THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM MARCH 3, 1968

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06787124
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 3, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The
The Situation in Vietnam
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� Information as of 1600
3 March 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
Renewed allied offensive operations have re-
sulted in sharp encounters in several sections of
the country.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Enemy-initiated military activity over the weekend
was at a relatively low level. No attacks have
yet occurred to confirm reported Communist plans
for a second country-wide offensive on or about 3
March (Paras. 1-2). Sharp clashes occurred near
Dong Ha during the past two days, and the Communists
launched a rocket attack against the Da Nang mili-
tary complex on 3 March. Tanks have been photo-
graphed ten miles west of Hue (Paras. 3-5). Bitter
fighting has occurred between Communist forces and
US and Korean units north of Qui Nhon (Para. 6)..
Casualties were high on both sides in small-scale
battles fought near Tan Son Nhut (Para. 8). The
Bien Hoa/Long Binh military complex may soon be
hit by Viet Cong main force units (Para. 9).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
A new "Democratic Bloc," comprising 42 generally
pro-Ky deputies,. has been formed in the Lower
House (Paras. 1-2). Criticism against Saigon's
Chinese community has developed since the Tet of-
fensive (Paras, 3-7), In Da Nang, anti-Communist
feeling is strong, but the people are concerned
about their ability to defend. against future
attacks (Paras. 8-11). In the Mekong Delta prov-
ince of Kien Phong, government control is limited
to the main towns, and over, half the people have
-
fled the provincial capital in fear of new Viet
Cong-attacks (Paras. 12-15).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to-report..
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I. .THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Enemy-initiated military activity was at a
relatively low level over the weekend. Several sharp
clashes did occur, however, when renewed allied offen-
sive operations encountered Communist forces in sev-
eral sections of the country. Activity at Khe Sanh
was confined to periodic exchanges of artillery fire.
A spate of reports had indicated that major
drives would be undertaken by Viet Cong and NVA units
in I, II, and III Corps on 3 March. No significant
attacks by Communist forces have been reported so far,
but it is possible that a general offensive--temporarily
delayed--is in the offi.ng.
I Corps Activity
3. US Marines completed a two-day sweep of an
area imtediately northeast of Dong Ha on 2 March in
which 81 enemy soldiers and 22 Marines were killed.
An ARVN battalion operating in the same general area
reported' 189 Communists dead in a four-hour battle.
4. Press reports indicate that enemy rockets
were used against three sections of the US military
complex at Da Nang on 3 March. An undetermined amount
of damage was reported at the Da Nang Air Base, at
Monkey Mountain, and at a major Marine supply base
at Camp Brooks.
5.
the North
Vietnamese have introduced tanks in the A Shau Valley
and on the newly completed road between A Shau and
Hue. At least two tanks were detected on this route
at a point about ten air miles southwest of Hue.
II Corps
6. Allied units conducting sweep operations in
Binh Dinh Province have become involved in intense
fighting with enemy forces during the past two days.
A Korean unit operating ten miles north of Qui Nhon
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engaged an unknown Communist element and reported
losing seven men while killing 165 of the enemy. A
US Army mechanized infantry company encountered a Com-
munist unit 30 miles north of Qui Nhon on 2 March and
killed 30 of the enemy in an eight-hour battle.
7. There are continuing indications
that North Vietnamese units are
planning major attacks against urban centers in the
western highlands.
elements of the NVA 1st Divi-
sion are maneuvering toward Dak To and that units of
the NVA 95B Regiment are within ten miles of Pleiku..
III Corps
8. Several bitter clashes between allied and
Communist units occurred in the vicinity of Tan Son
Nhyt after enemy forces succeeded in hitting the base
with 16 mortar rounds on l'March. A US infantry com-
pany was ambushed while on a- reconnaissance patrol
just four miles north of Tan Son Nhut on 2 March.
Forty-eight US soldiers and at least 20 Communists
were killed in the encounter. An ARVN unit operating
two miles north of the air base 'reported killing 35 ,
enemy soldiers on the same date.
9.
the Communists intend to strike the
Bien Hoa/Long Binh military complex northeast of Saigon
in the near future. The Viet Cong 9th Division.move4
some of its units to a, position about ten miles north.
of-Bien Hoa on 3 March.
Viet Cong 274th Regiment reveal that some of its ele-
ments had ',plans to attack the- Long.Binh area on or
about 3 March.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A new "Democratic Bloc" of 42 members has
been officially formed in the Lower House
The mem-
ber deputies are generally.progovernment but are con-
sidered primarily responsive to Vice President Ky.
2. The new bloc includes a large number of
ethnic minority deputies, with six ethnic .Cambodians,
five montagnards, two Chams, and two Chinese, as well
as 27 Vietnamese members. Although a number of mem-
bers participated in the constituent assembly, none
has yet built a reputation for outstanding performance,
and the new group appears to be having difficulty
attracting proven leaders.
Criticism of Chinese Community in Saigon
3. A wave of criticism against the ethnic Chi-
nese living in Saigon has developed since the Tet
offensive.
4. Editorials in the Vietnamese-language press
have denounced the Chinese for tolerating Viet Cong
in their midst and for failing to help the ARVN dur-
ing the enemy attack. Some papers have accused the
Chinese of being pro-Communist or at least neutral
during the emergency. When the campaign for refugee
relief and reconstruction funds began, the editorials
demanded that the "rich Chinese" give a share of
their "huge fortunes."
5. The director of National Police, General
Loan has expressed similar sentiments.
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6.
7. The recent wave of criticism seems likely to
add to the distrust that already exists between the
ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese communities and further
inhibit cooperation between the Chinese and the Saigon
regime.
Situation in Da Nang City
8. Normal activity has been resuming in Da Nang
city but security has remained tenuous in the sur-
rounding districts ofQuang Nam Province.
9. Many of the refugees in Da Nang have been
helped by their friends and relatives, and the refugee
burden has not been particularly serious for the city.
Most stores in Da Nang have begun to stay open except
during curfew, which lasts from 5:00 P.M. to 8:00 A.M.
Food is not abundant, but it has not been critically
scarce and the 30-percent increase in prices is partly
attributable to the blocking of supplies by security
checkpoints in and around the city as well as to black-
market operations.
10. Feeling against the Communists is strong and
widespread, according to US observers in the province.
Alter the allies began to regain control of Hue and
Saigon, the people began to recover from their shock
and take a more positive attitude. Anticipating another
attack, many families have reportedly been digging
bunkers and stocking a reserve supply of food. Many
people have also been eager to help defend the city,
and I Corps authorities have armed civil servants and
some special groups.
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11. Security in the "GVN-controlled" areas near
Da Nang, however, has remained poor. Each district
headquarters complex is protected by a relatively
small secure perimeter, and operations outside these
perimeters require company-size ARVN.or US units for
security.
Situation in Kien Phong Province
la. Security in the Mekong Delta province of
Kien Phong is the poorest it has been since the intro-
duction of American forces in the area.
13. Indications,.of a large Viet Cong build-up
in the province near the Cambodian border have been
reported and the provincial capital city, Cao Lanh,
expects further attacks. Government control is limited
to Cao Lanh and the district capitals, and government
forces remain in a defensive posture. Over half of
Cao Lanh's population has fled the city in fear of
renewed eneMy attacks.
14. In the countryside, only three of the 14
hamlets that had been recorded as pacified during 1967
are still under government control. About half of the
outposts in Cao Lanh District have been destroyed or
abandoned. All overland transportation in the prov-
ince has been cut, and support for the US community
there now depends entirely on air transport.
15. In addition, the Viet Cong have�seized a
majority of the rice mills and warehouses, jeopardizing
control of.the 1967 rice crop, which was .expected to
net 70,000 metric tons available for export.
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MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN 'NORTH VIETNAM
IV OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
3 March 1968..
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1/ COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Peking's statement of I March on Viet-
nam', the first official government pronouncement
since last November, was largely a reiteration of
China's standard propaganda line. Again, Peking
refrained from any specific commitment to Hanoi
offering only the "all-out support" of the "Chinese
Government and the 700 million Chinese people."
2. The statement emphasized the Chinese con-
tention that Hanoi and the Viet Cong can achieve
final victory if they will only persevere in the
fighting. The results of the Communist spring
offensive were cited as proof that "complete de-
feat" for the US "is not far off." The statement
warned, however, that out of desperation the US
would further escalate the fighting while it en-
gages in "peace-talk plots" in collaboration with
the Soviet Union.
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