PRISONER'S VIEWS OF VIET CONG (VC) ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES IN SAIGON DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786629
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 8, 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECIDEF .JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA
DWI EXO OCR FEIIS �CS
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Seca. 793 and 794, the Mum:Wagon or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited
0
MD USIA
N_O_EcRE-Fetil�crrssrm
Laws, Title 18, LIS.O.
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGE
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DIST 3 FEBRUt1968
COUNTRY VIETNAM
DOI 1 � 4 FE3hUARY 1366
SUBJECT PRISONER'S VIEWS OF VIET CONG (VC) ACTIVITIES AND
OBJECTIVES IN SAIGON DURING THE TEl OFFENSIVE
ACO VIETNAM, SAIGON (5 FEBRUARY 1965) FVS.-;16,578
SOURCE INTERROGATION OF NINE VIET CONG SUSPECTS Al THE
NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER.
I. BETWEEN I FEBRUARY AND 4 FEBRUARY 1968, AT LEAST 13 ERSONS
WITH VARYING DEGREES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE RECENT VIET CONG (VC)
ACTIVITIES IN SAIGON WERE AhAESTED AT
SAIGON.
AVAILABLE INFORMATION INDIC ES
THAT ONLY TWO OF THE FilISONERS HAD BEEN WORKING FOR THE VC LONGER
THAN ONE YEAR. ALL PRISONERS ARE LOW�LEVEL, THE MAJORITY CLAIMING
TO HAVE BEEN RECRUITED IN MID TO LAIE 1967 OR, IN ONE CASE, EVEN
AS LATE AS 31 JANUARY 1968. THE MAJORITY OF THESE PERSONS�HAD �
BEEN
(CAPTURED, BUT NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION)
(NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION) \
SECRETIsicLEOREI�GN--StSSEIvi
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2. THE TWO INDIVIDUALS WITH THE LONGEST VC AFFILIATION WERE
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THESE
TWO PERSONS PROVIDED THE ONLY ANSWEnS OF SUBSTANCE TO A SERIES
OF QUESTIONS REGAADIN3 VC tCTIVITIES ANL) OBJECTIVES. THE QUESTIONS
AND THEIR ANSWEAS FOLLOW:
Q. WHAT WEAE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COUNTAYUIDE MILITAnY ACTION? 3.3(h)(2)
THAT THE AMEAICANS WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT: 4 COALITION GOVERNMENT
IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) IN DECEMBER 1967 OR EARLY FEBRUAAY 1968
(DUAING TET), OR THERE WOULD BE A GENEnAL ATTACK BOTH MILITARY AND
POLITICAL (ORGANIZED DEMONSTAATIONS) TO DEMAND U.S. WITHDRAWAL
AND A "COALITION, PEACE AND NEUTRALIST GOVEhNMENT FOR SVC."
THE VC HAD SUFFICIENT FOACES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.
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Q. WHAT FUTURE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES WERE YOU GIVEN BEYOND
IMMEDIATE ATTACK ORDERS?
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A.
THAT AFTEn
SAIGON WAS LIBEAATED THEkE WOULD BE
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A DENOSTRATION IN WHICH WAS TO FAKTNIPATE. THE DENONSThATION
WOULD LVENTUALLY END AT THE SAIGON MAAKET WHEnE THE D MONSTRATORS
WOULD ORGANIZE A MEETING CALLING FOri THE WITHDAAWAL OF ALLIED
TROOPS (ESPECIALLY U.S.) FROM SAIGON. IF THE VC FAILED WAS
AND IF NO CONTACT
TO RETURN TO
) WAS ESTABLISHED WAS TO Tia AGAIN ON 4 FEBRUAn Y AT ANOTHER
LOCATION WHEN WOULD BE GIVEN A AL'Ai ASSIGNEMENT.
REPOHT THE RESULTS OF THE DEMONSTRATION BACK TO
WAS TO
ON
THE BASIS OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS, VC POLITICAL CADAES WOULD FORM
A RESOLUTION TO HAND TO TkE EXISTING SVN GOVEnNMENT
SAID THAT THE VC WOULD Tic? TO CnEATE THIS GENEnAL UPRISING
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTHY IN THE HOPE THAT THEY COULD PnESSURE
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) INTO ACCEPTING A COALITION GOVERNMENT.
Q. WERE YOU TOLD AND DID YOU BELIEVE THAT THE POPULATION WOULD
JOIN IN A GENERAL UFnISING AGAINST GVN AND AMERICAN FOHCES.
A. REPORTED THAT
IN SAIGON), HAD SAID THAT THE AMEnIOANS WOULD COOPEHATE WITH VC FORM
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BY REMAINING SILENT OK INACTIVE, THUS ALLOWING THE VC
TO ATTACK THE GVN FORCES THROUGHOUT SAIGON.
BELIEVED THIS
AND THOUGHT THAT THE SAIGON POPULATION WOULD A.ESPOND FAVORABLY
TO THE VC UPRISING.
THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE A GREAT DEAL
OF SUPPORT FROM THE POPULACE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WAR HAD LASTED
SO LONG AND MANY WA K VICTIMS WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY TYPE
OF GOVERNMENT FOR A CESSATI00, OF THE FIGHIING.
Q.
WHAT ACTUAL SUPPORT JID YOU RECEIVE FROM THE POPULACE?
A. NEITHER
THE POPULACE.
Q. WERE YOU LED TO BELIEVE THAT CURRENT MILITARY ACTION WOULD
BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH- KHE SANK
SAW
ANY ACTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE. VC FROM
OR DMZ AREA?
A. HAD HEARD
OF NOTHING SPECIFIC - ONLY ATTACKS THROUGHOUT
THE COUNTRY. HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY OTHER POSSIBLE UPRISINGS.
Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF AN EFFORT TO ORGANIZE THE "ALLIANCE FOR PEACE
AND DEMOCRACY" AS A COALITION MOVEMENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH NATIONAL
LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV)?
A.
ANSWERED NO.
Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY PLANS FOR FOLLOW-UP STEPS IN THE CURRENT
STRATEGY? IF SO, WHAT?
S E NO FOR � SEM
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A.
KNEW NOTHING OF ANY FunTHEk PLANS.
DID NOT KNOW
OF ANY FOLLOW-UP STEPS IN THE CuAkENT STkATEGY BECAUSE AT THE
TIME THE VC WERE SO SURE iHEY WOLILD WIN.
Q. IF THE CUAkENT MILITAkY ACTIVITY IS NOT DECISIVE, AND IN FACT
THE VC APPEAR TO HAVE ACHIEVED LITTLE MILITAkILY AS it:GAINST
PSYCHOLOGICAL kESULTS, HOW DO YOU ANTICIPATE THIS WILL BE EXPLAINED
BY THE NFLSV Oh HANOI?
A.
HAD NO ANSWER TO THIS SPECIFIC QUESTION.
STATED
THAT THE VC WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO THE PEOPLE. IN THEIR AREA
THAT THEY HAD DONE THEIR UTMOST AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO WAIT
FOR ANOTHEk OPPORTuNITY. HANOI WOULD NEVEk DISCUSS FAILURES
BUT WOULD PRAISE THE ACAIEVEXENTS.
S
ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO: WHITE HOUSE
STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA CCI
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