Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 CENTRA'L INTELLIGENCE AGENCY � 1.:.13.11.013RA.RY � Mandatory Review Case # NLJ qd-775-. ..Docilyr,tein# .a�?, ,OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 22 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR , SUBJECT: Communist ReaCtions to Certain US Military Operations in Vietnam � ' � GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS : � . . � 1. How would. the Communists react to US ground force 'operations in the northern portion or the DMZ or in immediately adjacent ter tory of North Vietnam? We think the primary factor inflUencing their reaction& would be not so much the immediate efreet or the US'actions, but rather what they � � believed these actions conveyed aa to eventual US intentions. WoUld:they estimate that the US was seeking only to neutralize � r Communist bases and sanctUaries in border areas? Or would they judge that the US was�making the first moves toward a massive invasion of NorthVietnam'and thus to a major change in the war?' In attmmpting to deciplier itsS intentions) the Communists would � GROUP I Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approv for Re -a. Date ___L-Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 991-/ ^ ""..% Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 take into count not only the nature and scope of the US Operations north of the 17th parallel, but also any siinificant ; movementor%new deployment of US forces in SU, and US operations ,in other areas (e.g., Laos and CaMbodia). Obviously they would :also Consider what the US said about its objectives, hut would � . be little inclined to take these statements at face value. .2. Of the three Communist powers, Hanoi would probably take the most somber view of the US action.. Hanoi almost certainly fears that the US will progessively increase military pressures on North Vietnam and gradually extend its objectives ...._.) .= e to. include destruction of the regime. US operations of appreciable 1 oN 4:� Mb , 1 siznd scope in the northern DMZ, and particularly an extension of such operations further into North Vietnathese territory, would 1. ='." � , greatly reinforce such.fears. Peking would be inclined to share ---i . -175 Hanoi' a epprehension., As for the Soviets, they wouldprobably .not.discard their estimate that US intentions were less far reaching .2,..- _I --.... than Hanoi:and:Peking feared but their .confidence in such a - 79 I 11 II 11 juslanertt would be weakened. � 3: 4.11 important aspect of the situation would be the reaction of public opinion in the United States and the non-Communist world pproved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 11MM= timi��11�ILIIMI� Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 .generally. 4tall-sca1e operations confined to the northern DMZ would arouse some,concern and criticism. But it US ground forces went beyond the DMZ further into North Vietnam, in numbers great . enough to be appreciable, there would be outbursts of disapproval .arld alarm :in most of the non-Communist world. Most of the �apprehension would be over the increased prospects of a Sino-US .war. The,Communista, or course, would try to exploit -such sentiment. Indeed, they alight anticipate that international reaction would be an important factor restraining the US from anY large-scale move into North Vietnatese territory. 4. Based on these factors, the Communists would determine their countermeasures. These would include not only immediate �, . tactical moves to cope with the new tactical situation, but also longer�terra preparations to deal with possible future US actions. Hanoi would have to consider not only new deployments of its own -forces but whether the time had come to request more extensive help from other Communist countries, including the introduction of Chinese ground combat forces into North Vietnam in some msdberad At the same time, the progress of the war to a new level:might cause the North Vietnamese leaders to believe their best oourse was to make some move toward peace. On the whole, - 3 - pproved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 fi Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 ."1""itmorros�em-- however, we think it more likely that Hanoi would refuse to enter negotiations under these circumstances-and would continue fighting., The following paragraphs proceed on the assumption that this would be the North Vietnamese decision. It. Biwa-to BEsions . The North Vietnamese Position � � 6. n recent .months, the North Vietnamese leaders have indicated increaSed concern over the possibility that the US will expand grind actions into North Vietnam. In September, General Giap publicly speculated on this and warned that the 'us wouldlie vadinga, member of the. "socialist camp." ReCently the North Vietnamese Chief of Staff claimed that the DB was considering "new -attacks against the northern part of the demilitarized zone. asthese statements suagest, the North Vietnamese leaders loveygiven serious thought to a US "invasion," they presumably have rouahed out their own counteractions, and, as Oiap implies1;the expected contributions from the "socialist camp." .7. This NorthlVietnamese would, of course, contest.any US operation in the D, regardless of its size. .21-ley have fairly � �Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 � 'imwer Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 large forces forces in this general area, and they would try to inflict . as much punishmentias possible on the US, hoping thereby to deter any further, operations'. As long as the operations were . on a fairly smallecale and remained within the DMZ, Hanoi would . ,prdloably not go much beyond a tactical response. Communist forces'in South Vietnam would try to take advantage of whatever opportunities were created by a thinning out of US forces for . . . the DMZ operations. � 8, It is possible that Hanoi might try to relieve the pressures on the DMZ by increased military action in -Laos. The /Torn Vietnamese leaders might calculate that limited moves eitber in the panhandle or nothern provinces would deter the US from plans to enlarge the DMZ operations. This seems unlikely, however. -Hanoi would probably judge that military escalation in Laos would only hasten larger US. actions against North Vietnam. And it would want to conserve its forces against the threat of a major US invasion., US operations in the DMZ, .and especially in North Vietnamese territory immediately adjacent, were conducted on a fairly large scale, Hanoi Would take some new steps to deter - 5 - _Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 � the US. More forces would be moved southward into the parinandle of North Vietnam.. Propaganda denunciations and threats would be amplified. Hanoi would urge Moscow and Peking to lend their voices to such a campaign. If US operations were extended further north in the panhandle, Hanoi would probably request Pekin to bring Chinese combat troops into the northern parts of North VietniM (a) as a further deterrent and CO to release North Vietnamese troops for deployment to the coastal areas and the DMZ. Peking's Reaction - 10. The contUsed internal situation makes Chinese intentions difficult to assess, but we believe the Chinese reM4in. basicaIty cautious about risking a military confronta- tion with the fiS. Small scale US operations in the DMZ or even Slightly-beyond probably would not cause any change in Chinese policy. Peking would, of course, 3oin in the propaganda chorus, and probably would be quicker than Moscow to make some demonstrative response -t6 an appeal from Hanoi. 11. If US operation's became progressively larger and extended further into North Vietnam, ,Peking would become increasingly concerned that they indicated a growing threat � 6- - pproved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 - to the the existence of the Hanoi regime. 'China would want to deter further US actions while still avoiding a direct confron- � tation with the US. It would probably calculate that the best means toward .these ends would be to give firm indications that it was prepared at some point to fight., Appearing. to hesitate or equivocate might seem to Peking to be in the long run a more dangerous course. Accordingly, we think that the Chinese; leaders would, if requested by Hanoi, send ground combat forces into North Vietnam. But these troops would be highly unlikely to move far enough south to engage US forces as long as Peking � felt that 'North Vietnexese:farces were still capable of Containing the 'US threat. . 32L The Chinese would probably not attempt a military diversion elsewhere around China's periphery, However, 'a larger Chinese involvement in North Vietnam would probably .be attendedlby other military movements within China -- . precautionary from Peltingts point of view. International : tensions would great* increase', and the US could never be Certain that Chinese military moves aid not have more ominous implications. than 'mere deterrence. - 7 - mommm�Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 1�101110.�111�4 --1�t?-mtt=rgemea ......�rtama�Mi�MONMIMINNEMINI Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 ..The Soviet Position . 13 'AS long as the US actions remained fairly limited in size) we think Soviet reactions would be confined to material and .Political. support for Hanoi. To help allay Hanoi's increased apprehension of aImajor US invasion) Soviet support would probably , include those -kinds of weapons which could Strengthen Hanoi';s capability to deal with such a threat. The Soviets night believe' tat providing."volunteers" to man some of these weapons would .have some deterrent value on the US. The Soviets would also try to Check further US action by warnings and. perhaps a demonstrative Political protest against, the US.(e.g.) terminating Certain rr- u negotiations er.contacte). 14. If US!Military operations expanded further into North Vietnalwand on a fairly large scale) the Soviets would anticipate critical turning point in the war. They would fear that the US � actions preshge& a direct threat. to Hanoi's existence and. they would foresee that the Chinese presence and influence. in North Vietnam would vastly increase. They would. feel compelled to become much more active in trying to forestall such developments. � pproved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 � Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 15. For one thing, the Soviets would probably feel that they.. ,had to speak More forthrightly to Hanoi, pointing but that unless it madeisome 1.ove toward peace it faced either a defeat by the US . or overWhelMing dependence on China. But they recognize that their ability to influence Hanoi is limited; especially since they are � almost certainly not prepared to pay the political costs of with- hole4ng aid, or even of making serious threats to' do so. � . 16. At the same time, the Soviets would certainly consider how they might put direct pressure on the US to force it to back 'down in Vietnam.' They could, for example, introduce at least a � 4mited number of their own combat units into North Vietnam, or . L._ � � ,m� � �� . 'provoke a diversionary, crisis elsewhere. We think it highly :unlikely that they mould risk a major military clash with the US it Vietnam, where their forces would ba at a great disadvantage .and.dependent on long lines of communication. As for provoking a majbr crisis With the US in some, other area, say in Berlin* this � would, in our view, constitute more of a risk than the Soviets would . be disposed to run for the sake of their interests in Vietnam. 'We :think.that..the USSR, as a matter of general policy, mould avoid move's which:m=1d have the effect of converting the Vietnamese' crisis into.a'woricl-vide. showdown with the US.. 1,,Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067 � ��., 17. Short of. such extreme reactions, however, the Soviets would almost certainly maim some limited moves, perhaps even in Berlin, which would be intended to create the impression that a Situation of great danger was developing. They would probably . � . warn the US with.considerable vigor and undertake some demonstrative *Political. act such as breaking off the Geneva disarmament negotia- tions or recalling the Soviet AMbassador. In short, US-Soviet � tensions would be greatly heightened. FOR THE BOARD OP NATIONAL ESTIMATES: )444'� -10- . ABBOT SMITH Chairman M�111�1�11.11.Mil pproved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00013067

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COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM