POLITICAL APPRAISAL

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06787086
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 16, 1968

3.5(c)
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SEGREr
16 February 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Philip C. /UM
Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs
Department of State
SITIITE;CT
3.3(h)(2)
Political Appraisal
Attached for your information is a political appraisat
and
analyele
discussed
we
3.3(h)(2)
at our 16 February meeting.
Attachment
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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3.5(c
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-S-EeitEr
1. There appears to be fairly widespread appreciation in political
circles in Saigon that a Unique and promising moment is at hand in the wake of
the Viet Cong's Tet offensive. Amid the devastation and hardship, a spirit of
new resolution to resist the Communist apparatus is abroad. It is coupled with
a discernible, if still faint pulsation toward unity among many persons and groups
heretofore keener on competition for power and publicity than coherence in the
national interest.
2. This is not to Suggest that the unifying elements are stronger than
the persisting dividers, but they are newly in evidence. U imaginatively and
aggrestiively nourished, while at the same time accommodating to the aggravating
realities of this body politic, the promise of the moment can be at least partially
realized. In assessing this prospect and in our amdetybr progress in political
Vietnam, we would point out that the South Vietnamese people and their govern-
ment have undergone a traumatic experience of sorts during the past two weeks.
They have been affected, changed in Some ways, but not transformed. The
following paragraphs will perhaps illustrate.
3. There are three separate (or at least separable), concentric circles
of action being played out in the arena of what may be called the popularization or,
as we prefer, the politicalization of the reaction to the Viet Cong's Tet offensive:
a. The mobilization of non-governmental organizational energies
in support of the relief and recovery program.
b. The formation of a broad, representative national political
front specifically dedicated to fight the Viet Cong and to support the
GVN in this particular endeavor.
c. The organization of the population, primarily in the cities
but hopefully also in the towns, for purposes of control, information,
early warning, self-defense including some system of arming the
citizens.
4. As of 1800 hours in Saigon on 15 February, the situation in each of the
above circles is as described below:
5. Relief support:
a. The*Ministry of Social Welfare and ReUgees has sent a
message of thanks to 37 organizations assisting in the emergency
sE-GREr
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effort of relief and recovery. We have direct knowledge of the
activities of organizations in the labor, youth and religious
sectors. There is little question that considerable activity ensues.
b. There is also no doubt that the GVN failed to exploit the
political and psychological potential inherent in the strong impulse
to cooperate which manifested itself in the days immediately after
the assault. Offers to help were deflected Or initially ignored.
A common and structured effort by the popular groups was not
organized.
c. On the other hand, many statements have been issued and
given radio and press publicity here. Groups which are active
have undoubtedly derived satisfaction from their, participation
and have been given GVN supplies of one kind or another.
d. President Nguyen Van Thieu stated his intention to call in
individual political and religious leaders, obtain assurances of
cooperation and eventually convene a "congress of notables." No
action has been taken by Thieu to form either a council Or a congress.
Although the most dramatic moment for such a convocation has
passed, it is not too late for action in this area, based on the
participating groups.
6. A political front:
a. Pre-Tet political development was momentarily suspended.
Neither the Upper or Lower House have had time or mental energy
for new bloc building (or bloc demolition). Nguyen Van Huong's
cadre-contacting was necessarily halted pending a return to greater
normalcy.
b. New initiatives are tied to the crisis and the resultant anti-
Viet Cong momentum. One behind-the-scenes catalyst is Dang Duc
Khoi, Ky's Special Assistant. The core element of this effort (the
c7-41'
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seriousness of which is not yet Clear) appears to be the farmer-
worker- soldier group of Than Van In with Catholic and
Buddhist additions. Khoi hopes for a militant youth appendage
(District Eight) and a smattering of relatively unattached (or
unlabelled) Assembly figures. Ky has purposely been cool to
Khoi's effort, giving it only mild and implicit blessing, but
making clear that he does not want his name used in any way.
inaists that identification with any political organizational move
at this time will feed the developing runzors of his exploitation
of the current criais for personal political ends.
7. Self-defense organizations:
a. Responsibility for self-defense organizations appeare
to be in Ministry of interior hands. The issues concerning
plane for organizing self-defense groups have been: who will
organize the people, for what tasks, where will this be done, and
most important in the minds of some, who will be armed; when,
and how. The plan which the Ministry allegedly has drafted appear s
to be a reasonable one Eind includes many functions for inter-family.
block-br.bloc city organizations with arms distributed selectively
after screening and training.
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