COMMENT TO THE TET OFFENSIVE AND INDICATIONS OF A FUTURE OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00758602
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 21, 1968

3.3
AL **II MA us VI 4 Dv too. va HAW
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758602�-----11-1
; 15'..t�d '
�`:-`. )1 TSAI' - I N
rN7 r p 7)0(11
tgy 1,1-0
errnr--
f itd,PI
� -252]
THIS REPOT IS THL WULT Or VS INTWO5ATION ACTITfr.7 CONDUCTED
BY T14..K NATICPNL TNTEAROGATION MMIT. (M) CMDa. 71.rff. JOINT.AMPIM;
OF Tg9.. atITT'iAL rNTELLIMICE, ORGAN17,14.TICN (cio) Axn THE U,S.
� TNISLLIGENCA AMICY (aIA) WITH Ng PAPTICIPATTM or I.:;EV4HMENT 6,
6119,:�?'Nf zr.OUP
',V.:0 �x�-- � � �.
�
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF INFO
DATE AND PLACE
OF ACQUISITION
: SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) NIC REPORT NO : 353/68
NIC CASE NO : CHIEU HOI
: Comment to the TET Offensive and
Indications of a Future Offensive DATE OF REPORT: 21/3/68
: 28 January 1968 - 9 February 1968 NO. OF PAGES : 2
14. March 1968 (X - REF : NIC Report 350/68
: SAIGON, Vietnam � (PIR)
':This report was colledted by a NIC Interrogator at the National CHIEU HOI
Center in SAIGON on 11 March 1968. Source is not available at the NIC for
further exploitation.
TINM. .Y
, _ , ,A R
--,-- -..,- -
. \ . 0,p),...1,VA: ' . ' � .. . .
ource did not believe the TEToffenspe;in'his sector of :KONTUM Province
-.-� .
would succeed due to their inadequate force of 250 men. The VC lost their
objective (TAN CANH Town) because they failed to destroy a bridge over which .
GVNreinfercements would come. Indications of future offensive were apparent
when Source left his base camp to rally. The VC were being told by their '
unit commanders to prepare for a new TET offensive.
.�������������........*
DISTRIBUTWN:
VS MACV
US MASSY (08A)
� i.,
,CLASSIFICATION
K I N
0-NFID
EICLUDtD OM AUTOMATIC
'GRADING AUD
'CLASSIFICATION
11
-
ATTACHMENITi;'
( h
NOTICts Mtli IIATIMIHAL: CONTAINS INFORMIX!.
I
AFFECT/ G TNE NATIONAL DU EivSE OF TIIE umnte
STATES 'THIN THZ MEANING OF THE itIPIONADIE
LAWS. T tE IS O.S... SECTIONS 793 410 MP&
THE TRA 'SLIISS444 OR REVELATION OF WHICH tir
' ANY HA AE! TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON ID
leROHIDITED DV LAW
� APR 1 5 19811
9 0 1110
_pptal-Rogistiwy No:
"91c[/IqW, iJd
pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758602
t.'
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758602
4
K I N NIC REPORT NO : 353/68
CONFIDENTIALPages: 2
TET pffensive was first heard of on 28 January 1968 at 1500 hours.
Political Officer (name unknown) told Battalion 2 that every VC unit must
launch an attack on the enemy that night. BattaliOn 2 was to attack TAN
CANH Town, TAN CANH District (Called District 80 by the VC), KONTUM
Province. There were three objectives for units attacking TAN CANH Town:
O. To capture the Pagoda, which had one guard squad of GVN troops, who
were to warn a GVN garrison outside of town in case of a VC attack; b).
Attack the town. and GVN troops home on vacation, and rally the townspeople
to their cause; and c. destroy the bridge over which GVN reinforcements
would have to come.(NIC Comment Source did not think the offensive would
succeed; they only had 250 fighters.)
2. -.Battalion .2 left the base camp for the TET attack on TAN CANH Town at
1700 hours on 28 January 1968. The town was three hours walking distance
. from the base camp.
On the second day of TET (31January 1968), Battalion 2 returned to its base
camp at 1600 hours after losing the town of TAN CANH to the GVN forces and
remained there until Source rallied Source heard from the men of Battalion
2 about the attack. The Pagoda was taken easily since it was only guarded
by four or five GVN troops. The bridge, however, which was crucial, was
not destroyed as the mam with explosives disappeared. When the GVN reinforc-
ments appeared, the VC tried to tell the people to stay in the town, since
they knew the GVN would not shell the town with so many civilians in it.
However, the people listened to the GVN which told them to evacuate; in the
ensuing attack the VC were routed from TAN CANH Town at 1500 hours on the
first day of TET (30 January 1968).
Source rallied brcause he no longer felt like dying for the VC. Ever since
he was wounded he had been accused by the political cadre of inflicting the
-iiiceandhimself so he would not have to fight.
5. When Source departed the base camp to rally there were indication of a new
offensive. He was sure they would attack with new plans learned from their
past mistakes, since the TET offensive was generally considered a defeat by
the men. Units were being reorganized and unit commanders were criticizing
VQ who had not 'done well in the TET offensive. They were all told"they must
all prepape for a new TET offensive, and this time the bridge of TAN CANH
Town must be destroyed".
�
� r
diAt
-KIN
5
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
pproved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758602