THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786687
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 28, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
614.
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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28 February 1968
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Information as of 1600
28 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
Reports from several rural areas indicate that
the Viet Cong have almost complete freedom of move-
ment there, even in formerly pacified sections. The
relative lull in major Communist ground action activ-
ity continues, although there are indications of im-
pending large-scale activity in several areas of the
country.
I. .Military Situation in' .South Vietnam:. Com-
munist. military activity on' 27-28 February was high-
lighted. by continued shelling' .of allied strongpoints
in northern and. western Quang Tri Province, and by at-
tacks in 'western Kontum-Province, and against provin-
cial ancldistrict capitals. in III-and IV Corps. On
the allied side, US. .forces have 'inflicted heavy losses
on the .Viet Cong:in Quang .Tin Province and' have launched
two new. spoiling operations against enemy units threaten-.
ing Da Nang 1Paras'.. 1-7). -There are unconfirmed re-
ports that North-.VietnaMese,force's may be moving addi-
tional armored vehicles.and.rocket-launchers southward.
into theLaotian. infiltration corridor (Paras. 8-15)'..
Evidence of Communist intentions to conduct sustained
military operations in theweStern-.highlands mounts
(Paras. 16-22)
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: The
latest labor leader arrested in Saigon _was released
a few hours after he had been picked up (Para. 1). Re-
ports from several rural areas indicate that the Viet
Cong have almost complete freedom of movement there,
even in formerly pacified sections (Paras. 2-6). De-
fections to the Viet Cong are discussed (Paras. 7-12).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The. network of allied sti'ongpoints from Khe Sanh
eastward across the Demilitarized Zone again received
artillery, rocket, and.mortar fire on 27-28 February.
No. significant North. Vietnamese ground attacks were re-
ported.. Reconnaissance- elements of. two Communist divi-
sions in the Khe Sanh area have intenSified their de-
tailed reporting on allied air strikes and ground activ-
ity as well as on the construction and repair of fortifi-
cations and fences at Khe Sanh.
2. The heaviest fighting in I Corps � was in Quang Tin
Province where, on 27 February, a US Army battaliOn.at-
tached to .Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA killed 148 enemy in a
.four-hour'firefight less than five miles west of the Capi-
tal city of. Tam Ky. US losses were two killed and 14
wounded. The enemy force encountered was tentatively
identified as the 72nd Viet Cong Main Force Battalion.
3. In an effort to delay, or disrupt renewed Com-
munist offensive activity in the,Da Nang area,US forces
have launched. two spoiling campaigns. -.Operation HOUSTON,
a four-battalion US Marine/US Army task force, will try
to secure, the general area northwest of Da Nang, which
includes strategic coastal .Route 1 in the Hai Van Pass
and Phu Loc area.- Meanwhile, in Operation TAMPA, ,a rein-
forced US Marine battalion is .tasked.with.the destruction
of enemy, staging and' assembly areas ten miles west-south-
west of .Da Nang. No significant brushes .with the enemy
have thus far been reported from eitheroperation.
4. Communist tactical activity in II Corps on 27
February was highlighted by attacks against three US
Army companies attached to Operation MACARTHUR in Kontum
Province. The first attack was aimed at two US companies
operating west-northwest of Dak To and resulted in enemy.
losses of 50 killed and US losses of 4 killed and 22
wounded. The second attack-'-a mortar and small-arms
assault--against one US company five miles north-north-
east of Kontum city inflicted American casualties of
24 wounded. Enemy losses were not reported.
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5. In the coastal provinces of central Vietnam,
the Binh Thuan provincial capital of Phan Thiet re-
ceived small-scale enemy probes on 27-28 February.
US Army airborne units operating just west �of the
capital reported killing 29 Viet Cong during this
period.
6. Communist forces in III Corps continued their
attacks-by-fire against provincial and district
capitals on 27-28 February, with all eleven provinces
reporting some form of Viet Cong activity. The most
serious situation appeared to be in Phuoc Long Prov-
ince, where the adjoining towns of Song Be and Phuoc
Binh were reported under enemy ground attack. The
Phuoc Binh airstrip was closed after Viet Cong
ground fire destroyed a US C-130 aircraft on take-
off. Elsewhere, rocket and mortar attacks were re-
ported against US infantry base camps at Tan An, the
capital of Long An Province, at Cu Chi in Hau Nghia
Province, and against Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
7. In the IV Corps area, the provincial capitals
of Chau Phu, Can Tho, Vinh Long city, and Soc Trang
came under Viet Cong mortar and rocket attacks on
27-28 February.
New Heavy Enemy Weapons Reported
8. Reports during the past few days indicate
that the North Vietnamese may be moving additional
armored vehicles and rocket launchers down into
the Laotian infiltration corridor. The reports
are not confirmed.
9. A Laotian Army company commandet who had
been, stationed just west of Khe Sanh at Ban Hpuei
San before that outpost was Overrun in.late.January
claims. that.he saw-and counted. 174 pieces of heavy
equipment including tanks, mobile assault guns, and
artillery rocket launchers moving south in. Laos
the night of 11-12 February, The Laotian.officer
reportedly Made the observations on Route 92 about
18 miles southwest of Khe Sanh as he was retreating
overland toward government-held-Laotian territory.
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New Infiltration Routes into Kontum Province
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15., A number of low-level agent reports have
stated that the enemy intends to use tanks in the
central highlands and northwest of Saigon. Allied
troops reportedly engaged a force which was sup-
ported by tanks near the Cambodian border in Tay
Ninh Province on 26 February. In addition, enemy
tanks were sighted in Binh Long Province on 27 Feb-
ruary, according to a preliminary report from an
aerial observer. In general, however, the evidence
of enemy tanks in the southern part of South Vietnam
is rather tenuous at this time. The possibility
exists that captured allied vehicles or even Cam-
bodian vehicles might be involved.
The Western Highlands
16. Evidence of Communist intentions to conduct
sustained military operations in the western high-
lands mounts.
17. Analysis of aerial photography of early
February has revealed the further extension of a new
�road from the Communist-controlled road network in
Laos through the Cambodian salient and into South
Vietnam's Kontum Province in the vicinity of Dak To.
Aerial photography of December 1967 provided the
first indication of the extension of Laotian Route
110 to a point near the South Vietnamese border.
By 9 February, �this road had been extended across
the Kontum Province border and joined with South
Vietnamese Route 512. New occupied enemy defen-
sive positions--personnel trenches, foxholes, auto-
matic weapons/antiaircraft artillery sites--were
also revealed in the 9 February photography at the
junction of �this new road and Route 512.
, 18. The completion of this road provides the
Communists with a motorable logistical transport com-
plex capable of supporting operations against a net-
work of at least four US military installations in
the Dak To area.
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19. Moreover, the photography revealed enemy
road-clearing operations extending a branch of this
same new route southward along the Cambodian - South
Vietnamese border and into Kontum Province some 32
miles northwest of Kontum city.
20. Meanwhile, the pattern of deployment and
of major B-3 Front combat
units in the highlandsreflects preparations for early,
coordinated attacks in the Dak To sector, in the Kon-
tum city - Pleiku city region, in the Le Thanh area
of western Pleiku, and in the Ban Me ThUot area of
Darlac Province.
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there has been a- sOUtherly move by some B-3
Front elements which normally operate in the western
Kontum-Cambodian border area.. For .example, between
12 and 24 February, the 1st North Vietnamese Army
Division's 32nd Regiment moved nearly l09 miles south-
southeast from a.Spot west of Dak To to the Pleiku-
Darlac province border area. The present. communica-
tions of this regiment indicate that it may have been re-
subordinated to a headquarters element of the B-3 Front
which appears to be controlling military operations in
the area. Elements of the 174th Infantry Regiment and
the 40th Artillery Regiment'have also shifted from the
Dak To area to positions threatening the provincial
capitals of Kontum and Pleiku.-
22. While the repositioning of these units has
probably temporarily weakened the enemy's over-all of-
fensive posture in the Dak To area, at' least one regi-
ment--the 66th of the 1st Division�along with artil-
lery and other combat support units still pose a
threat in western Kontum Province. Moreover, the com-
pleted construction of the previousl mentioned road-
way into western Kontum will facilitate the introduc-
tipn of reinforcements and war materiel into the Dak
To sector.
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Enemy .Communications StanddOWn'Aiong the Northern Coast
23.
During the
past few weeks there have been numerous inaications
that the enemy plans to launch additional attacks
in this region, possibly in coordination with a move
in the Khe Sanh area.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Labor leader To Thanh Tuyen was released from po-
lice custody a few hours after he was picked up on 27 Feb-
ruary. Tuyen, president of the Vietnamese Confederation
of Labor's Saigon Council, had been detained for undeter-
mined reasons, but was allowed to go after Saigon Mayor
Van Van Cua intervened on his behalf. Cua told a union
official that the police had 'overreacted to Hanoi radio
appeals urging workers in Saigon to rise up against the
government.
Grim Situation �in Rural Areas
2. Reports beginning to come in on the situation
in the rural areas of Vietnam indicate that, in several
areas, the movement of allied military forces to the
cities has left the countryside almost completely unde-
fended. Pacified hamlets are no longer safe for travel
in these areas, and authorities there cannot get out
to the rural areas to assess the situation. The Viet-
namese Army, in many cases, is locked in static defen-
sive postures around the cities.
3. Local officials'in Da Lat, capital of Tuyen Duc
Province, say they have not yet been in contadt with the
rural areas. Although some commercial traffic has been
moving along Routes 20 and 11, Vietnamese and American of-
ficials regard security as .inadequate on these major roads.
Until the. Tet offensive, the two roads had been secure for
more than two years. The Revolutionary Development chief
fpr the province has been forbidden to leave Da Lat, and the
province chief has made only helicopter visits and one heav-
ily armed convoy trip to the districts..
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4. Of the 11 Regional Force companies normally as-
signed to Tuyen Duc, three were brought in to defend Da Lat
and are still there. Only six of the province's 16 Revolu-
tionary Development teams are in place in their appointed
hamlets, and many of the remainder are unaccounted for. No
significant attacks occurred in rural Tuyen Duc until the
Viet Cong had withdrawn from Da Lat, at which time Revolu-
tionary Development hamlets in each district were hit. Small
groups of Communist troops have now returned to the outskirts
of the city, but the Vietnamese Army has made no moves to oust
them, even though its forces outnumber the enemy's and have
been assured of adequate air and artillery support.
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5. In Binh Long Province, reports from resi-
dents of An Loc and Loc Ninh districts indicate that
the Viet Cong are gaining a firm foothold. They have
been expanding their administrative control and mobiliz-
ing the population in many hamlets. Residents report
that the Viet Cong are firmly entrenched in many ham-
lets. Destruction of government identity cards by
the enemy has reportedly become so standard that the
people autOmatically produce their cards when the
Viet Cong appear. '
6.. In Phu Yen Province, government forces, which
had been deployed inand around Tuy,Hoa to defend the
city against the.Viet'Cong attacks, have now been moved
back out to the rural areas. They have beenrreluctant
however, 'to patrol at night or to set ambushes. They
move instead in company. strength from one sttongpoint
to another, and operations even during daylight hours
have been largely confined to Revolutionary Development
hamlets instead of being extended.to more insecure areas.
Revolutionary Development teams, almost all Of which
have been back in their assigned. hamlets since 15 Feb-
ruary,.feel so unprotected that many will not spend ,
,the night in the hamlets. The. Viet Cong have been rel-
atively 'free to operate at night in platoon' strength and
reportedlY'havebeen taxing villagers, confiscating rice,
and recruiting.
Defections to the Viet Cong
7. Although no major government military unit is
believed to have defected to the Viet Cong since 30
January, numbers of South Vietnamese Government per-
sonnel are believed to have individually joined them.
Evidence of this is most readily available in Hue.
8. South Vietnamese Government authorities have
discovered that at least -25 individuals--company grade
military officers, noncommissioned officers, civil
servants, and policemen--defected to the Communists
in Hue. This may be an extreme case, since Hue has
long been a hotbed of antigovernment dissension and
was the center of the abortive "struggle" movement in
the spring of 19-6-6-. Mo�eover, the Communists con-
trolled parts of Hue far longer than was the case
in any other city attacked at Tet.
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9. Most of the civilian defectors in Hue, ac-
cording to the Vietnamese information, were associ-
ated with "extremist struggle elements" in the
past. Some of these people apparently were recently
released from government prisons.
10. Most of the military defectors in Hue
were assigned the mission of propagandizing other
soldiers and civil servants to surrender and coop-
erate with the Viet Cong. One group was charged
with writing letters to members of the Vietnamese
1st Division, urging them to leave their unit.
11. The number of defections elsewhere in the
country, especially among government forces located
outside of cities and towns, cannot be accurately
assessed. The large number of rural outposts over-
run or abandoned--including at least a few through
treachery--suggests that this kind of thing may
have occurred elsewhere.
12. Recent Communist propaganda claiming de-
fections from the government forces has-provided ex-
plicit unit designations and the number of personnel--
in many cases no more than four or five alleged de-
fectors. For example, a Liberation Radio broad-
cast of 24 February claimed that a majority of
the officers and troops from the Vietnamese 45th
Regiment (23rd Division) joined with the "libera-
tion forces" to attack and take over Ban Me Thuot.
Although this is known to be an exaggeration since
the unit as a whole fought the enemy attack, reports
from US and Vietnamese officials did suggest that
at least some members of the 45th Regiment assisted
the Communists. Since "troop proselyting" has al-
ways received heavy emphasis from the Communists,
it is not possible to determine at present whether
the apparent defections were spontaneous or were
in fact enemy "agents in place."
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. The .evidence clearly indicates that . the
infiltration of -personnel from North- to South Viet-
nam has continued at a high rate since the first
of the . year. Infiltration has probably been _above
the 1967 monthly average .of 4,000 - to 6;000 -men.
2. The bulk of the infiltrators appears to
have been replacements or- reinfordements - for exist-
ing units. Reports from prisoners - and agents sug-:
gest that significant ,replacement and augmentation
groups arrived in January.
also reflect the .influx
ment .personnel.- For example,
mid-February referred to replacements
Independent Battalion and 803rd North Vietnamese
Army Regiment in Quang Tri Province.
of replace-
for the 27th
3. It is possible that new organic North
Vietnamese units have'infiltrated, although there
is no firm evidence of this.
the 316th Division probably has
deployed out of North Vietnam, but its destination
is unclear at this time. Captives recently taken
in the Demilitarized Zone area have stated that
new divisions, including the 308th1 have moved into
this area. This information has not been corrobor-
ated.
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5. The Communists, in planning the Tet offen-
sive, are likely to have made provisions for re-
placing large numbers of troops they probably ex-
pected to lose or for exploiting any advantage
gained from the offensive.
6. As in the past, it'will be some months
before a firm assessment can be made of the pace
of infiltration during the past eight weeks. There
is normally a time lag of three to six months.
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