THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786637
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 9, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
�Tep-SeCfet�
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9 February 1968
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69569 2-68 CIA
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TOP SECRET
I. _THE. MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. There have been no new Communist initiatives,
and the lull continues throughout. the country-. Enemy
attacks. in urban areas ..have subsided and allied, forces
throughout. the country are having some success in
reducing tbe.remaining.enemy pockets in the Cities.
Tension remains high in many areas, however, and the
ComMunists are attemptingto fan the fears they have.
created.
New Phase of Attacks May Be Nearing
2. There are a number of indications, that the
Communists may be preparing for a new phase of attacks,
possibly to coincide with a major thrust in the Khe
Sanh/northern Quang Tri area.
3. North Vietnamese forces along the Demili-
tarized Zone from Khe Sanh to Gio Linh continue to
maneuver. Some refer to specific
attack plans in the eastern portion.
a major concentration of enemy forces
just south of Da Nang and around Dak To in the central
highlands. B-3 Front elements
in the highlands have recently referred to the "up-
coming phase" and to "D-Day plus four," a date which
may be imminent.
4. Elements of the North Vietnamese 7th and
Viet Cong. 5th and 9th divisions are operating some
distance from their normal base areas and are in a
position to strike key US installations in central
III Corps. or to serve as a reserve force against Saigon.
Signal intelligence has also located a cluster of
unidentified units near Saigon and ,another concentra-
tion near My Tho in the delta.
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5. A number of enemy prisoners and documents cap-
tured since late fall indicated that the "winter-spring"
of would have a second phase lasting through
Match. Several prisoners taken in the recent fighting
have claimed that there would be follow-up attacks.
Heavy communications traffic between Hanoi and major com-
mands in the South, similar to that preceding the 30 Jan-
uary attacks, has persisted. Many of the units now
massing have not yet been generally committed.
9 February 1968
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6. Except in the northern Quang.Tri area, the
Communists are probably not in a position to repeat
the scope of their Tet effort. They may well con-
clude that the losses suffered so far outweigh the
advantages of pressing a second phase Neverthe-
less, it would appear to serve both their political
and military objectives to, keep up pressure, at
least on selected military bases and cities, and to
strike before allied forces have sufficient time
to disrupt their offensive plans.,
I Corps
7. Following the heavy bombardment and ground
assault on the Khe Sanh combat base and its defen-
sive perimeter early on 8 February, the base received
sporadic mortar fire through 9 February. West of
the base, Special Forces elements withdrew from the
Lang Vei area, leaving it completely to the enemy.
8. Steps are being taken to clear the refugees
Of: the Lang Vei fight from the area. The refugees
include Laotians, Vietnamese, and mountain tribes-
men as well as Vietnamese and Laotian troops.. Some
of the Laotians are being evacuated by air to Da
Nang, according to late reports.
9. There have been new reports of movements
of North Vietnamese tanks on the western portion of
Route 9. US air strikes were directed against the
vehicles.
�10. L
around the Khe Sanh area seem to reflect grow-
ing morale problems in some of the units there. Ac-
cording to 17 men deserted
their units on 5 February, bringing the total number
of deserters to 73. The period of time and the-units
involved were not disclosed. Included in this total,
howeVer, were platoon commanders and five radio opera-
tors, who took along 11 radios, stated
that the "battalion was understrength."
9 -February 1968
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11. Heavy B-52 strikes throughout the area
may have contributed to the hardships already
imposed by the difficult living conditions, food
problems, and the prolonged combat status of these
troops.
12. In Hue, moderate to heavy enemy resistance
continues. Communist forces still hold portions of
the citadel. South of the Perfume River, US Marines
reported that movement was easier on the 9th. South
of Hue, a US convoy was ambushed on 7 February.
Eleven of the 15 vehicles were damaged or destroyed.
Enemy losses totaled 34 dead against 20 Americans
killed and 39 wounded during a three-and-a-half
hour battle.
13. In the coastal flatlands of Quang Nam
Province immediately south of Da Nang, a US - South
Vietnamese combined action platoon was attacked
by an estimated 200 to 300 enemy troops on 8 Feb-
ruary. Four US Army companies and one US Marine
company joined the battle in the afternoon. By
nightfall, the enemy had withdrawn leaving behind
152 bodies. American losses in the firefight to-
taled 15 killed and 63 wounded.
14. There appears to be a growing enemy
threat to Da Nang. During the past week there
has been a clustering of North Vietnamese units
in the area west and south of the base, between
Da Nang and Hoi An. The entire North Vietnamese
2nd Division and the 31st Regiment and the 368B
Artillery Regiment have been noted massing here
for what may be a large-scale attack on the huge
US air base and/or the city, of Da Nang.
15.
has established a forward com-
mand post in Phu Bai to take charge of allied
forces in northern I Corps.
9 February 1968
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Saigon and III Corps
� 20. The Communist threat in Saigon remains
serious. Sharp fighting continues, particularly
in the southwestern part of the city near the
Cholon race track. The government force�SouthVi_et-
namese rangers, Marines, paratroopers, and National
Police--has been augumented by elements of the
US 199th Light Infantry Brigade. The Communists
appear to be trying to break out of the encircle-
ment. Widespread fires were reported in the Cholon
area and also in a warehouse colliplex near the
Saigon port where some of the Viet Cong withdrew
during the night. Some fires were said to have
been set by the Viet Cong to cover their escape;
others probably were caused by heavy small-arms
and rocket fire from both sides.
21. The Viet Cong are apparently trying to
establish strongpoints within the populated
suburbs just to the north of Saigon. American
troops have made sweeps on all sides of the capi-
tal to head off Communist reinforcements. � North
of the city, US forces have reported moderate
to heavy contact with possible elements of the
Viet Cong 9th Division's 271st Regiment. The
Viet Cong 9th Division, north of Saigon, con-
stitutes the major threat to the area.
22. A possible indication of renewed at-
tacks in the Saigon area was contained in an
an unidentified unit hadbeen considering
the "additional task of attacks." In a pos-
sibly related development,
9 February 1968
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23. Elsewhere in III Corps, except for a light
mortar attack early on 9 February against Bien Hoa
Air Base, no major enemy activity, has been reported.
There are reports, however, that Communist forces
are arming and training montagnarA tribesmen in
Binh Long Province, in the area near Loc Ninh and
An Loc. The tribesmen are being told that they are
to be formed� into a "people's militia" to support
the "popular groundswell" calling for the libera-
tion of Binh Long by the Communists.
IV Corps
24. In the delta, South Vietnamese Army troops
reported killing 131"Viet Cong and capturing 72
weapons in a battle yesterday 115, miles southwest
of Saigon in Kien Giang Province:Gbvernment forces
lost 21 killed and 71 wounded. Elsewhere in IV
Corps, new large-scale attacks were reported, al-
though there were incidents of light mortar and
small-arms fire in several provinces.
_ 25. The situation is tense, however, and
the people fear new attacks on a number of cities.
In the capital of Bac Lieu Province, for example,
there are rumors among the local population that
the town will be the target of a Viet Cong ground
attack by 15 February. In the Kien Giang provincial
capital, there is uneasiness because of heavy Com-
munist pressure on the outlying district towns.
26. Since the first attacks of the Tet of-
fensive, there have been widespread reports from
the delta indicating that the Communists are de-
liberately trying to maintain tension in population
centers. The Viet Cong have threatened new attacks
in many areas and have attempted to intimidate
people'by saying that they will retaliate against
those who helped the government during the recent
fighting.
9 February 1968
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1.
two of the three IL-28s known to be in North Viet-
nam flew from Phuc Yen to Gia Lam during the after-
noon of 9 February.
one IL-28 was damaged when US aircraft struck
Phuc Yen on 8 February, and it is likely that the
other two were transferred to Gia Lam for safekeeping.
Gia Lam is Hanoi's international civil air terminal
and is the only major airfield which has remained
free from US air attacks.
2.
the IL-14s which arrived from China on 6 February
and which have been involved in missions to the area
of the Demilitarized Zone have returned to Nan-ning.
Their brief stay and highly unusual behavior while
in North Vietnam suggests that they were involved
in a project which called for urgent air delivery
of priority cargo in support of the Communist of-
fensive in the vicinity of Khe Sanh.
3.
these planes probably succeeded in para-
chuting some supplies into the A Shau Valley. area.
On the 7 February flight the aircraft took off from
Gia Lam, passed over Bai Thuong and crossed the
Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the Laos bor-
der. As the IL-14s flew south they were sighted near.
Khe Sanh by USAF fighter pilots who described them as
"unmarked, silver, twin-engine, C-47 type transports."
4. The precise location of the IL-14s' objective
is not known, but it may have been the probable posi-
tion of the North Vietnamese Army rear services head-
auarters in the A Shau Valley.
references to "dropping" and eliminates previous re-
ports of "striking" and "bombing." This evidence,
coupled with the operational characteristics of the
IL-14 and the brief period the planes spent near A
Shau, suggests that the planes were involved in a
paradrop mission.
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5. Not all. of. the IL-1'4s were successful in
completing their.Mision:Oh 7 February, which May
explain.the.flight of two additional IL--14s below-
the Z'one on the follOWing day,
at least two. planes could not find the
probable drop zone because of bad weather. A third
IL-14 was hit by ground fire from a .Communist unit
near Lang.Vei.
a .fire was started in its left engine. This
aircraft.madean emergency landing at Bai Thuong
where rendezvoused with an 1I-2. transpOrt Which
.carried four airplane mechanics" from Gia Lam.
6. The-cargo delivered to the A Shau Valley
area by the IL-14s is not known. The relatively
small capacity of the IL-14 and the limited number
of' missions flown suggests that it must.have been of
limited volume and high importance.. Repeated.bombard-
ment.of Communist positions around Khe Sanh- by-B-52s
apparently has deprived, several, units--including the
Khe Sanh Area Front--of key equipment and. personnel.
It is possible that.the IL-14s were involved in
replenishing essential items such as communications
gear or specially trained individuals.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There .is nothing of signifiaance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Hanoi is using diplomatic as well as
propaganda channels to convince free world leaders
that it "sincerely wants to start negotiations once
the bombing of North Vietnam has stopped." This
statement was made to officials of the Indian
Foreign Ministry by the North Vietnamese consul
general in New Delhi in a special call at the
ministry on 6 February. In Hanoi, the Indian
representative apparently was called to the For-
eign Ministry recently and given the same message.
2. The Indians also report that Kosygin on
his recent visit to New Delhi told Mrs. Gandhi that
if the bombings were stopped the North.Vietnamese
would move more rapidly than anyone expected toward
an acceptable settlement.
3. The North Vietnamese consul general in
New Delhi probably used his conversations with UN
Secretary General Thant on 8 February to convey
the same version of Hanoi's intentions.
Defense Minister Giap Speaks
4. Hanoi seems to have gone
highlight the obscure occasion of
Day. The attention may have been
of support for the Pueblo captors
of thanks for North Korean aid to
Communists.
out of its way to
North Korean Army
partly a gesture
and an expression
the Vietnamese
5. North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap was
the center of attention as he played his first
ceremonial role in public for some months. Nothing
he said provided any solid clues to Hanoi's inten-
tions toward the war. Giap told a reception audience
in Hanoi on 8 February that the Communist offensive
in South Vietnam had created a "new situation"
favorable for continuing the fight until "final
victory." He took a similar line in a message to
the North Koreans. He said the Vietnam conflict
was entering a "fierce phavie." He made no sug-
gestion there would be any early, end to the fight-
ing.
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