VC ACTIVITIES DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE IN CHAU DOC PROVINCE.

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00758650
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 5, 1968

:Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758650
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CONFIDENTIAL - KIN
UNTERRO6
MON REPOR
RAND
; 1968
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THIS REPORT IS THE igsula OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED
BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S.. CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT 6: .
6499TH SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF).
::COI1NTRY ,.: SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)
SUBJECT VC Activities during the TET
Offensive in CHAU DOC Province.
'DATE OF INFO : 1 January-1 February 68
DATE AND PLACE 15 February 1968 (C)
OF ACQUISITION : CAN THO, PHONG DINH, Vietnam.
NIC REPORT NO : 263/68
NIC CASE NO FET
DATE OF REPORT: 5/3/68
NO. OF PAGES : 5
REF: NIC REPORT 157/68
This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team am la February
1968 in CAN THO City, PHONG DINH Province, SVN. Source is not available
at the NIC for further exploitation.
DISTRIBUTION:
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US EMBASSY (OSA)
ATTACHMENTS:
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1ASSIFICATION
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SUMMARY
CHAU DOC Province Committee VC units assembled and briefed for offensive 29
January 1908 at CO TO Mountain; marched to THAI SON Village, TRI ION District,
CHAU DOC Province night of 29-30 January. 1968; attacked CHAU PHU, CHAU DOC
Province SVN on the night of 30 January. Battalion 1 targeted against GAC
,Barracks, Sub-Sector Headquarters and CHAU DOC Township Administrative Offices.
/Battalion 2 targeted against Military Police Barracks, CHAU DOC Township Police
Posts and Militia Training School. Civilian cadre and CHAU DOC Township Special
Action Forces were to occupy CHAU DOC Township Administrative Offices and Police
Post, capture Township Administrative Services Chiefs, and establish security
of docupied facilities. Pre-offensive indoctrination led VC to believe time
was 'right for coordinated offensive. Objedtive was to occupy towns and �
Provincial capitols to force GVN and U.S.governments to accept elected coalition
government. All military and civilian cadre were committed to offensive with
no reserves at Province level. No promises of reinforcements or instructions
for withdrwal. Offensive elements supportud.bY seven-man medical team and 304.
man Civilian labor force.
MAP REFERENCE:
AMS Series L701h, Sheet 6029 IV, Scale 1/50,000, Edition I.
AMS Series 1,70140 Sheet 5929 I, Scale 1/50,000, Edition 1.
AMS Series L7014, Sheet 6030 III, Scale 1/50,000, Edition 1.
1. The AN GIANG (CHAU DOC and AN GIANG)(VC) Province Committee cadre and
military units were apprised approximately one month in advance that
there would be an offensive launched during the general period of the
TET holiday. No other information had been available until 29 January.
1968, at which time the civilian and military units were assembled at the
VC Province Committee headquarters located on CO TO Mountain (approximately
WS 010450). The assembled units were briefed by VU HONG DUC, Chief of the
Province Committee Current Affairs Section, who had just returned from a
jleeting at Military Region II Headquarters some where in KIEN PHONG Province..
VU HONG DUC told them that the situation was favorable for a coordinated
a'VC attack against towns and provinces throughout SVN, and that the overall
.,objective of the attacks would be to occupy those towns and province
capitals to impress the GVN and U.S. governments and to force the election
,of a coalition government.
NIC REPORT NO L263/68
Pages 2
,V0 HONG, DUC gave a briefing on the general situation as follows: U.S.
,�troops were introduced into SVN with five stated purposes, all of which
he reported to have failed.
To eliminate VC main forces. DUC told them that to the contrary,
the U.S. forces had failed and were being defeated by the VC.
B. To strengthen the GVN government and military forchs. DUC reported
that in spite of the U.S. intervention, the GVN government and
military were declining.
. To pacify rural areas. The assembled units were told that this
effort had failed and that the VC now occupy four-fifths of the
land in SVN.
To destroy the HO CHI MINH Trail. DUC told them that there were
more weapons and ammunition being introduced into SVN from NVN than
ever before.
E. To step up the war on NVN. This effort has also failed, he told
them, and reported that so far, the U.S. has lost 2700 aircraft
over NI/N.
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Thejollowing units were under the command of the Province Committee.
All available military units and civilian cadre were committed to the
offensive.
Battalion 1: (formerly the 512th Battalion) This battalion was
reported to consist of approximately 500 men assigned to five
companies. It was supplied with DK 75mm. and DK 57mme Xecoiless
rifles, 62mm. and 82mm. mortar., 12.7 heavy machineguns, subma...
chineguns, and explosive charges. In addition, it Was especially
supplied with B41 rockets and AK machineguns and CKC rifles and
ammunition. Previously, there had not been enough ammunition for
training purposes. The only other special equipment used were
gas masks which the men had made for themselves.
Battalion 2; ( formerly the 510th Battalion) This battalion was
reportedly newly organized within the preceeding six months and
,consisted of approximately 250 men assigned to three companies.
This battalion was armed with essentially the same equipment as
Battalion 1.
Battalion 3: This battalion has just been organized within the .
past two months and contained approximately 200 recruits which
had previously not received any military training. Since this
battalion was not combat ready, it's members were used to augment w
the forces of Battalion 1 and 2.
cadre and CHAU PHU Special Action Forces: A 22-man
'Civilian: cadre which was augmented by the 30-man CHAU PHU Township
Special. Action Forces unit. Source stated that the civilian cadre
were equipped with AK submachineguns, CKC rifles, and B-40 rockets.
The unit did not have any food or medical supplies issued prior to
the attack. The Chief of the Security Section was given SVN$
17,000 by the Rear Services Section to buy rice for the unit after
it reached CHAU PHU, CHAU DOC Province. No rice could be purchased
after the attack began, however, because all the stores closed and
the unit could not find any sources for food purchases of any kind.
Medical Team: There was a medical team of approximately seven members
which followed the military units into the battle area of CHAU PHU,
CHAU DOC Province. The medical unit had insufficient medical
supplies and equipment because two members of the cadre had been
seriously wounded but couldn't get medical attention. The two
wounded men in his unit were eventually carried off by members of
the civilian labor force.
F. Civilian Labor Force: A civilian labor force of approximately 30
men under the guidance of the Rear Services Section of the Province
Committee were employeed to carry ammunition into the battle area
and to evacuate wounded. The civilian labor force may have included
members who were. impressed into service.
A large percentage of the military units employed, in the offensive
consisted of freshly recruited youths between 15 and 17 years of age.
The units of VC AN GIANG Province had difficulty recruiting older and
more experienced soldiers and was thus forced to use the young men. There
was no time in advance of the offensive to properly train the new recruits,
but they were committed to battle out of necessity. None of the young
men were forcefully recruited, but joined because of VC propaganda.
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NIC REPORT NO 263/68
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e military and civilian cadre of VC AN GIANG Province were committed
o'the following targets:
. Battalion 1: (1) GAC Barracks; water facilities, weapons and
ammunition storage.
(2) Sub-Sector Headquarters.
(3) CHAU DOC Township Administrative Offices.
Battalion 2: (1) Military Police Barracks.
(2) CHAU DOC Township Police Posts.
(3) Militia Training School.
Civilian cadre and CHAU DOC Township Special Action Forces:
(1) Occupy CHAU DOC Township Administrative Offices
and Police Post.
�
(2)
Capture Township Services Chiefs.
(3) Be responsible for security of occupied
Township facilities.
During the night of 29 January 1968, the units marched from their CO TO
Mountain encampment to the vicinity of THAI SON Village, TRI TON District,
CHAU DOC Province (approximately WS 635045) where they rested until the
night of 30 January 1968 when they launched their attack against CHAU-
PHU (CHAU DOC). During the morning of 31 January 1968, they were able to
occupy the CHAU DOC Township Police Post, seizing one automatic rifle
and an undetermined number of submachineguns. The civilian cadre along
with the CHAU DOC Township Special Action Forces were responsible for -
securing that facility, and defending it against ARVN Battalion 3 which
arrived and engaged them during the night of 31 January.
7. All military and civilian cadres of the Province Committee had been
*omitted to the offensive on 31 January 1968 to include non-combattants
such as typists because the VC considered the offensive to be of such
significance. During the pre-offensive indoctrination they were told
that this was the last chance for an ultimate victory. The committed units
were not given any instructions for withdrawal, however the forces would
have retreated to either the CO TO-GIAI Mountain complex used as the SVN
headquarters of the Province Committee. Some of the units may have
retreated into CAMBODIA. The units were not promised any reinforcements,
but were told that Regional Military units would be committed to targets
at the Regional level.
.OURq commarmSeurce become aware ,during the offorisine thnt the pre-attack
Eigarina=orhich he had received vas: false. He reasoned that if the
OW and U.S. forces had been as weak as he had been told, the would have
been easily been defeated. Instead, the ARVN forces drove the VC units
out of the attacked cities and caused heavy damage to the VC.
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NIC REPORT NO : 263/68
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rjApliefthe�Source s belief that the TET Offensive will be recorded as an
historic failure for the VC for three reasons: (1) the VC didn't keep their
word about honoring the TET holiday truce, thus making the people of SVN and
abroad realize that the VC don't keep their promises; (2) the VC will lose
popular support for having conducted the offensive during the solemn period
of TET when families traditionally get together for ancestor worship, and caused
the separation of many families; (3) the VC civilian cadres and soldiers will
lose, faith in the VC leadership for having so badly misled them about the true
situation. Source was also discouraged by the fact that he had not received
any help from villagers in his efferts to escape the counter-attack. He
reasoned that if the people truely wished to be "liberated" and supported the
VC cause, he would have had no trouble finding shelter and assistande in getting
out of the city. Source concluded that continue to step up their harrassmcnt
activities in order to preserve their image as a cohesive offensive fighting
unit while recruiting replacements and resupplying their forces.
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