THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786532
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 25, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
ToOseir
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25 February 1968
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Information as of 1600
25 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
Enemy activity slackened over the weekend, but
a number of mortar and rocket attacks were �directed
against several US airfields, and a battalion as-
saulted a US base in the delta.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
The tempo of enemy activity is at its lowest point
since the offensive began on 30 January. Neverthe-
less, enemy threats to several urban areas, includ-
ing Saigon, continue. A US fire support base south
of Saigon in the delta province of Dinh Tuong was
attacked with heavy losses to both sides (Paras.
1-2). The enemy attacked a series of US airfields
on the 24th and 25th with mortar and rocket fire
(Para. 3). .The enemy maintains pressure on Khe Sanh
and nearby posts, but allied forces have cleared the
city of Hue of organized Communist units (Paras. 4-5).
Enemy attacks in the Pleiku, Dak To- Ben Het, and
Kontum areas may be imminent (Paras. 6-9).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The government's detention of a number of prominent
individuals, especially the arrest of two labor lead-
ers, is causing considerable consternation and may
have unfortunate repercussions (Paras. 1-4). A new
Lower House bloc, composed of opposition deputies,
has issued a reasoned appeal for governmental re-
forms in order to make the people's anti-Communist
struggle worthwhile (Paras. 5-7). Food prices are
falling in Saigon, but uneffiployment at manufacturing
plants damaged during the Viet Cong attacks has be-
come a serious problem (Paras. 8-11).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Although hampered by poor flying weather, US air-
craft managed to strike the Hanoi port complex, Radio
Hanoi, and three airbases on 23 and 24 February (Paras.
1-4).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
VI. Other Major Aspects:� New rail and road
construction in northeast North Vietnam is progress-
ing rapidly (Paras. 1-2).
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I. THE MII,ITARY, SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM:
1. Although the tempo of enemy activity is at
its lowest point since the start of the Tet offen-
sive on 30 January, numerous mortar and rocket at-
tacks and small-scale ground attacks are still oc-
curring throughout South Vietnam. Communist forces
also still appear to pose a threat to a number of
urban areas, including Saigon, Da Nang - Hoi An,
and several delta cities.
enemy attacks may be imminent
areas.
the Pleiku-Kontum
US Base Attacked in the Delta
2. On the morning of 25 February, an artillery
battalion fire-support base of the US 9th Division,
located about nine miles northwest, of My Tho in Dinh
Tuong Province, was attacked by an estimated enemy
battalion. The enemy succeeded in penetrating the
base perimeter but was repulsed after the arrival
of US reinforcements. US forces suffered 19 killed
and 43 wounded in comparison with enemy losses of
94 dead and 24 weapons seized. Two US 155-mm. artil-
lery pieces were damaged and nine armored personnel
carriers were destroyed.
Enemy Artillery Attacks on US Air Bases Continue
3. On 23 February, enemy rocket and mortar
shells hit Ban Me Thuot and Tan Son Nhut. airfields,
and on the 24th, Da Nang and Marble Mountain were
struck by 122-mm. rockets. Can Tho and Binh Tuy
airfields were also mortared on the 24th. As a
result of these enemy actions, seven US soldiers
were killed, 50 US and Vietnamese soldiers were
wounded, and about 28 aircraft were. damaged. At
Binh Tuy, the enemy's mortar rounds struck an am-
munition storage area adjacent to the airfield
destroying large quantities of small arms and air-
craft ammunition.
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Pressure Against. Khe Sanh Continues
4. The Communist shelling of allied field
positions in northern Quang Tri Province continued
on 23 and. 24 February, but slackened On the 25th.
After receiving nearly 1,000 rounds on 22 February,
the Khe Sanh:combat base received approximately '1,300
rounds. of artillery, mortar, and rocket fire on
the night of 23-24 February. Eight US Marines were
killed in the latter shellings and another '38 were
wounded;.a large'quantity.of-tank ammunition was
destroyed. The Vietnamese Ranger unit on the eastern
perimeter of the base was probed by an estimated
enemy battalion on the 24th, but it suffered no .
casualties. On 24725 February the Khe Sahh base was.
again shelled and its defenders suffered 11 wounded.
On the afternoon of. the 25th, the US installation
and Airfield at Dong Ha received an estimated 64
rounds of 130-mm. artillery fire; there were no
personnel casualties, but six aircraft were damaged.
Hue Is Secured
5. In Hue, Vietnamese forces reportedly drove
the last enemy force from the area of the Citadel
and on the 25th, the city was declared clear of Com-
munist units. Sporadic firing continued, however,
as pockets of resistance were still being neutralized.
Threat to Kontum and Pleiku
6. enemy attacks in the
Pleiku, Dak. To -Ben Het, and Kontum areas may be
imminent. Sinde the.middle of February, units sub-
ordinate to the.B3.Front have gradually .moved from the
tri-border area into southern Kontum and .northern
Pleiku provinces. Units identified as deploying
include elements of the 40th Artillety Regiment and
174th Infantry Regiment. In addition, at least five
terminals serving the headquarters of the B3 Front
have moved into Kontum and Pleiku.
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9. /
/enemy forces in
Pleiku and Kontum provinces are attempting to con-
duct a large-scale recruitment drive to replenish
the ranks of military units. The recruitment is
being conducted in the villages and hamlets that
have come under their control as a result of the
withdrawal of allied military units from the country-
side. the
enemy was buying large amounts of foodstuffs. The
enemy appears to be preparing for another round of
large-scale attacks.
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II, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. The government's series of arrests during the
past several days--especially those of two labor lead-
ers--is causing consternation in many circles and may
have unfortunate repercussions. Labor Minister Pho Ba
Long told an embassy officer on 24 February that he had
been unable to discover the real reason for the arrests
of Tran Huu Quyen, secretary general of the Vietnamese
Confederation of Labor (CVT), and Vo Van Tai, secretary
of the CVT's Saigon Council. He said neither he nor
Prime Minister Loc had had advance word on the police
action, and he believes--as do many others--that it was
carried out under the personal direction of Police Di-
rector Loan as part of a predetermined plan to "neutralize
certain people" in a time of crisis.
2. Tran Quoc Buu, CVT president, has reportedly
received indirect assurance from Vice President Ky that
Quyen and Tai will be released, but Buu plans nonethe-
less to bring the matter up with President Thieu in a
meeting on 26 February. He has told an embassy officer
that he will point out to Thieu that the CVT has been a
consistent supporter of the government, despite occasional
differences, and that he, Quyen, and Tai issued state-
ments condemning the Viet Cong and supporting the govern-
ment immediately after the Tet offensive. Non-CVT labor
leaders have remained mute on the subject, Buu noted,
but it was the CVT officials whom the government chose
to detain. Buu said that the CVT will not launch a pro-
test movement which would hurt the government, but his
officials are "so demoralized that the CVT might just as
well close down its doors."
3. The detention of militant Buddhist leader Thich
Tri Quang is causing less of a stir, but some
feel that this action too will hurt the government. A
Cao Dai leader who is well acquainted with many of the
militants told an embassy officer on 22 February that
Tri Quang's prestige with the Buddhist faithful had been
diminishing rapidly in recent weeks and that this trend
would probably have continued if he had not been taken
into custody. Now, however, his image among his followers
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will probably improve. Lower House deputy Ly Quy
Chung has expressed similar views, claiming that
Tri Quang's refusal to denounce the Viet Cong at-
tacks had seriously hurt his prestige, but that the
government has now made a martyr of him.
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Lower. House Deputies Appeal for Government Reform
5. A new Lower House group, the New Society
Bloc, composed primarily of opposition deputies, has
presented President Thieu with a reasoned appeal for
a governmental clean-up in order that the people's
anti-Communist struggle and their sacrifices "will not
havebeen in vain." The statement begins with a de-
nunciation of the Communists' Tet attacks and goes on
to request a reorganization of the administrative ap-
paratus to eliminate corruption and inefficiency. It
further urges an immediate re-evaluation of government
policies and programs, particularly in the areas of
national security, revolutionary development, and in-
formation.
6. The statement also points to the need for true
unity within the executive and for greater allied as-
sistance in order to put down false rumors that "the
war has been prolonged for some hidden reason or other."
Deputy Ly Quy Chung, one of the New Society Bloc's lead-
ers, told an embassy officer on 23 February that Presi-
dent Thieu, when presented with the statement, had ap-
peared to accept the justice of the criticisms.
7. The tone of the statement and the manner of its
presentation will strengthen its impact. The authors'
credentials as fair-minded critics are also strength-
ened by the fact that they joined quite readily in the
Lower House's earlier statement of support for the gov-
ernment during the crisis and apparently still hold that
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view, while recognizing the immediate necessity for
certain reforms.
Economic Situation in Saigon
� 8. By 22 February food prices in Saigon had
dropped considerably, p\rimarily because of increased
deliveries of certain items and the reopening of the
central market. The price index now stands at 15 per-
cent above the pre-Tet level, in contrast �to the 70-
80 percent which held fOF some time after the Viet Cong
offensive. Most major roads to Saigon are again open
for traffic, thus permitting deliveries of food from
Da Lat, My Tho, and Vung Tau.
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9. The industrial employment situation presents a
less encouraging picture.\ 0f27,000 persons employed
in the major industries--tpxtiles, machinery and mill
products, glassware, and rbber--in the Saigon area,
11,000 are out of work becuse of plant damage and
many of the remainder are only working part time. It
is estimated that this sitliation will persist for six
months, and even afterward, some 7,000 will probably
still be jobless.
10. Although details ,Fe lacking on the current
status of the approximately 23,000 employed in smaller
industries around Saigon, thelir situation is probably
similar. In addition, constr\uction activity has been
very limited, causing a temporary income loss to about
70,000 employed in this field!
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11. In the area of reconstruction, the minister
of public works told the national recovery task force
on 24 February that the ministry is now ready to begin
the construction of three high-'rise apartment buildings
in burned out areas of Saigon.In addition, the home-
less in other areas of the city\ are to be given a reset-
tlement allowance and building materials in order to
begin building their own homes. \Refugees in Saigon totaled
143,000 as of 24 February. Figures for other areas stood
at 78,000 in I Corps, 88,000 in II Corps, 92,000 in III
Corps, excluding Saigon, and 104,000 in IV Corps.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Poor flying weather reduced the number of
US aircraft sorties over North Vietnam on 24 and
�25 February; however, a number of targets were hit,
including three airfields, Radio Hanoi, and the
Hanoi port complex.
2. The Hanoi. port complex handles approximately
30 percent of North Vietnam's inland waterway traffic
and is an important commercial transshipment point,
handling some shipments. destined to support Communist
operations in Laos. and South Vietnam. Two aircraft
using radar-controlled bombing systems, struck the
port complex on the morning of the 24th.. Another
aircraft hit the.Hanoi radio station, four miles south-
west of the city, at about the same time. Adverse
weather prevented a damage assessment. of these strikes.
3. Three airfields, Cat Bi, Kep, and Vinh were
also hit by US sorties on the 24th.
4. On 24 and 25 February, US pilots observed
24 surface-to-air missiles within a 20-mile radius
of the city of Hanoi. One missile succeeded in
downing a US A-6A aircraft near the Hoa Lac Airfield.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
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1. The new rail and road construction in northeast
North Vietnam is progressing. rapidly.
two-thirds of ,the roadbed construc-
tion of a new 67-mile rail, line between Hon Gai and Chu
Nguyen on the main rail line from China had been com-
pleted.' This is a 60-percent advance over early October
1967. In addition, a rail yard, three passing tracks,
and about half therequired bridges are finished or
underway along the line. Track could_be laid and the
line completed within a year.
2. A new, nearly completed, high-quality road from
Ssu-lo, China, connects with the rail. construction at
Hon Gai. Other work is under way on a road running west
from Hon Gai toward Hanoi. The rapid pace and quality
of construction suggest these are priority projects and
the.work of Chinese engineering troops: When all construc-
tion is completed, the Communists will have a new stra-
tegic rail.and road net from China to the Hanoi-Haiphong
area via Hon Gai and connecting routes.
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