THE CURRENT VC CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786481
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 10, 1968

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, VIETNAM AFFAIDS STAFF
0/DC
DATE:
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
The Director
George W. Alien
REMARKS:
10 Feb 196g
.Attached is a coordinated1 revieed version
of the MI etno ran dual on the Current VC
Campaign., Copies were sent to kitutorabie
ROStOW. Ar,11 baador Leontiart. M. Habib,
CTen. DePtty. ana LtCiert. Carroll.
an you ine,trut;ted. over George Carverts
signature&
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Vietnamese Affairs Stag
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Current VC Campaign
10 February 1968
Recent enemy activity must be reviewed within the framework of
the overall aims of his winter-spring campaign � to break the will of
U.S. to continue the war, and to create conditions favorable for a settle-
ment on Communist terms. In this context, the winter phase of the
campaign (October � January) was intended to set the stage for a "decisive"
period of the war during the spring phase. The winter phase was char-
acterized by major operations in outlying amid (Dak To, DMZ, Loc Ninh)
to draw out and engage U.S. mobile forces, coupled with attacks on US-
GVN bases and administrative centers and intensive guerrilla pressure
against the pacification program to tie down allied forces. It also in-
cluded preparation for a major (conventional) warfare campaign of
potentially climactic character in the IChe Sanh and general DMZ area.
These activities were accompanied by political and subversive actions
preparatory to a "general uprising" in urban areas.
The Tet offensive represents the beginning of the spring phase --
which our adversaries have described as the decisive phase of the war.
There is abundant evidence to demonstrate that this phase aims at a
"general offensive" combined with a "general uprising." The VC hope
that this offensive will inflict major defeats on U.S. forces, disintegrate
the Vietnamese forces, and collapse the GVNA. The Communists evidently
believe that major successes along these lines will create irresistible
international and domestic pressures on the U.S. to open negotiationanen
Communist terms.
The evidence available suggests that the,Communists hoped to ac-
complish a great deal more than they did in their initial assaults on the
cities. They had made arrangements to seize control of the radio stations,
seize key officials, destroy the local GVN apparatus, and organize and
manipulate the populace. This they failed to accomplish except in portions
of a handful of cities. This failure, coupled with the heavy losses they
have suffered, must be regarded as a setback to their campaign.
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On the other hand, other reports, the basic documents pertaining to
the winter-spring campaign, and analysis of the pattern of recent opera-
tions, suggest that the Tet offensive may have been only the spectacular
initial onslaught of a sustained offensive, with a successful uprising
as an ultimate, rather than the immediate goal.
Although they probably are disappointed to some extent with the re-
sults, they probably also believe that they have created conditions favorable
for the attainment of the basic objectives of their winter-spring campaign.
They have dealt a severe psychological blow to the urban population --
much of which had sought sanctuary in the cities from the terrors of the
war in the provinces. Although it is true that the urban populace did not
rise against the GVN, it did not depart from its normally passive, neutral
stances. The Communist attacks have resulted in widespread devastation
and imposed substantial new economic and social burdens on an already
overtaxed GVN administration. They have also inflicted significant damage
on US and ARVN military installations and materiel, and tied allied military
forces down to an effort to restore security to urban areas, to some degree
at the expense of protecting pacified areas. These limited accomplishments
may satisfy the minimum objectives of the Tet offensive and encourage the
Communists to pursue their basic strategy.
There are numerous indications that the Communists intend to con-
tinue their pressure in many areas, probably in concert with major opera-
tions in the Whe Saab - DMZ region. In that sector, North Vietnamese
units comprising two divisions are probing outposts of the Khe Saab base
camp while extending their entrenchments in siege-like fashion. Another
two divisions remain capable of attacking U.S. positions in the central
and eastern DMZ area.
In the coastal plain, strong Communist forces -- two or three
regiments -- remain in the districts surrounding Quang Trt city, and
U.S. officials expect further attacks there. 9tiother regiment or two
are in the vicinity of Hue, and may attempt to reinforce those units still
contesting allied control for that city. In Quang Nam province. the North
Vietnamese 241 Division. reinforced by the 31st Regiment of the 341st
Division and possibly the 4th Regiment, has moved into the area between
Hof An and Danang, and tnay attempt strong attacks against either or both
of these cities. Strong Communist forces reportedly remain close to the
cities of Tam Ky and Quang Ngai.
In II Corps, all three regiments of the North Vietnamese 1st lXvision
are now located near Dak To. and major action appears imminent. Reports
from Darlac province indicate that the North Vietnamese 33d Regiment is
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being reinforced from. Pleiku and that new attacks are expected. In the
central coastal provinces. Cul Nhon and Nha Trang anticipate mortar
attacks, but no major ground assaults. Two or three battalions are re-
ported west of Thy Hos, in Phu Yen province, however, and new attacks
are expected.
In /II Corps, the 7th Division apparently remains in northern Binh
Duong province with the mission of maintaining pressure on bases of the
U.S. et and 25th Divisions. The status of the 9th Division is not clear;
major elements have been reported in action in the area north of Saigon,
but there are indications that others are located further north in Binh Long
province. The 5th Division, which attacked Bien lioa. has disengaged and
may have 'withdrawn temporarily to regroup.
In IV Corps. Viet Cong concentrations continue to be reported in the
immediate vicinity of several province capitals, maintaining limited
pressure through sporadic mortar attacks.
Numerous reports from various parts of South Vietnam indicate that
many of the threats enumerated above will result in new attacks in the
period between 9 and 15 February; the most frequently mentioned date is
the 10th. These actions would be intended to further disrupt allied control
in the cities, to demonstrate the ability for repeated attacks, to further
intimidate the populace, and thus contribute to the ultimate goal of a
general uprising.
One ominous aspect of the current posture of the enemy military
forces is their apparent implantation in the immediate vicinities of the
district towns and province capitals. This pattern, reported in many
parts of the country, suggests that the Communists have moved into and
reasserted authority over the rural populace in formerly pacified areas.
The current flow of refugees into district and provincial capitals would
seem to be further evidence of this; the refugees could be fleeing their
homes for fear of allied air attacks On the CSinmunist forces occupying
their hamlets.
Several documents have suggested that the winter spring campaign
entailed the creation of new guerrilla forces. A number of recent reports
indicate that the Viet Cong are organizing and arming new guerrilla ele-
mente, both in the cities and in adjacent hamlets. Since Communist plans
for the general uprising must have provided for arming additional guerrilla
and militia elements, these reports are plausible. Some reports have
suggested that these newly organized guerrillas will be used in renewed
attacks on the cities. The fragmentary nature of available information
precludes a firm estimate of the numbers that may be involved but it is
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conceivable that they may be sufficient to offset at least in part, the heavy
losses incurred by the Viet Cong in their recent attacks. While the quality
of such elements would be low, they could be used as replacements for the
depleted main and local force units.
There is also a disturbing lack of information on the status of RVNAF
soldiers who were home on leave during Tet, and hence possibly trapped in
hamlets now occupied by the Viet Cong. We also have received little infor-
mation on the status of RF and loF outposts in the areas engulfed by the
Viet Cong. These isolated elements would seem to be vulnerable to Com-
munist propaganda claims of urban successes, and hence another source
of potential manpower for depleted Viet Cong units.
There are indications that the intensified offensive in South Vietnam
may be coupled with some form of air action by the North Vietnamese Air
Force, by ground attacks in Laos. and possibly by terrorist attacks on
U.S. bases in Thailand. Recent unusual flight activity by North Vietnamese
MIG- Zl'a and IL-14's and the movement of IL-20's from China back into
the Hanoi area could be indicative of preparations for some new form of
hostile air action. Reports from Laos indicate impending Communist
attacks against government installations in the North and 3.3(h)(2)
South (e. g. Saravane). Some reports say Saravane is to be attacked on
the MN or I Zth -- a titneframe coinciding with the indicated new wave
of attacks in South Vietnam. Thailand reflect rumors of 3.3(h)(2)
Impending terrorist action against U.S. air bases. While the Communists
have not previously reflected the interest in, or the capability for such
far-flung coordinated actions, an attempt in this direction would not be
inconsistent with the general concept of distracting attention from the
main theater of operations and exercising all available capabilities in
order to decisively alter the situation in the Communists' favor.
The Communists, in the weeks ahead, thus seem likely to confront
the U.S. and the GVN with the most serious political-military challenge
since the introduction of our combat forces in 1965. We cannot be certain
how the initial phase of the spring offensive has affected Communiet plans
and capabilities. The evidence, however, strongly suggests there will
be renewed and repeated attacks on some urban areas and nearby military
installations, and a major campaign against Iihe Sank and along the DMZ.
If this effort materializes, it will indicate the Communists remain com-
mitted to preseing an "all out" endeavor to bring the war to an early and
favorable conclusion.
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