THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786616
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 11, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
12
11
February 1968
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Information as of 1200
11 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
There has been an easing of enemy pressure
around cities and towns in some areas, but new
fighting has broken out in the delta.
� I.. Military-Developments in South Vietnam:.
Fighting continues in areas near Saigon and in. the
Mekong Delta (Paras. 1-3). The situation- in the.
four corps areas is summarized (Paras.'4-15)..
II. Political.Developments in South Vietnam:
Internal. bickering And red tape appears to-be.hamperl-
ing the efficient operation of the task force set-up
to. handle civilian problems (Paras. 1-3). : The-mili-
tant Buddhists-have sent Ambassador Bunker an insult-
ing letter. accusing the US of firing indiscriminantly.
on the An Quang Pagoda (Paras. 4-6)
, III. .North. Vietnamese Military Developments:
The North Vietnamese moved their IL-28 bombers from
'Phuc Yen Airfield. to Gia Lam- Airfield. and orbit
them near the DRV/Chinese. border-to.avoid damage
from:US-air strikes (Para...1). Additional trans-
port aircraft have been detected making flights to
Vinh and couldhave gone on into South Vietnam
(Para. 2).
.Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of 'significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Libera-
tion Front officials abroad continue to maximize
their publicity opportunities. The 'Front man in
Phnom Penh.disc4sses a possible coalition government
(Paras..1-3). In Djakarta, Communist spokesmen empha-
size thepolitical:successes of the Tet: offensive (Paras.
45). The Front man in. HanOi endorses Trinh's. will-
talk offer (Para. 6). Foreign Communist support (Para..7).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
�. 1. There has been an easing of enemy pressure
around cities and towns - in some areas. of the country
during the weekend, ,although the delta has been the
scene of new attacks Elements of the Communist
forces concentrated south of.Da.Nang appear to be
withdrawing to the southwest, but indications of
imminent enemy activity near Dak To continue, The
situation,athe Sanh, Hue, and Da Lat has under-
gone no:significant change in the past 48 hours.
2. There are persistent reports
of Viet Cong intentions to launch "large-scale
attacks" against Saigon some time before 13 Febru-
ary. Some of these reports allege that elements
of the Viet Cong 5th and 9th divisions or the NVA
7th Division--located north of the capital within
striking distance--will be engaged in or support
such attacks.
3. Bien Hoa Air Base was the target of a 122-
mm. rocket attack on the night of 10 February, in
which one American was killed, 60 wounded, and 22
aircraft were destroyed or damaged. The same evening
a US battalion had a sharp engagement with a Com-
munist force near Tan son Nhut Air Base which re-
sulted in 165 enemy killed. A fire started by Com-
munist rockets in that area resulted in the explosion
of a bunker containing 2,000 rounds of 105-mm. am-
munition. In the delta the Communists attacked :the
capitals of Bac Lieu and Kien Giang provinces. The
threat of new activity in Kien Phong and Phong Dinh
provinces has increased.
I Corps
4. Khe Sanh received .sporadic mortar attacks
throughout 10 February and a heavy mortar and rocket
barrage around noon on 11 February, but shelling
had become sporadic by early afternoon. The Lao
battalion in the area is being evacuated to Da Nang,
and preparations are being made to ferry it back to
Laos.
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5. has reflected
the shipment of large quantities of heavy caliber
ammunition--up to.152-Mm.-7to points just north of
the DMZ within the past week.
18 truckloads of. 130-mm. ammunition were being
e ivered on 8.February. .There are also indications
in that. at least one bat-
talion of. the North Vietnamese 813th Regiment is mak-
ing attack preparations in coastal-QUang Tri Province,
Messages of 11 February suggest that'the-lst Battalion
of the regiment. may be .preparing to cross the. .Qua
Viet River into..Trieu Phong District, where.other.
enemy units have.been active.
6. In Hue, newly reinforced South Vietnamese.
troops.are.continuing their efforts, to dislodge enemy
forces. from the citadel area. The Communists still
hold the Imperial Palace, a portion along the citadel's
southwest.wall, and a section immediately east of the
citadel. Snipers are still prevalent throughout the.
city. South of the Perfume River, where US Marines
had gained control-earlier,.widespread.looting is be-
coming a major problem..
II Corps
7. .There have.been_no major changes.in.the situa-
tion throughout Ii Corps, despite a continued, threat to,
the Dal< To area. In D4 Lat the Communists still con--
trol a- hamlet. on the western outskirts 'of the city._ In
Darlac Province, elements of the NVA 33rd Regiment are
still believed to be located.about'20 kilometers south-
east of Ban. Me Thuot.
Saigon and III Corps
8. - InHadditiOn to the major. skirmish north-north-.
West of Saigon and the harassMent_at Tan-SonNhut_Air
Base, Sporadic small-scale fire fights-persisted in. the
Cholon_section of the. capital. where.ARVN troops are-still
engaged in clearing efforts..
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9. Preliminary interrogation of afield com-
mander and political officer from a Viet Cong unit
which participated in the recent attacks on Saigon
�has revealed additional information on enemy plans
and deployments in the capital area. According to
the prisoners, the main mission of their two-company
strike force was to seize and hold Saigon-Cholon's
Chi Hoa prison, regardless of the cost. They were
�
absolutely forbidden to retreat and were told they
would be executed if they did. The attack on the
prison failed. The field commander maintained that
a total of 30 battalions were in or near Saigon,
with one to two divisions in reserve and artillery
units "to come later." The political officer claimed
�that there were some 25 battalions in the Saigon
area, that the "maximum utilization" of artillery
units was programmed for the "second phase of attack,"
and that "Divisions 5, 7, and 9" were reserve forces
to provide support.
10. ,,major
elements of the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Light Infantry
divisions and the NVA 7th Division continue to be
located within striking distance of the capital.
IV Corps
11. Communist actions in the delta during the
past few days have emphasized continued attacks by
fire against provincial and district towns, inter-
spersed with ground assaults against lightly defended
rural outposts. Although the over-all intensity of
ground attacks has declined sharply, several Viet
Cong units in IV Corps remain deployed in close
proximity to heavily, populated areas.
12. A. Viet Cong force which on 10 February at-
tacked Bac Lieu city remains within the town. Some
of the attackers have attempted to exfiltrate,
using women and children as shields. Thirty-three
persons were killed or wounded and a large portion
of the city has been destroyed by fire.
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13. Rach.Gia, the capital of-Kien Giang
Province,.came under-13740 rocket attack during the.
early morning hours of 11-February. The 30-minute
bombardment resulted in 19 friendly casualties and
total destruction to the CORDS_ building. There-ap-
parently was no follow-up -ground attack and the. city
is now reported quiet..
14. An estimated 500-man Viet Cong force has
reportedly surrounded Cao Lanh, the capital of Kien
Phong Province. This strike force, supported by
some 400 laborers, has constructed bunker complexes
1,000 to 1,500 meters from the city proper. Due to
eroding security in the rural areas, all Revolution-
ary Development teams in Kien Phong have been with-
drawn from their hamlets and pulled into the capital
or district towns.
15. The Headquarters of :Military Region (MR)-.
3, a Major-Viet Cong command authority
unprecedentd. move.. On 8 February,
command authority in-southern Phong.
Dinh province, marking the first time since July 1963
that Headquarters, MR .3 had-been identified outside
its, normal operating area--some 50'miles to the south-
west. The relocation of this headquarters into Phong
Dinh Province, coupled with the recent identification
of three Viet Cong main forde battalions.in,the im-
mediate area of Can Tho, may portend renewed enemy
offensive activity in. and around the provincial capi-
tal.
has made an
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The task force established to cope with the
massive problems arising in the aftermath of the Viet
Cong Tet offensive is apparently running into:serious
difficulty because of internal bickering and bureau-
cratic red tape,
Inafrustration, General Nguyen
Duc Thang, Vice President Ky's deputy on the task
force, declared on 9 February that he was resigning.
He has failed to appear for subsequent meetings.
2. many of
the cabinet members on the task force, most notably
the ministers of health and refugees, have been un-
able or unwilling to work together and insist on
following normal ministerial procedures. The re-
sult is that needed services are not being provided
for the people in a timely and efficient manner.
3. Vice President Ky,/
/is being urged to use his influence
to have the constitution amended so that he could
be appointed prime _minister. Several Lower House
deputies, some senators, Ky's own advisers, and
General Thang have all reportedly approached Ky
with the proposition. Ky has apparently put them
all off, at least so far.1
Ithat he is doing his best to im-
prove Prime Minister Loc's image and to include him
in the task force's plans and activities.
Militant Buddhists Attack Alleged US Actions
4. The militant Buddhists of An Quang Pagoda
have sent Ambassador Bunker an insulting letter
accusing the US of attacking the pagoda "both mili-
tarily and politically." The letter, signed by the
An Quang director, Thich Thien Hoa, charged that
the US was careless in defending Saigon, attacked
the population indiscriminately and fired on the
pagoda even though there were no Communists inside.
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5. The Americans were charged also with slan-
deking'-the Buddhist bhurch-by broadcasting over - Voice
of America that the Viet Cong were in the pagoda.
The letter concluded with a "request" that the am-
bassador order a halt to-the "calumny" and with a
charge that the US alone is responsible for the
deteriorating relations between the Americans and
the Buddhist church..
6. The An Quang Pagoda suffered little damage
during the 1 February attack to rout the Viet Cong
force entrenched there. No American troops joined
in the attack, except possibly as advisers to the
Vietnamese Rangers who carried it out. The mili-
tant Buddhists have stood out thus far as the one
significant group which has not denounced the Viet
Cong attacks and has not voiced a' modicum of sup-
port for the government.
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. In an effort to protect their IL-28 bombers
from US bombing raids, the North Vietnamese moved
the planes on 9 February from Phuc Yen to Hanoi/Gia
Lam. This airfield is Hanoi's international air
terminal and has not yet been struck. On at least
four occasions since their transfer to Gia Lam the
IL-28s left the field and circled in airspace over
the North Vietnamese/Chinese border while US strike
aircraft were in the Hanoi area.
2. indicates that
at least four transport aircraft completed a Hanoi
to Vinh flight during the late afternoon of 11
February. The purpose of the flights is not yet
known, but the aircraft could have continued on
into northern South Vietnam.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Liberation Front officials abroad are con-
tinuing to make every effort to be seen and heard.
Twice last week, Nguyen Van Hieu, the Front's repre-
sentative in Phnom Penh and one of its most authori-
tative spokesmen on foreign affairs, discussed Viet
Cong plans for a coalition government. Radio propa-
ganda and prisoners captured in the Tet offensive
have indicated that the Front intends to establish
unilaterally a coalition government in opposition
to Saigon. Nguyen Van Hieu, however, is the first
responsible Front official to comment publicly on
this issue. In an apparent effort to drum up some
international support for such a government (if it
should ever be established), Hieu gave a press con-
ference on 8 February, and on the 9th reportedly
held a special briefing for neutral diplomats in
the Cambodian capital.
2. According to Wilfred Burchette, who pub-
licized the press conference, Hieu said that the
Front planned to establish a coalition government
to replace the South Vietnamese Government after con-
sultation with "other revolutionary forces." Ac-
cording to a Burmese diplomat who attended the
briefing on 9 February, Hieu told his diplomatic
colleagues virtually the same thing. The Front in-
tended to convene a national conference of the
"peace and democracy forces for the purpose of form-
ing a provisional government" and would hold nego-
tiations with the US for a cease-fire and the with-
drawal of US troops. Hieu also told the diplomats
that the Front would seek "recognition and respect
for the territorial integrity of Vietnam from the
world and especially from Cambodia, Laos, India,
Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Japan."
3. At home, the Communists are taking the same
line on a possible coalition government and are con-
tinuing to pump up the "democratic and peace alliances."
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The Front central committee issued a statement on
9 February, and the Tri-Thien-Hue Liberation Front
issued a similar statement on the 5th, offering to
hold discussions with the new peace alliances "to
work out the best solution for getting the US out
of Vietnam and restoring peace." Both statements
dramatize the intent of the new peace alliances to
"set up a government of the people."
4. Communist officials in Djakarta also dis-
cussed Viet Cong intentions on several occasions in
recent days in private forums. Prior to the Tet of-
fensive in late January, the head of the Front of-
fice told Indonesian Government officials that he
had attended a Front central committee meeting last
summer and had come away with renewed confidence and
optimism on the war. In a rare admission of past
difficulties, the official admitted that US forces
had had some success in the past two "dry seasons"
(the winters of-65-66 and 66-67). He boasted that
Communist units how had new weaponry and much greater
experience and the US would not do so well this year.
The Viet Cong intended to strike "several blows"
this year, he said.
5. In two conversations in early February (after
the opening of the Tet offensive), lower ranking of-
ficials of both the Front mission and the North Viet-
namese Embassy denied current press speculation that
Khe Sanh was to be a second Dien Bien Phu. There
would be no large-scale attack on Khe Sanh "now,"
they said. When asked what could be considered-a
decisive battle in the current military campaign,
the two officials pointed to the fight at Tan Son
�Nhut Airfield. They boasted that communications be-
tween the field and Saigon were broken and that in-
ternational civil traffic had been disrupted. The
Front man claimed that the Communists intended a
"long fight against this base." Both officials
emphasized the political significance of the Tet at-
tacks. They said that one of the major objectives
of the first phase of the fighting was to increase
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the Front's political support and that this aim
was as important as any military results. In
these. post-Tet conversations,
Front Endorses Trinh Statement
6. In Hanoi this weekend, the Front spokes-
man issued an unequivocal endorsement of the re-
cent North Vietnamese offer to talk with the US
in exchange for a bombing cessation. Front propa-
ganda in general has avoided comment on this is-
sue, but on 9 February Front representative Nguyen
Van Tien, in an interview with a Hungarian journal-
ist, said the Front "entirely agrees with (the
North Vietnamese foreign minister's) statement and
fully supports its contents." The Front representa-
tive also used the interview to boast that "revolu-
tionary forces" controlled three out of eight dis-
tricts in Saigon. The Viet Cong, he said, intended
to mobilize the young people of towns and villages
and arm them to help defeat any possible American
"counterattack."
Foreign Communist Support
7. In Moscow and Prague, the Front representa-
tives were received by prominent Communist party
leaders amid much publicity. The Soviets, in addi-
tion, issued a special Tass statement supporting
the Viet Cong offensive and the North Vietnamese
offer to talk. They are also staging mass rallies.
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