THE ATTRITION OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES 1968-1969
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00012509
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March 30, 1968
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LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ
Document
TBE ATTRITION OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES, 1968-1969
30 MARCH 1968
CENTRAL INTELLTGENCE AGENCY
DEFENSE INTELT,TGENCE AGENCY
2 ack.
Sec Def Cont Nr.
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THE ATTRITION OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES, 1968-1969
ASSUMPTIONS
We have approached the complex problem of determining the,
ability of the Vietnamese Communists to withstand manpower attrition
by constructing a hypothetical model of what could reasonably be
viewed as a "worst case" situation for Hanoi. This approach is
based on the fact that if the Communists have adequate manpower
to meet the hypothetical "worst case" requirements during 1968 and
1969, then they can meet any lesser requirement resulting from
the actual course of events. Our assumptions, therefore, are not
offered as estimate judgments of the probable course of events
during 1968 and 1969, but are presented as reasonable structural
components of a "worst case" model.
In accordance with this approach we are basing our calcula-
tions on the following assumptions:
a. That the level of combat will be significantly higher
than that of 1967 but. less than that during the first quarter
of 1968.
b. , That manpower requirements must be met completely from
resources within North Vietnam and South Vietnam, with no
manpower inputs from third countries, e.g., China or volunteers
from other Communist countries.
c. That recruitment and impressment in South Vietnam will
be adequate to provide manpower at an average monthly rate of
IIIIII
7,000 or about - I5,000 persons a year.
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d. That the rate of personnel infiltration from the North
is determined by requirements in the South rather than being
limited by existing capacities of the infiltration system.
e. That the Communists have an insurgency base in the
range of 500,000 persons and that they will attempt to
maintain this assumed base at this level.
f. The level of air attacks against NVN, and the
associated requirement for air defense will be based on
experience in the third quarter 1967.
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I. Manpower Requirements
A. Military Forces
(1) North Vietnam
The North Vietnamese are estimated to 'have about
475,000 men in the Armed Forces and another 400,000 in the
militia/security forces today. Of this force some 115-130,000
are deployed out-of-country. About 300,000 are considered
necessary to provide for defense of the homeland. This defense
force includes .basically six infantry divisions, air and coastal
defense forces, and :command and logistics elements. Thus, a
force of about 50,000 or 4 division equivalents would be available
for out-of-country deployment during 1968.
(2) Laos
The North Vietnamese military forces in Laos total
about 30,000. They are a part of the NVA and are counted in the
NVN total. Pathet Lao forces have remained in Laos and are not
considered in this analysis,
(3) South Vietnam
VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam have probably developed
a total insurgency base in the general range of 500,000 persons.
The North Vietnamese component of this base is from 85,000 to
100,000 persons.
B. Civilian Labor Force
The North Vietnamese civilian labor force totals 9.8
million persons. Over 400,000 of this total are shown in our
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figures as militia. About 200,000 full-time workers are assigned
to essential war related work such as bomb damage repair, the
maintenance and operation of LOCis, and logistics activities.
Of the remaining 9.2 million people we estimate that 8.7
million are necessary to maintain economic activity at its normal
levels. Thus about 500,000 persons may be regarded as a potential
manpower pool which can be diverted to other activities without
excessive disruption to the economy.
We estimate that the North Vietnamese labor force contains
about 1 million males in the 17 to 35 age group that are physically
fit for military service.
North Vietnam also maintains a civilian labor force of
about 20,000 persons engaged in LOC construction and repair
activities in Laos.
II. Manpower Availabilities
North Vietnam has a population of about 18.7 million people
of which about 2.8 million males are believed to be between the
ages of 17 and 35. Of these draft age males, about 1.5 million
are believed to be physically fit for military service. More
than one million of these have yet to be drafted.
In addition every year about 200,000 males reach the age of
17, and it is believed that at least 120,000 of these are
physically fit for military service. We have assumed that 100,000
of these can be drafted each year.
We have previously stated that a total of 500,000 males can
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be drawn from the labor force. If we add to them the 200,000
that can be drafted during 1968 and 1969, a total of 700,000
persons can be diverted to the military service.
III. Manpower Losses
A. South Vietnam
Our calculations postulate that the insurgency base in
South Vietnam will be attrited at a rate of 300,000 a year during
1968 and 1969. This figure is based on an assumed loss of 800
men per day from all causes -- killed, died of wounds, disabled,
died of sickness, deserted, defected and captured. It is a
compromise between the assumed enemy casualties if the enemy
should revert to a 1965-1967 style protracted war, and the
considerably higher casualties he would sustain if he continued
the forward deployment which he adopted after the failure of the
Tet offensive.
B. In Laos
We have almost no firm knowledge of the attrition ex-
perienced by enemy forces in Laos. For the purpose of this
estimate we have assumed that the forces in Laos will be attrited
at about 15 percent of force levels for annual losses of about
5,000 personnel during 1968 and 1969.
C. In North Vietnam
It is assumed that the North Vietnamese will lose
approximately 10 percent a year, or 45,000, though normal administra-
tive attrition.
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D. Summary
South Vietnam 300,000
Laos 5,000
North Vietnam 45,000
1968 350,000
1969 350,000
Total 700,000
IV. Manpower Replacement Capabilities
A. South Vietnam
We are assuming that the Viet Cong will be successful
during 1968 and 1969 in recruiting at an annual level of 85,000
persons and thus calculate that the remaining 215,000 men
required to replace total enemy manpower losses in South Vietnam
must be infiltrated from North Vietnam. In addition, North
Vietnam must provide an additional 50,000 persons to meet losses
in North Vietnam and in Laos.
B. North Vietnam
We believe that in addition to its annual population
increments that yield about 120,000 physically fit males of draft
age, North Vietnam has a manpower slack in both its military and
civilian forces.
In the existing military structure there are about 50,000
troops, or the equivalent of 4 divisions, that could be deployed
to the South during 1968 without reducing NVN forces below the
levels necessary for defense of the homeland. Such deployment would
be a one-shot movement could not be duplicated in 1969.
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We calculate that North Vietnam would have to draw down
the surplus elements of its civilian labor force to make up any
shortfalls not covered by annual drafts or the movement of
existing military units.
As we see the situation North Vietnam would be able to
obtain manpower to replace losses in the following numbers:
1968
1969
Annual Draft Class
100,000
100,000
Military Deployment
50,000
Draw-down from Civilian
Labor Force
115,000
165,000
Total
265,000
265,000
In each year 50,000 of the 265,000 would be required to
replace losses in North Vietnam and in Laos, and 215,000 would
have to be infiltrated into South Vietnam.
Our figures indicate that the drain on the civilian labor
force would increase from about 115,000 men in 1968 to 165,000
men in 1969. The cumulative drain of 280,000 men is just over
55 percent of our calculation of surplus labor in North Vietnam.
V. Training
The current national estimate of the North Vietnamese capa-
bility to train 75,000 to 100,000 men a year for infiltration was
based on an analysis of reports and all source data of the number
of units associated with this training and our estimate of their
requirements. At that time, the identifiable training base
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consisted of six infantry divisions associated with infiltration
training. Airborne, artillery, officer/NCO training, and specialists
were trained by other appropriate organizations, schools, and
the basic six divisions. In addition, some of the higher or
specialized training is provided by Communist advisors both in
country and in their homelands.
Subsequently, some of the divisions were redeployed and
they no longer provide infiltration training. An analysis of
the most recent data has revealed that the North Vietnamese are
now employing four divisions and two training groups for basic
infiltration training and that, for the most part, they have
retained the three month training cycle.
It is estimated that each division (2/3 training, 1/3 regular
duties) can assimilate, equip, and train 6,000 to 8,000 recruits every
three months. The two training groups are rated at 6,000 each.
On this basis, 145,000 to 175,000 recruits can be trained each
year. By shortening the training cycle or expanding the base an
additional 50,000 to 60,000 recruits could be trained.
Replacements for the NVN forces in-country are considered to
be absorbed in the existing units although there may be some
provisions for basic training prior to joining the units. For
instance, replacements taken from the militia or other reserves
would have had some prior basic training.
The most important manpower problem is the adequacy of
available leadership. The quality of the leadership, officer
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and NCO, has declined as the demand has increased. Officer and NCO
schools have been shortened from two years to eight months. The
largest single source of junior officers is now believed to be
from battlefield commissions. The decline in standards and
training, however, is offset to a considerable extent by the type
organizations being deployed south and the absence of requirements
for more sophisticated equipment. Basically the VC/NVA is an
individual weapon, man pack army which uses equipment easily
adaptable to the individual soldier. In the North, the training
demands generated by more sophisticated equipment have been met
by provision of foreign training at home and abroad.
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BACK-UP SBEETS
A. North Vietnamese Order of Battle ' DIA
B. Insurgency Base CIA
C. Breakdown of Civilian Labor Force CIA
D. War-Related Labor Forces CIA
E. Enemy Losses in South Vietnam DIA
F. North Vietnamese Personnel Losses in North Vietnam DIA
G. Surplus Labor Force CIA
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NORTH VIETNAMESE ORDER OF BATTLE
TAB A
As of 1 April it was estimated that the strength of the regular
North Vietnamese Army was on the order of 475,000 men. The Army
includes the following major forces:
NORTH VIETNAM IN-COUNTRY STRENGTH - 360,000
Infantry Divisions
10
Artillery Divisions
1
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command (12 Regiments)
1
Infantry Brigades
2
Independent Infantry Regiments
6
Independent AAA Regiments
85
Armored Command (2 Regiments)
1
Surface-to-Air Misile Battalions
25-30
Plus other Rear Services, support, headquarters, and
miscellaneous support and replacement units.
NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN LAOS 30,000
figure is broken down into 14,000 combat troops and _16,000
-additional personnel engaged in engineer and rear services support
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activity as well as the maintenance Of infiltration routes and
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stations.
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NORTH VIETNAMESE STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM - 85,000-100,000
Front Headquarters
2
Divisions
9
Regiments
37
Battalions
144
Total North Vietnamese Force
in NVA Units
73,000*
Within North Vietnam seven of the 10 infantry divisions are
estimated to be at their full TO strength of 12,500 men. These
are the 308th, 312th, 316th, 324th, 325th, 330th, and 350th
Divisions. Two other North Vietnamese Divisions -- the 304th and
320th -- are carried at garrison strengths of 3,000 men each. The
bulk of these two divisions entered South Vietnam in January of this
year. One other division -- the 341st -- is believed to be under-
strength by at least one regiment which recently infiltrated into
South Vietnam. 'Information available on the 341st Division is of
uncertain validity, however, and its status s currently under study.
In addition to those forces in North Vietnamese -units in South
:Vietnam, MACV is estimating that an additional 10-12,000 North
-Vietnamese troops are integrated into Viet Gong units. Therefore,
the total NVA force in South Vietnam is on the order of 83-85,000
men. For the purpose of this paper we have assumed that the NVA
force in South Vietnam is on the order of 85-100,000 men. The
--additional 15,000 men could be in various support units which have
not yet been accepted organic to some of the divisions or merely
in units which may be in country but which cannot be documented
within the criteria established for OB figures.
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Of the seven infantry divisions above carried at full strength,
two -- the 324th and 325th -- have previously been carried at
garrison strength, but we believe they have now reconstituted their
units to a full TO strength of 12,500 men. The 324th Division, for
example, sent three regiments to South Vietnam in mid-1966 while the
325th Division sent three regiments south in early 1967.
It should be emphasized that the strength of various North
Vietnamese units is an estimate. There is little hard intelligence
information available as to the actual strength of any North
Vietnamese division. Moreover, there is little information available
to judge with any degree of confidence whether such units are manned
at their full TO strength. The same is true for other major
formations of the NVA listed in paragraph 1 above, with the possible
exception of anti-aircraft artillery forces, whose strength is
estimated primarily on the number of guns counted in aerial photography.
RATIONALE FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE HOME DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS
It is recognized that the North Vietnamese Army has a significant
capability to reinforce in South Vietnam with regulAr forces should
the political decision to do so be taken. The dispatch of most of
its division size forces would, for example, lead to a greatly
stepped up enemy war effort along more conventional lines with its
resultant increased casualties, logistic requirements and the like.
If the North Vietnamese were to make such a decision, they would leave
themselves open to the threat of an invasion. While they might hope
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that their regional forces and militia would be able to bear the
initial brunt of such an invasion, they would be unable to contain
an invasion and would probably have to recall sizeable forces from
South Vietnam or invite the Chinese to defend them.
In addition, they would be stripping the North of a major
portion of the Army's training base. The deployment of such
sizeable forces would creat logistical requirements beyond their
capability to sustain them in conventional combat unless the bombing
campaign were stopped.
For the purpose of this paper, therefore, we are assuming that
a prudent North Vietnamese government faced with a threat of a
DE invasion would want to maintain at least six divisions in a
position to counter any invasion. In addition, the North Vietnamese
would be prudent to have additional forces available in order to
reinforce as necessary. These forces would be needed to cope with
the threat of an Inchon type landing or an armored thrust north
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1-Of the DMZ. These forces are also necessary to provide the NVN
base The attached chart shows a breakdown of the forces
that the North Vietnamese would prudently maintain in-country.
-The regular army forces total some 301,000 men out of the total
.;,-.in-cpuntry army of some 353,000 NVA estimated to be available. Thus,
some 50,000-odd men or four division equivalents would be available
for deployment to South Vietnam in 1968.. We estimate that this
would be a one-time move on the part of the North Vietnamese in
1968 and that they would ble to reneat.. it in 1969. Obviously,
-however, with their training and dee uueIntact and the
_ipossibility of reconstituting deployed would be possible
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for the North Vietnamese to send some additional forces south in
1969 from the regular Army, but they probably could not match a four
division deployment in 1968.
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MILITARY FORCES
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NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
Air Force 4,200
Navy 2,600
Army
COMBAT FORCES
6 Inf Div, 2 Inf Bde, 6 Inf Regts,
and Arty Div
AIR DEFENSE
* 120,000
96,500
1 AAA Div, 85 AAA Regt,
25-30 SAM Bns
, OTHER
Rear Services, Command and
Administration, Bases & Depots
85,000
301,500
Total Military Forces
308,300
SECURITY FORCES
Armed Public Security Force
16,500
Militia
400,000
416 500
Grand Total
724,800
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ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING AN INSURGENCY BASE OF
500,000 PERSONS
TAB B
The insurgency base concept includes several categories of
personnel; it includes, of course, the Communists regular military
and guerrilla forces; it also includes the political infrastructure,
and other less formally structured groups used to support the
insurgency.
A large portion of the infrastructure represents some of the
Communists most valuable assets in South Vietnam in terms of
keeping the insurgency alive by providing it with material and
human resources. The concept of the insurgency base includes
the widest possible range of resources in terms of manpower.
This broad concept was chosen also because members of all
of these elements sustain casualties and must be considered
against the 800 per day attrition rate, and in South Vietnam
against the recruitment rate.
� It should be noted, however, that this model deals with losses
to the manpower base and sources for replacements, and these flows
would be of the magnitude postulated regardless of the size of
the base, which is being held constant.
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TAB C
BREAKDOWN OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE
According to US Bureau of the Census estimates there are
presently about 10.4 million North Vietnamese in the 15 to 64 age
group. By excluding from this total the 475,000 in the armed
forces and the approximately 120,000 students of working age,
an estimated labor force of 9.8 million is derived. Such a
figure represents a labor force growth rate of 2 percent per
year from the officially reported 1960 labor force figure of 8.1
million. This 2 percent growth rate appears reasonable in view
of the population growth rate during the period.
The following tabulation shows an estimate of the labor force
according to sectors of employment as of 1 January 1968:
Sector of Employment Thousands Persons
Agriculture 7,000
Services 800
Industry (including handicrafts) 800
Transport and communications 400
Trade 300
Construction 250
Other 250
Total 9,800
These figures were derived from the official 1960 labor
force breakdown figures and various statements and figures
announced by the regime during the last eight years.
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WAR-RELATED LABOR FORCE
TAB D
The estimated total number of civilian workers countering
the air war over North Vietnam amounts to a maximum of about
600,000 individuals, including full time and part time workers,
both male and female of all ages. The tabulation below shows
that of this total less than 200,000 workers were engaged full
time:
In Thousands
Full Time
Part Time
LOC repair and reconstruction
72
100 to 200
Transport workers
100 to 120
25
Civilian defense
150
Total
172 to 192
275 to 375
The number of full time workers on LOC repair and reconstruction
(72,000) was based on special intelligence regarding LOC work camps.
The information specified locations of the camps, numbers of workers,
and the work underway. The total number estimated was cross
checked by using aerial photography to determine the extent of
reconstruction and repair activities. A ratio of two part time
workers to every full time worker was established from a variety of
intelligence sources.
The additional 100,000 to 120,000 full time transport workers
include laborers for the extensive transloading required in bypassing
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interdictions in the transport system, additional truck drivers
and boatmen, and the increased use of primitive transport, particularly
for moving supplies south.
The estimate of 150,000 part time civilian defense workers was
based on collateral sources as well as special intelligence that
discussed watches being maintained for air attacks and the warning
system.
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ENEMY LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
TAB E
The estimate of 300,000 enemy losses a year is a compromise
between expected losses if he reverts to a protracted war (267,000)
and those which he would sustain if he continued the forward
deployment (350,000) which has characterized his operations since
the Tet offensive.
Protracted War Strategy
KEA
First Quarter 1968
Projected remainder
Year 1968
84,00o
80, 000*
164,000
Total Losses: 164,000 x 1.62** = 267,000
Forward Deployment Strategy
KIA
First Quarter 1968 84, 000
Projected remainder
Year 1968 131 000xxx
215,000
Total Losses: 215,000 x i.62xx = 350,000
* Based on a study of enemy killed, 1965-67, it was found that
every addition of a battalion to the allied OB resulted in an
increase in kills by all allied battalions. Projecting 1965-67
casualties in accordance with expected allied buildup during the
,:remainder of 1968 results in the estimate of 80,000 for the final
nine months of 1968.
** Adjustment for those who died or were disabled from wounds,
deserted, defected, and PW's. It does not include died or disabled
from sickness.
xxx During March 1968 the enemy sustained approximstely 14,600
killedlor projected to 131,000 for the remaining 9 months of 1968.
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TAB F
NORTH VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL LOSSES
The figure of 45,000 for losses in North Vietnam in 1968 and
1969 is based on an estimated turn over in the NVN forces of about 10
percent a year from normal causes i.e., sickness, over-age or
physical retirements, training losses, etc. These are no hard
figures on such attrition, but it occurs even in war. This should
be considered a maximum worse case figure for the purposes of
this paper. No estimate has been made for war casualties in
the north although the North Vietnamese Armed Forces are suffering
casualties from our air and naval actions against the north.
Such losses have not been announced by the North Vietnamese. The
data available from any other sources are not in sufficient detail
to provide a basis for an estimate.
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DERIlATION OF THE 500,000 SURPLUS y(ABOR POOL
TAB G
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At least 200,000 workers could be drawn from agriculture without
a decline in agricultural output because of the low marginal pro-
ductivity of North Vietnamese farmers. For many years the regime
has had a goal qf reducing the number of farm workers per unit of
land. Female labor can be substituted for male labor. Moreover,
additional labor can be withdrawn from agriculture by substituting
imported food for lost domestic production - the average output
per year of a rice farmer in North Vietnam is only about one-half
ton.
About 150,000 workers could be withdrawn from the total industrial
labor force of about 800,000. Of the industrial force approximately
600,000 are engaged in handicraft activities. Much of this labor
force has very law productivity and is not engaged in essential
economic activity. The loss of one quarter of this handicraft
labor force to the armed forces would not be missed.
About 150,0d0 workers could be withdrawn from the 1.1 million
workers engaged in the trade and services sector of the economy.
Although this diversion would result in a decline in consumer
welfare the overall effect on the economy would be slight.
In addition to these pools of manpower which can be drained for
military purposes there are also approximately 120,000 students in
North Vietnam of working age which could be put to work to replace
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some of the draft age physically fit male laboc-ers who might be taken
into military service. Such a utilization of students however would,
in the long run, be detrimental to the economy.
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