
Rangoon. The White Flags have increased their activity
and perhaps their strength during the past year, but
they are still hampered by inadequate logistics, poor
coordination, and ideological divisions.
It is unlikely that the White Flags, or any other in-
surgent group in Burma, can sustain an ambitious cam-
paign against the government. The government is aware
of the Communist order and is conducting military sweeps
designed to forestall any significant upsurge of terrorism.
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Panama: The legislature will probably attempt
to convict and remove President Robles for electoral
malfeasance by 24 or 25 March.
Arnulfo Arias' National Union is making an all-
out effort to mass its supporters in Panama City during
the trial. As soon as Robles is sentenced, the Arias-
controlled asseinbly plans to swear in First Vice Presi-
dent Max Delvalle, an Arias man, as chief executive.
Delvalle is already choosing his cabinet, in which he
intends to include the father-in-law of National Guard
Commandant Vallarino.
National Union secretary general Nicosia told the
US Embassy that "everything depends on Vallarino's re-
action." Nicosia said that his party expects him to do
everything possible to hinder its activities. In that case,
Nicosia added, the party will be forced to rely on the
reaction of the masses.
A rally for government presidential candidate
David Samudio is scheduled for today, and Vallarino 'S
handling of the crowds will be closely watched by the
Arias forces. Nicosia affirms that while they have
avoided criticizing the guard or any confrontation with
it up to this point, they will not tolerate partisan activ-
ity by Vallarino.
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NOTES
Mauritius: The government, in office only since
independence on 12 March, has announced that it will
establish relations with both the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China. Although Prime Minister Rangoolam
was probably inclined to recognize Communist China
in any event, he presumably was influenced by a Chi-
nese offer of economic aid, including an immediate
and badly needed shipment of 10,000 tons of rice. Mos-
cow has been quietly penetrating the island's youth and
labor organizations for several years, and Peking has
sought to cultivate a variety of elements, including the
local Chinese community.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 21 March
1968 approved the following national intelligence es-
timates:
SNIE 58-68 "Communist Intentions in Laos"
ME 93-68 "Brazil"
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