THE COMMUNISTS' ABILITY TO RECOUP THEIR TET MILITARY LOSSES

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05007925
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 1, 1968

?L U1l1J�
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
!arch
sT771,1T:cro The Cormunists' Ability to ecoup Their Mct
ilitary Lonses
Irtrocluction
1. 17e have oxarined and assessed in kletaLl the
evidence Learing on the ability of the Coranlunistn to
renlace their military losses sustained in the Tot
offensive. e are able to Offer only a very terlious
judrrnent concerning the time frame within w*:lic-A they
right accomplish a full recovery in numbers of zreops.
2. At a naxim�m, it appears that this y411
tahe then no longer than six months. This iscumes
that the rate of combat will he sustained at ,110e
normal levels, but that no new ground effort on a
scale iiie that at Tet will be mounted. It is
possible, however, that they night he al.le
to accomplish full recovery in o much shorter ti-le
and that iithin six ronths their troon
.-firote: This memorandun was produced by CIA. I waa
ntly prepared by tha Offios.of Current Tntelenco
and the nffice of Economic Research.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
C2 f !PACT
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
jrcater than it us prior to 'et.
Pvvthinq ';'inge- on the real e%tent of their "rt
1-,-17es a,n: on their al)114t.7 to recruit is
-,ersonnr,1 in the countryside. (in 'oth of the-:c.-
evi.,enc-� Ls vory spotty at nresert.
'et.
3. In raRing our assessment, -e included the
enemy villed-in-action (IA) reported US
military authorities in Vietnam from the period 3n 'Tan-
nary through 21 Fenrua--y--some 33,600 ren. This
reriod covered the mass urban attacl:s and ti-o 'sec-
ond rollner on 12-19 :February, as well as its f=
(7iate aftermath- We e=ludea the fighting since
21 February on the gronns that, although enemy
losses have continued heavy, they have leen overall
at a more "normal" level for the war.
4. We have based the assessment on our judg-
ment that roughly 77,0fli0 enemy were involved In the
attack'. This nclucie9'7orth Vietnamese (7m,)
units and main and local forces of al-out 52,Orq.
(This latter figure ias reached in-sleperd,ent1N-
a 01A analysis and is also roughly accented 1,v -est
OL authorities vino have studied the o"fen-;iva,
eluding the ITS "AC7). The additional 20,Tn on
in our connutati.on of the forces involved in the
-2-
STTIRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
offcnr.ive wf?re, :olieve, members of inenondont
(Tnerrilla_ 7:ni_ts or imerrillas added to local force,
unitr.; for t7-,e attac.ks.
Table
Strength of Participating Conmunist rorcos
-in the Tot Attackf7
Strc,nr-4-h
Percent of Total
Total
77,000
100
NVA
21,600
27.R
VC rain 7orce
16,00
21.c
VC Local Force
10,300
24.0
(11:7erril1as
20,000
25.7
9. rl'-lero is goeC evidence of oNten-zi�c!
participation in tl-,,T! offensive. Ca;.)tIlreC
docrients have nc'7 1-rovirlod us with some (-etailc,1
planning for the :Ittacks in a few provinces. "'-ose
sugcTr?st that the enemy 1-.0:1o,:l to use from one half to
to thirds of is (:;7,1errilla force in an offensive
role. It apnars that about 20,000 guerrillas
thall77 paric4pated in tho urban attacks.
mainder were used in offensive roles against smaller
targets such as lines of conunicat;on, etc.
C. The (-ii1en.7.713 with respect to the casun.7.
arises when the re7orte:1 enemy TiA (32,00) is
si.'ernel against t!-:e ton/ offensive force egti.11-,t&l
SE
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
to "have 1)e:Tm involver7. (77,000). Taen at face value,
thi7 ri2ap!-1 tat approximately one ]alf of the at-
1:i1c7:1rni force was ilic1 in the offem7Aive ar;.1.
afternat7J. This, in itself, is m:cceding1%.,iffict
to necet--.7fivon tie estaction recyrts we already
'1,Ti1e on status of ';o!,.e enem-7 units 71i.7. to. cur-
rent level of enemy activity throuq!lout th47,
�
country. The reports surflost the Co-inunists cro
badly hurt, but do not indicate that their Thad
-eael'Ierl 50 Percent. A numl,or of the attner'ing units,
-iereover, 'oave already reappeared in effensil-o co:1')at.
some*-hinq they woulJ hardly have been &plc, t.o o
if their losses had been on the order of 5r1
ccnt
7. The retorted .�TA becare oven nore unac-
ceptable 1.7hrl an atterpt was made to account for
those who were proably disabled. ven if the
standard, conservative factor of .35 died of v-onns
or iero permanently disabled is a7In1iee, for evnry
17IA, over 13,0(10 more nen arc aale.3 to the 1-.es
The total casualties computed in this conservative
Inanner, would be nearly to tirels of our 4-777e1
estimate of those involved in the attacks.
The
total enemy casualties would be about )f.) percel-%t
of the assault 'force, if this force is corleve of
only as composed of regular forces (s 5F.,G00).
ST;'
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(c)
1
3.5(c)
e"r1.1
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
Possii)le Casualties
9. Assurin,rJ that the 1.7.12\ figure itself le c-
curae, t t1i.ot certainly rut include a su7)-
stantial pronortion of ot-Jver organi7.ational clel7ents
the onerlY apna,-atun :.11f7L nonparticioating cil inns
who anpenet1 to 7')e caut in the nran 1,att-le
77111ita-7 officials in Vietnam aciree that Lorlo
are probai-217 included. 7,7e now know, in addition,
1-at tho Communists made a najor effort in tile few
months prior to Tot to fill no their irrem.12a,-
rans (guerrilla and militia) and to recruit n:71n,J-
laborers
for logistic support, particularly the
so-calle "assanit youth." Tlani of the P7,7:::3
from the of!ennive Iderf, individuals virtually
taken from street corners and presser1 into tYle
attacl-zs s'--)v the enemy.
Fyewitne.sses, moreover, re-
, port that larcTo nurners of civilian-type po=onnl
were used as "shcon troops" in many of the 1373an
assaults.
9. Analysis of the available evidence coos
not provide a good enough base from T:Ihich to J!.:7sign
.even a tenuous percentage to the total numer of
individuals like those above who might have rartici-
pated in the attacks and became casualtie onoOf
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
"771
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
ovidc,nco, for =ample, sugests tThe casualtien
i;lvinq7ilitia-civi1iann-1aborers, etc, 7av have
rin aout 2r; percent of the total; evicionce,
however, inicates such caivaltie ciay have run
higl, as 5'.! percent of the total losses in sone
areas.
10. Therefore, in adopting a 1)ase for juin:
the Co.c�rlunist recurerative ahility, we can on'1,-
acce-vt the re-oorted figure as it stands--
questionable as it is--and view future enemy ,ana-
1,ilition against it. In contrast with the i-oirt of
view of the US nilitary in Vietnam, that the rmenv's
losses ar. canability to recoup should be weichetll
ar- innt his offensive military strencrtt-, e 70111-1
he inclinefl to judge these factors fran the sti,r:1-
reint of his total organized ranpowe, base. 'or
-
this reason, we -7�111,1 include enemy i1itia and
even political infrastructure as sources for trcnn
;
re-qacer-ent and as part of the roraininc: uist
11. In our view, the organize(1, enemy 'orco
structure in South Vi::.�tn,7:1 prior to ?et and fol-
lowing an extensive recruiting drive set-, up op-roNi-
-latrgy as follows:
- 6 -
S :c-----
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
Table 11
flstinated Comunist Organized lanpowel Te
-
as of 30 January 1960
7.7C/7VA 7,1th and Local Forces 160,000
guerrillas 10o,000-1.20,000
A(Iministrative Services 7,000-100,000
Self-defense Militia 100,000
Political Cadre 20,000-120,000
515-600,000
12. Tl-e above table of organized I strength in-
cluetefl the additional north Vietnane-ie forces that
know are in country, hut which have not vet
been added to MACV's 01', as well as a number of
serialized units and small elements--eitv forces in
some cases--whicl, have been fairly well identified,
but not yet included in the OB. The table also in-
eludes a higher strength
figure
rio!1 for tile guerrillas, hut io
than
PAA,CV no7;
car-
reflective, yo
hove, of 1-1,e reality of the situation and the -re-
Tot recruiting. The self-defense militia is also
included in the table since it is an element of
enemy defensive strength at least, and one which
furnishes some of the nannower for higher level enemy
units. The a(aministrative services and political
we believe, also reflect more roanstic 1evel:3.
-7--
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
13. ,t.;7e(J'nu7.orically tnis
losss, 2art7cularly in of ein
local force stron,7t, con1,1 be relati-,7ely
loncj-term ro)10T.I. It woia1,7. see:1 rea::-Jon-
a;)le that, if the '..7e7o.unists have ,l(anacje(1 in the
v)acit to ;.aintain an orcranize .),asg of ti
size 1)ostu1atet:1 in ?able IT, the-7 could a.asily re-
coup their Tet losses in a rc..lative1,7- short perio
of time, :loth by.recrIlitent-conscription into no
lower level rdlitary cletagnts, and b ul_yjraclin7 to
the 74-ef-Tular forces fron the lower level units.
11. Thgn--:, is a'!.:-)nndant evidence that the Comr-m-
-to - strentloui effort to r:lc-r/-,
ih-17 ]osses anl, in lar:t., to rais- their ,)vr-all
military force stren(ith ,')ove the
(--:cer.t3 from of t'in ra-torts on
a-:tivit-.7 are contained in Annem rportl in-
.
u1-17!r -Jay in a1no-7,t
all T)opulons areas �rc, the ene7qy c:an perwtrate,
r)articularlv in the elta, hns lon;) been a
reservoir
f'or
15. .ir.-rce is little Tuestion that the c.-t of
fenve has opend a ne,1 rc2cru1tm:-2nt base to the
'it Cz7s11 in the outh Vie.tnaese countrysie.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
recruLtont nool becau3e of rofue _:ove-
n,.7!nt to zlrons was pa,-tially responsile
'701- V"c rocruitont shortfalls .in 1)67.
consit3nrj of the. 7)oulalLions of lam1et:7;
the countryside rhre-tIt VC formor17 :�rtvo ha,]iJ
or no inf.luonce, can :)o t;) bo22it 1:)5C ro-
r-rnitment groatly. ;,/-foun,.7, influence. in rural
aroas--if only in the or: of incra;oH. o2ular
-;7,oct For 10 power--will "TC recruiter:
acce-1-1 to hamlets and a r^aftv audience of yontA3.
16. Tvidence ained from a recent field
inciicates that 70 rocruit.-ent in a c;:)=_toific are
i; irect1y related to /C inf1uoce in
that area.
stated cliff=ontiv, in aro; of :Itrone7 :;,:tclu-ttco
v]ommuniqt7, are ablo to :,oilizo inificentiv
,Irg,ater sharos of t1,--t ,I-traila!)1e.ponulation. fh
Z-,t offensive has ,na.)lecl, the -1(2/;:\ forces to ,--
ten,2 their influence Aflj., nreS.2r1C., iuto :)oth rural
and url)an until recent -,ont't,
(A,- control.
17. South vietn'7; countrysie offers a
;-)nol for
Snuth 7ietnam's total ponulation of ,1out 17 illion,
-:oro. than 31 :Anion live in rural areas---
in .1a--,1.,.;t1 outside of ,-yroviroe capital-;,
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
,Ittono-on7.cit i.c' 3roxi1ao1' to
oC nro ili3 hr-twf-,en ti -�t7Cs5 of )
�ond an al-itional :;80,030 rrol-1 25
to 1). \!thc:41(j1 tho VI ar;
20-43 tixis r(!cruit...-nt
LThla.io :Inpow,r. I-
3 la-3 7ot to 70C.�.-1 thl:t.15 to 19 .roup;
yotas ;Ire -)ri;.0 tarc;,?ts for 'C.
cr
13� Te 1nto.-1-3ity of t:le current 17-!.cruitInc;
Lhcl awlilrIlity 07 -an )04 .111 c�arrn.t.
:r-to,'o,1 off the ciov in 'orl,..,r17 cont23ted JInt:
;0:o ,;,,curc. lrcta3 of thc c'o,intry, to L11,
;.Thorr-3-14on th-tt ,:ovrinni_f;ts Lo
1o33r,-; n-17-7,ricallv in r
o-77 cffanniv,
oa tI ate,1 mi.litrtry authcr;
!tnrt t .et.,-oen P tont:1. It 1.--; zio,7
,lowever, t_ht t:11,1 rate 'tad ';11.nt_
-Int;17.1i; intCI7 DTCC.Lfl( t vial of tito
rcrating '-riv(7, and access to tho
countr75, it ,005 11.0t 17.7.1roba31e tilat n0%-7
.nn3t13E3t clou'Dlo this rate to .y_t,.7m 6,003�..an-.1.
A.0,9 a ':ont'a, at:loa:;t ovor t-no short torm.
:Inch a rate, it woulrfi taa the :.7o71..ylunists no oore
SECIF4T
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
r
than six months, at a ma:,:ium, to replace their re.-
..)orted !a7, losse- Auring the Tot offensive.
19. This co717-)utation, of course, does tai:e
into account the -normal� Co-lunist losses sin(;..e
21 1--'orudr..p, or the 7utur.,, losses iurinq t.4(2 -J::ecupo.ra-
tion oerio. ).,)%:1-7- a sL-1*--7onth tic friYle, 5LC loses
.i naps doul'..i) the total roolace;qent ncce:.:sary.
)-aring certain periods within the past year, for ex-
ample, .:ommunist losses have run at a rate of around
4,000 ;,len r month. 2n the other hand, the replac2-
ent rate described a:)ove for the losses ,_ocls
not ta&e, into account t!lo continuinis infiltration of
nanoower from jorth Vietnam into the South.
has been running at a rate of about 4,000 to (,;,000
men a ronth on the averaT7... during the past year and
conceivably could offset the additional combat losses
during the Tr:t recovery period. InFiltration would
clearly tend, over a six-month period, at least, to
of nt TI;7\ unit lvsse'3 in r3outh Vietnam.
The .11alitative
_
rrom tse standooint of tr000 quality, the
Com-)unit losses ;7i.11 be sorlew�lat harder to r.:.laco,
and a ti-e frame for su:-.711 recovery cannot be
assigne(1. however. it is 1-)ro'Da'ale that the over�:11
qualitative less to t'In r:urinr; the Tt f.:cen-
stv was not as schst-Intial as the i:ntal ti-nr(.1
-11-
S'C.C1-217T
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
indicat7A. noted above, anyw'he
2ercnt of the I. ooriceivahiy ioro net -art
of horos]ular o.-qunist snlJaratus. ere-
over, thorr, ore everal other hsnects to coni'or
in asry-Ar:sn- the Tlalitative loss. Jne is the .7(--
plent of well-trainel .clre in th:, person oc
non-cot;, an,1 technical h-,cialists.
-nother as;)ect is the Lenlace ient of trained 5n-
fantrymen.
In the forre.er case, our judgment that
the lcxes ran aroun,1 20 to 30 nr-,rc3nt of the net
':1\--Derhapq 12,000 .en. woul(1 tnclut ht-
trition renresentin.r the norrial ratio of
non-coml, anC, rr--)ecaM.hts in Jo:1-,111 i.st unit; ,n'
alr.-;c, hole adlitin-,a1 Allowance for hih ion on
Lrained as s,--r),,rs
set: ce:tnstely in tie ohrly sta,jes o'
the urban offon3ive,
21 hi lols in rany w-AY-1 ny be the o'
rAerious aspect of the :27.o=1-Anist cas'halties,
the o-ffonsive, since the trai.nincs of renlacoents
for these (7roups tale
77re777 captured documents, or e:!'ampTh, that the:
nunistr; have been rainin larcje :'eers '; p
during the past year n courses ::'ie up to
onths.
-12-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(9)
3.5(c)
72.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
renlacet of traihe,:t infantry 1.1.-puld
so to : les ser1aus, althougA still sicrrfict,
us .7:Ct of the loss. MY-771al1y, t7:10 trainin,j cycle
:(Jrrue.2-1 eu in r-1, ;oxo thorn essunjst unit runs
J.I.out throe -.Ionths. Th i.s nrol(:r::
enerly to eoe ext!--'t, hoew,r, by his;)*rle-ss
of upgrading to ki.-F11,.:1r eche/ons 17:en have already
receive-T artial or rudintary nilitarv trainin
::',rom the nature of th re7.Dortia7 fe far, it ,7ou3d
appear that the Communists plan to continue this
course in re.nlacin their Tet 1035 's. The regular
forces -gill be fille,1 out by levies from among t71,-,
irr7u1ars, who will in turn receive the new conscri2t:3
and recruits.
23. Perhaps the rost I ortant as,a-c,ct cf tb
ua1itati77e loss amonc7 th,f!
will he in the youl-;Ifill age o -7,rvr of the inco-:,Anj
recruits ani.1 consori?ts. It is clear that a 7re-Jin
')roportion of the Coml.:tnist f7o::ccs over th
year hav,7_..1..K2cin in the lcie qrou froo 16 to 16
exact proportions oe? currnnt- proscti7o
ago rax of Cormunit rank-and-f; soldiers,
is far fron clear and will pre!.)afuly rc7.ain SO.
The fi7.-21T1's Loses
24. Thr, V.Itnamose :''srmv and paramil.i.t-v
forces also suffered sif,stantial c,7=alties urLn
-13-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
recent o(fonsiva. 7ror:, 30 .Inuary tillroug,1
27 .'ehrunr-r, ry iet over 3,23 hii1e en
wonn,lef.. �Its1o3i rat,11 Ls -;:nproxill.utely
threet3.Pe3 the 1,or-la1. ront'dy rAte can:ta1-
1:ies ,Airinc, the p-I.ct 7V 10 have no accounting
0' i:roops. '7,10 Ti ,urin the1-,Jc=t
Tht of.fensive.
23. :Attie :Ian] inf-or-.1ation i ruilaeie to
U9 on the :Oility of the ,7,V1i to n-colln its ln-
7ower losses. do %nr-Jw th3.�,1 �1,711 'peen
able, despite i'f.n 1033 JE iUifl0 10')7, to sustai.n
its o'.for-all CO: t throu
and the Jraft. It 11-1-1, in f-act, increar4e,1 slIt
in stren,;t1t during latter el of 1267,
the :sesertion .1rop. ;0e-s
hwever, 1o31 rate rr-latn3 it
anything like Crle le v1sustained urin1 the
oonth, the Drny 4i1l he,'n,a')le to :aintain its mrilr-
ical strength. It is ?-e'-)a')le that the loss rte ;7;_11
sir07) 3ub5tantiallv t Icv-215 of t'lc, rZ5t
alt'-,0110 not to l'he 11)37 ra'zrl.
26'. 'the current ,plans of the 3aio-on (-overn-lent
f.or th.,n aurpnntation :if the .-\..2V; p--oJablv enable
the ''.1VAo raintai:1 Its co-3n:It stren7tIl at rctl-:tly
the current nomerical 1%,_!ls, a p,-,r-;A2s Lo
-14-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
it,unless no 'i-Thtin7 a.uain flares to :'ajor 30v,-21s.
;:now little in , tail about t,Itese plan:, althiluTi
the(.overn '1;ts annousc-2d that it intemisto
Inurting 12- (mil 1)-year-ola youtt19 in riu
first half of 1r)(3`3.fe recall of ;,any
len 0.n,.1 a Freeze cm qscllargos of Lose now in se-:-v-
_ice will also, if fully iYplennnte3, help in re-
cowninrT ani a-Idinq to the ;CT; 3tren.qth. Lhis
point, it 13 ipos3i*31e to predict the time ,ram^
in .71-lich this will take plac.
27. eportinq also is incom-31ete on the impact
oF therf4 offensive on the regional and pooular
forces, the paramilitar7 arm of thrt south '.-ietnaesn!
esta'AishInt. There are inJications,
ever, tat these forces, whic'l operate ?ri-aril in
thr, conntr7si,le, are currentiv.beinrj subjected l to
a substantial inf.:1i rivc aine.i at ,3e-lorali7An-r
o7fort ap7ears to e achicvinc :oe succels,
es2ecially in the Delta, whore rocjalar
have oulleJ in to Clfen,1 district an arovicia1
towns. There are .:,any reports of ontposts _ormcrly
held by eqional rtnfl popular forces that have now
'been o.:Iandoned.
-15-
SW.P7,01-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05007925
3.5(c)
3.5(c)