THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
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03010097
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Publication Date:
December 3, 1967
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
3.5(c)
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
cret
3.5(c) 1
3 Dec6nibdr 1967
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WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Top-Secrof
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Information as of 1600
Dorp.mher 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
Heavy rail and truck traffic was reported on
the� major transportation routes near Hanoi on 1
December. In the south, no major engagements oc-
curred over the weekend, but small-scale Communist
attacks took place in several areas.
I. Military Situation in South Vietnam: Spo-
radic, small-scale Communist attacks occurred in
widely scattered areas of South Vietnam over the
weekend (Paras. 1-6). Cambodian MIGs have strayed
over the border into South Vietnam (Para. 7).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
J The Lower House of the National As-
sembly debates government's mobilization decree
(Paras. 4-6). President Thieu continues to take a
'tough public line on Communist use of Cambodian ter-
ritory (Paras. 7-8).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The Chi-
nese Communist Foreign Ministry has protested an
alleged US air attack on a Chinese ship in a North
Vietnamese port (Paras. 1-3).
VT n.f.hr Major Aspects:
heavy traffic on
and highway routes near Hanoi
1-4).,
the principal rail
on 1 December (Paras.
1 December 1967
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*NO
THAILAND
\ NORTH
\ VIETNAM
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I. MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Sporadic, small-scale Communist attacks oc-
curred in widely scattered areas of South Vietnam
over the weekend.
2. Communist mortar and artillery fire was
directed against an element of the US Army 173rd Air-
borne Brigade located about ten miles west of Dak To
on 1 December. One US soldier was killed and ten
others were wounded in the attack. The enemy barrage
destroyed two 155-mm. howitzers, two trucks, and a
quantity of artillery ammunition.
3. A company-size enemy force attacked a South
Vietnamese Revolutionary Development team 15 miles
north of Saigon on 1 December, killing eight team
members and wounding five others. Artillery fire
was directed against the attackers, but enemy losses
are unknown.
4. On 2 December the Royal Thai Army Volunteer
Regiment was attacked while on a road security patrol
30 miles east of Saigon. In the ensuing firefight
two Thai soldiers were killed and an American adviser
was wounded. No enemy casualties were reported.
5. Enemy mortar and small-arms fire directed
against a US Army cavalry troop killed two US soldiers
and wounded 17 others. The engagement occurred about
15 miles northwest of Chu Lai. Artillery fire was
placed on the enemy position, but Communist casual-
ties are unknown.
6. Enemy forces resumed their attacks on the
Bu Dop Special Forces camp on 2 December with two
periods of 82-mm. mortar and suspected rocket fire.
In the two attacks, 17 allied troops were wounded,
communications and electrical equipment were destroyed
and two howitzers were damaged. Air and artillery
strikes were directed against the source of the enemy
barrage, but Communist losses were not reported.
3 DeCember '1967
TO
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MIGs Sighted Near Cambodian Border
7. Observations of MIG fighter aircraft in Hau Nghia
Province on 29 and 30 November and 1 December suggest
that Cambodia may be stepping up its normal air patrols
in the border area. Reports from US forward air
controllers indicate that on each occasion one jet
interceptor came from Cambodian territory and made
brief, shallow penetrations of Vietnamese airspace.
The MIGs took no hostile action against the airborne
observers or against personnel Or installations in
South Vietnam. Cambodia has seven MIG-15/17s in its
air force, and its aircraft have strayed into Vietnam-
ese airspace on previous occasions during periodic
patrols of the border.
3 December 1967
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Mobilization Decree
4. The Lower House of the National Assembly
on 1 December debated the government's recent par-
tial mobilization decree. The government was crit-
icized for proclaiming the mobilization decree with-
out first clearing it through the assembly. The
decree itself came under attack by opposition dep-
uties as "unconstitutional" and unnecessary. In
addition a handful of deputies took a stronger line,
castigating the decree as a clear example of US in-
tervention. A representative from Hue suggested
that Vietnamese youth should not have to die in a
war being fought for US interests. His remarks werc
repudiated by other deputies, however.
3 December 1967
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5. The mobilization decree was also strongly
defended by progovernment deputies who maintained
that it was necessary to meet the challenge of Com-
munist forces and to demonstrate that South Vietnam
is contributing to its own defense. The Lower House,
however, finally passed by a substantial majority
a resolution calling on the government to explain
and defend the mobilization decree before the Na-
tional Assembly. A similar resolution had been
passed earlier by the Upper House.
6. The government, meanwhile, has moved to
help clarify how the mobilization order will work.
The Ministry of Defense released a note in Saigon
on 1 December stating that the partial mobilization
will be implemented in stages according to age groups.
The note also indicated that student deferments
would continue, although stricter criteria will be
enforced.
Thieu on Cambodia
7. President Thieu continues to take a tough
public line on Communist use of Cambodian territory.
Thieu told the press in Dalat this weekend that
South Vietnam reserves the right to pursue and at-
tack into Cambodia when Communist units move across
the border. Thieu emphasized, however, that this
would only apply during the course of a continuing
battle, and that he is not advocating allied oper-
ations into Cambodia.
8. Thieu's remarks will further fuel appre-
hensions in Phnom Penh that the recent spate of press
reports on Cambodia's involvement in the war are de-
signed to provide justification for allied ground
and air strikes across the border. South Vietnamese
troops have actually engaged in "hot pursuit" on a
number of instances in the past, although the na-
ture of the fighting in the border area does not
often provide occasions when "hot pursuit" becomes
a relevant factor.
3 December 1967
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. On 2 December the Chinese Communist Foreign
Ministry issued a statement protesting a 25 November
US air attack on a Chinese freighter anchored at the
North Vietnamese port of Hon Gai. Peking claimed
that the attack wounded eight Chinese crew members
and seriously damaged the ship. Although a US air-
craft did drop at least one bomb in the vicinity of
the ship on 25 November, photographic reconnaissance
the next day showed no apparent damage.
2. The Chinese protest went no further than
Peking's standard anti-US rhetoric and its pledges of
support for the "Vietnamese people." The attack was
labeled as an additional sign that the US, faced
with "dire straits" in Vietnam, intends to further
escalate and widen the war--a major theme of recent
Chinese propaganda on Vietnam.
3. Hanoi broadcast a pro forma statement on 2
December backing up the Chinese protest. North Viet-
namese Foreign Minister Trinh met with a Chinese diplo-
mat to "convey his warmest greetings to the wounded"
and to condemn the alleged attack. Trinh was quoted
as saying that "repeated" US attacks on "Chinese and
other foreign merchant ships" was a "serious war
escalation" and a "brazen violation" of the rights
of free trade and navigation.
3 December 1967
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Nasi Nuif
HANOI
To
Leo Cai
To Thai Nguyen
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Main RR & Hwy Bridge
Gia Alternate RR & Hwy Bridge
Lam
Doumer RR & Hwy Bridge
Ha Dong
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
3.5(c)
1. Heavy traffic was moving on the principal
rail and highway routes in the Hanoi area as of 1
December
//Most of the trains and trucks 3.3(h)(2)
observed appeared to be heading toward Hanoi from
the direction of China and from Haiphong.
2. The Doumer rail and highway bridge over the
Red River was closed b US bo si. O. �ctober, but
it had been
made serviceable at least for truck traffic. The
rail and highway bridge over the Canal des Rapides
was damaged by a US raid on 26 October. but was 7pen
again as of 5 November
3. both of
these spans were operating at full capacity on the
night of 1 December and
\train and truck move-
ment on both bridges had been heavy and continual dur-
ing the preceding week. At the Canal des Rapides
crossing\ an alternate rail
and highway bridge was still inoperative, but that
a pontoon bridge to the west of the main span was
carrying additional truck traffic.
anoi is taking advantage of the poor
flying wea er over North Vietnam to replenish sup-
plies consumed during the past six weeks of heavy
bombing in the capital area.
3 December 1967
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