VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03398201
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 13, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03398201
varol yore
13 February 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Vietnam
1. In the aftermath of the Communist Tet offensive most
observers have agreed on the need to suspend judgment until more
data is available. Nevertheless, such avowals have been quickly
followed by broad judgments ranging from the blackest pessimism
to the wildly optimistic. Inevitably, judgments concerning the
objective situation in Vietnam have been mixed with and influenced
by a complex of attitudes on the justification or lack thereof
of our policy in the area and its impact on life in the US and
our posture in the world at large. Perhaps a non-emotional
approach to the problem is no longer possible for anyone with any
sense of involvement. (Many of us have been involved, in one
way or another since at least 1950 and can point to this or that
estimate, recommendation, or action which if properly followed
through by wise statesmen and soldiers would have avoided our
present frustration and malaise.)
2. But here we are and our first responsibility is to assess
the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries and the will and
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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competence of our friends. Over the past two weeks the general
trend has been to inflate the power of the former and to derogate
the performance of the latter.
3. An objective appraisal of the Communist position should
begin with the understanding that the winter-spring campaign --
in both its military and political aspects -- does represent a
radical shift in tactics. Beginning last fall with the battles
of Loc Binh and Dakto, we witneseed a departure from the low
risk approach of a protracted war effort and the switch to a
determined effort to force a relatively early and successful
conclusion of the conflict. This new strategy was impelled,
not by a sense of great strength, but by a realization in Hanoi
that the US/GVN effort in South Vietnam was gathering momentum,
that manpower in the South was increasingly being denied to the
Viet Cong, and that a war of resistance in the South based on
a predominately northern force was not politically viable. In
brief, Hanoi calculated that the strain of the war could not be
borne indefinitely and that something drastic had to be done to
retrieve the situation.
4. The Tet offensive itself, far from demonstrating
unexpected Communist strength (give it excellent marks for daring,
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fair marks for coordination), confirmed the low state to which
many local Viet Cong units had fallen. In Saigon a large number
of inexperienced, recently impressed young nen were used in attacks
on key targets. It also appears that many local Viet Cong units
had to be stiffened by North Vietnamese replacements. Surely,
if better trained Viet Cong units familiar with the street plans
of the various towns and cities had been available they would have
been used, possibly to decistve effect. The failure of main force
units -- Viet Cong and NVA -- to follow up quickly to exploit
the confusion of initial attacks shows poor coordination, a
lack of confidence, or both.
5. It might be said that the hoped for effect on the GVN
was worth the sacrifice of the poorly trained local units and
even their experienced cadre. But this does not detract from the
argument that the Tet attacks are further evidence of high risk
tactics on Hanoi's part. Many of the attacks were in fact carried
out by Main Force units -- Viet Cong and NVA. Hanoi could not be
sure that surprise would be achieved; they were risking substantial
losses of trained manpower. And as it turned out, losses to
these units -- as in Kontum -- were high even with surprise.
Exposing the 2nd NVA Division in the vicinity of Danang-Hol-Hu
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where it was badly beaten between 8-10 February makes no sense
except in terms of a high risk determined effort for an early
and decisive impact on the ARVN, the GVN, and the US.
6. Obviously, the military punishment which Communist
forces took last fall along the Cambodian border, around the
cities during Tet, and around Khe Sanh over the past month
has not forced Hanoi to call off its major effort. The scenario
is far from played out and the Communists probably have other
surprises yet to spring. More NVA Divisions can be committed
across the INZI new Soviet-made weapons can be introduced, Viet
Cong units can be replenished by impressment from the unprotected
countryside, perhaps Khe Sahh can be over run by a maximum effort.
But Communist forces in the field are not composed of supermen,
they continue to demonstrate the inability to coordinate actions
closely, to meet readiness deadlines, to stand up to the superior
fire power and mobility of US/ARVN forces. Their chances of
success continue to rest heavily on destroying the will and
effectiveness of the ARVN and GVN.
7, The failures of the ARVN and the GVN are, of course,
the source of much of our pessimism and frustration. We want
or expect the GVN to snap to, vitalize national administration,
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raise taxes, weed out corruption, get cracking on pacification,
stimulate democracy, and generally win the hearts and minds of
the people. Progress toward many of these objectives in the
short term is quite unrealistic in view of the cultural inertia
of a traditional confucian society and quite out of the question
in the midst of a major war. Perhaps the DB should be encouraged
by the simple fact that a government of sorts has now been in
continuous control since the emergence of Ky and Thieu in 1966.
Certainly the GVN and the ARVN could and should do more -- the
ARVN a good deal more -- to make the overall political and military
effort more effective. But perhaps if we had expected a little
less we would be more willing to acknowledge that some progress
had been made before Tet, that ARVN and GVN reactions during Tet
were not so futile, that South Vietnamese morale has stood up
amazing well over the past two weeks, and that the outlook is not
totally black. Obviously, if the US wavers at this juncture, the
entire structure could unravel quickly.* But there is still no
And if this should happen there would, of course, be no chance
for a "satisfactory" negotiation to ease the US departure from
Vietnam. Whether or not the US should take this opportunity to
shed its burdens and make a fast exit is another matter. The
point here simply is that it would have no alternative if it
appeared now to reduce its commitments.
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evidence of a widespread preference for the Communists in South
Vietnam, even if there is little evidence of a passionate loyalty
to the GVN. (Ho Chi Minh may be a popular nationalist figure in
Vietnam, this does not mean that his party shares in this esteem
either in North or South Vietnam.)
8. Thus, the issue remains in doubt. The Communists have
risked much already, including their prestige and the morale
of their forces. Many of their regular units have been subjected
to prolonged and continuous harassment and attrition. If they
back off now and return to a protracted war line they will risk
an adverse reaction among their less committed adherents in the
South who have been sustained by hopes of an early end to the
war. Meanwhile, the strains of the war which led to the adoption
of high risk tactics will still be there. If they continue to
commit their resources in all out effort over the next few
months and fail to achieve their purpose they will be in an
even less advantageous position to prolong the fighting.
JAMES GRAHAM
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