Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM Sec D � - ��-� � pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 I. s (0)64) Approvad or Date 1 2 March 1968 No. 0638/68 R,1 *2 . Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 s (a) C-4) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 2 March 1968 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM International Communist Aid to North Vietnam Summary The USSR continues to provide the overwhelm- ing share of the increasing amounts of military aid being provided to North Vietnam and is willing to sustain this commitment at present or even higher levels.[la deliveries will increase even further in 19684: ithere is no quantitative limit to the types of the-Is- sistance that the USSR would provide with the pos- sible exception of offensive weapons that would result in a confrontation with the US.E: :Ithe USSR cannot refuse to provide aid if it wishes to maintain its position in the so- cialist camp. L: does not believe that the recent increase in aid eliveries reflects an awareness on the part of European Communist power that the Tet offensive was imminent. the USSR has not been able to use its aid pro ams as a means of influencing North Vietnam' conduct of the war.[3the Chinese are a more influential power. I . (a) (-4) Finally, [7. :Ithe USSR will use force to maintain access to the port of Haiphong. The evidence offered to support this statement conflicts sharply with the present judg- ment of the intelligence community and is under- going extremely close scrutiny. pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 J 1.3(0)64) � Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 AINEMON4 t.s62-X-4') Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam 1. The record of military aid deliveries to North Vietnam in 1967 and information on agreements for 1968 deliveries reflect the dominlant role of the USSR as the main supplier of military equipment. Information l: jindicates that military aid deliveries from North Vietnam's allies will increase even further in 19684: :also makes it clear that there is no quantitative limit to the aid that will be provided to support North Vietnam's military ef- fort.and to offset the effects of bombing of the North or the material losses in South Vietnam. Military Aid Deliveries in 1967 2. Our estimates of Communist military aid deliveries by quantity and value in 1965, 1966, and 1967 are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The value of military materiel delivered to North Vietnam in 1967 from the Soviet Union and Communist China increased to a total of about $660 million, from $455 million in 1966 and $270 million in 1965. -2- pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 1611��10. Of the total value of goods delivered in 1967 the Soviet Union supplied almost 80 percent--about the same percentage of the total supplied in 1965 and 1966. Communist China supplied the bulk of the re- mainder. Although East European countries supplied only negligible quantities of combat materiel in 1965 and 1966, the amounts increased during 1967 and will be even greater in 1968. 3. Soviet military aid has concentrated on air defense equipment including surface-to-air mis- siles, antiaircraft guns, radar, and fighter air- craft including MIG-21s. Chinese military aid has concentrated on the build-up of North Vietnamese ground forces and sustaining the military effort in South Vietnam. More recently, China has provided radar of increasing sophistication and apparently has supplied large quantities of MIG-17s in 1967-- most of them being delivered in response to heavy losses in the latter part of the year. 4. Although we cannot make a confident judg- ment on levels of military deliveries at any par- ticular time, there appear to have been erratic changes in the categories of military goods pro- vided by some donors during 1967. Communist China delivered only eight MIG-15/17s during the two- year period 1965-66 but is believed to have de- livered about 61 of these aircraft in 1967 with the bulk of them arriving in the latter part of the year. About 12 were delivered in late October and about 28 in December. The North Vietnamese armored vehicle inventory probably was increased substantially in the latter part of the year. Pho- tography of October revealed at least 38 armored vehicles or self-propelled guns at Ping-hsiang China believed to be en route to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union. L these might well be a Czech-produced armored V; hide known as the TOPAS. This vehicle was speci- fically requested by the DRV delegation that ne- gotiated 1968 deliveries in Prague during the fall of 1967. C -3- pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 LsCaX4) ,....Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 The 1967 Military Aid Agreements 5. During 5 August to 18 October 1967, rep- resentatives of the DRV concluded with 12 Communist countries* trade, aid, and technical-scientific agreements that were generally declared to be for strengthening the economic and national defense po- tential of the DRV. Details on the agreements are not available but public statements indicated that at least Communist China, North Korea, Bulgaria, Poland, USSR, Hungary and Rumania agreed to provide military assistance without charge to the DRV. 6. The 1967 agreements were also significant because for the first time the majority of the do- nor countries acknowledged that military as well as economic assistance was being provided to North Vietnam. 7.E :I The ne- gotiations with the European Communist countries were used, particularly by the USSR and Czechoslovakia, as an opportunity to encourage North Vietnam to give more public emphasis to its political rather than its military objectives. This approach on the part of the European Communist countries was reported to reflect their interest in a negotiated settlement of the war. The North Vietnamese rejected these ap- proaches, partly on the belief that they can with- stand present manpower losses "for a hundred years" and partly on the belief that North Vietnam is ruin- ing the US and its economy. � 8. Hanoi was able to obtain commitments for greater amounts of assistance but not to the levels it sought. The need for increased levels of mili- tary assistance is apparently regarded by the Com- munist countries as a logical result of the increased *These 12 countries are the USSR, Communist China, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, East Germany, Albania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Mongolia and Cuba. -4- pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 %maw, �Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 ftwo.�� 1.3 (c3C-0 damage caused by the bombing of the North and the war in the South. Generally, Hanoi's solicitations followed the pattern of previous years andE :Irevealed no in- tentions with respect to military strategy or North Vietnam's views of the phasing of the war. f: the North Vietnamese delegation stressed the need for accelerated deliveries in 1968 but gave no elaborations on the reasons. L: :Icomplaints on delays in deliv- eries, attributable in part to Chinese obstruction, have been chronic although abating somewhat in 1967. 9.E :/attributed the more widespread acknowledgment that military assistance is being provided to North Vietnam as simply a ploy to pre- clude Chinese charges that European Communist coun- tries are not helping their Communist ally. Terms of the Agreements 10. The 1967 negotiations followed the pat- tern of previous years. Military aid is negotiated as a separate agreement whereas economic assistance is negotiated as annual protocols to long-standing agreements. All military assistance and much of the economic assistance is grant aid. Although some of the economic assistance is carried on the books as credits,1: areported that there was no expectation that these credits would be repaid. L: also indicated that all of the donor countries are aware that they will have to pick up much of the costs of North Vietnam's postwar reconstruction. The Limits of Soviet Aid Programs 11. The public announcements about the 1967 aid agreements and information on the volume of goods being imported by North Vietnam all support an upward trend in military assistance from all donors, particularly the USSR. 1: made several observations that confirm Soviet willing- ness to give North Vietnam almost unlimited mili- tary assistance. -5- %MOM* pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 sOC-0 it.861X.4) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 imam* 12. Despite the fact that Hanoi's requests to Czechoslovakia in the 1967 negotiations were not fully met, the general impression among Czech official circles is that North Vietnam is provided essentially all the assistance it seeks. The out- look is that military aid will stay at least at its present high levels and if further assistance is required it will be provided. The USSR,E: 3, feels that it cannot jeopardize its position in the socialist camp by refusing to meet demands for aid. He reported, moreover, that the volume and sophistication of the aid provided would have been even greater if it were not for the Chinese. El ja Soviet of- fer to provide more advanced equipment and tech- nicians was refused by the North Vietnamese be- cause the Chinese would object to a further influx of Soviet technicians. The Soviets apparently are not willing to provide this equipment without the accompanying technicians. 13. The only practical inhibition to Soviet willingness to provide aid at ever increasing levels is the desire to avoid a confrontation with the US. Thusl: ithe USSR would not, for example, provide short-range surface-to-surface missiles for use against targets in South Vietnam. howeverl: they would provide such equipment if there were an invasion of North Vietnam. a 62Y-1) 14. The extent of the Soviet commitment to the North Vietnamese is illustrated by the source's report of the Soviet attitude toward a report that the US was considering_ the mining or a blockade of the port of Haiphong. L jthe Czechoslovak minister of national defense was told by high Soviet military officials that if these measures were taken by the US that Soviet merchant ships would be provided armed escorts and woula. shoot their way through. The evidence offeredL _77to support this statement conflicts sharply with Ehe present judgment of the intelligence com- munity and is undergoing extremely close scrutiny. -6- Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 J Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 11 I.SCc.)64) Aid and Influence 15. Despite the significant role of the USSR in providing assistance to North Vietnam there is little evidence that the USSR exerts any influence or leverage on North Vietnam's conduct of the war. The North Vietnamese themselves have emphasized re- peatedly that the strategic conduct of the war has been purely Vietnamese in origin and nature. 16. This situation is confirmed byl: jt The Soviets, for example, have had little suc- cess in influencing North Vietnam to negotiate a settlement of the war. Indeed, Soviet offers to in- crease the type and quantity of assistaxi2e have been refused. E ...the large shadow of Communist China looms foremost in North Vietnam's attitude toward foreign Communist powers. Because of Chinese objections the North Vietnamese have refused both Czechoslovak and Soviet offers of military experts and have allowed only Soviet missile experts to maintain an extended presence in North Vietnam. This latter point to the best of our knowledge is true. 17. On balance any power has an inf uence over North Vietnam s conduct of the war it is Communist China. E: sulted3ith the Chinese before the Tet offensive. the North Vietnamese may well have con- At any rate t Ilreading of Soviet and Czech reac- tions to the Tet offensive is that the high military officials in these countries had no prior knowledge of the event and took a rather sober view of the whole affair. ij if �7� p proved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 ��.� ..] Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 L Table 1 Soviet-Military Aid Deliveries to North Vietnam 1965-1967 - s (a)6.4) Total Value 1965 1966 . Zuantity (Units) (Million us $) Quantity (Units) (Million us $) At Foreign Trade Prices At Foreign Trade Prices 210-- 360 - -=-=. SAM Missile systems 72 77 Firing Battalions 15 66 lo. _44_ Replacement Missiles 200 6 1,100 33 Aircraft 57 17 85 45 IL-28�light jet bomber 7 3 14I0-21 jet fighter 11 g 26 21 MIG-15/17 jet�fighter 32 4 42 .. 6 MI-6 Helicopter 6 _ 12 14I-4 Helicopter 3 1 7 1 U-MIG-15 jet trainer 3 Negl. AN-24 Medium Transport 3 .3 1 2 IL-18 Heavy Transport 1967 (Million USS) ,Zuantity At Foreign (Units) Trade Prices -4 c-= . ,4-_ 17.g ==-__. _ _ . 5 22 3,810 _ . 114 . 15 12 .� . 15 _ --.: Armor .113 5 15 Negl. 123 T-54 medium tank 340 3 --4-5 T-34 medium tank 25 PT-76 amphibiouS tank 25 1 . 5 1-Tegl. 10 BTR-40 armored personnel carrier 25 Hegl. 10 Negl. 40 BTR-50 armored personnel carrier 3 ZSU-57 self-propelled gun 8 Negl. SU-76 assault gun 30 Negl. Artillery 100-mmAAA 85-mm AAA -mm 57 AAA 37-mm AAA 14.5-mm AAA Field artillery (76-152-mm) Radar Vehicles Small arms add other infantry weapons Ammunition (metric tons) 1,1130 38 5 12 17 - 2 1 1 2160 _ --3 70 2,830 _ 50 5 - 2 - 25 NI. _1 . 17 2 164 2,230 53 19 21 . Ps Negl. 5 2 . =. 100 315 485 250 230 50 23 650 17,000 loo 55 735 1,850 50 40 _ 465 590 850 100 225 89 850 79,000 400 40,000 pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 Table 2 Chinese Communist Military Aid Deliveries to North Vietnam 1965-1967 1965 (Million US $) Quantity At Foreign (Units) Trade Prices Total Value Aircraft 8 MIG-15/17 jet fighter Naval craft Shanghai-class fast patrol boat P-6 class motor torpedo boat 2 2 Armor 25 T-34 medium tank 25 Artillery 320 57-mm AAA 100 37-mm AAA 200 14.5-mm AAA Field artillery (76-mm) 20 Radar Vehicles Small arms and other infantry weapons 600 Ammunition (metric tons) 8,000 60 2 2- 1 1 6 W 2 Negl. 3 10 33 1966 (Million use) Quantity At Foreign (Units) Trade Prices 2 2 140 100 40 400 10,000 95 --0 2 0 4 Negl. 2 35 41 1967 (Million US $) Quantity At Foreign (Units) Trade Prices 6 6 645 100 120 425 67 700 24,000 pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00011747 150' 8 4 8 1 3 7 4 22

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST AID TO NORTH VIETNAM