CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/11/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02739316
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 22, 1951

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22 November 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN cgj
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GEVIEWEF
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
USSR
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2.
FAR EAST
3.
New Communist tactics used in Malaya (page 4).
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5.
Tension heightening over West New Guinea (page 5).
6.
Dutch would be sensitive to US pressure in dispute With Indonesia
(page 5).
NEAR EAST
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8.
Egyptian King seeks curb on extremist LaDeramon DaLutut.
ns" (page 7).
9.
Greek Army officers fear trend to left (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10.
France again rejects US Austrian treaty strategy (page 8).
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FAR EAST
. New Communist tactics used in Malaya:
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The activity of Communist-led bandits has been
sUbstantially higher during the past week than
in any similar period since the "emergency" was
proclaimed in 1948. The most ominous develop-
is e approac mg labor crisis on large rubber plantations, where
10, 000 rubber tappers are already idle as a result of Communist threats to
kill any tapper who defies a non-work order. The US Consul General ex-
presses alarm at the apparent inability of the authorities to counter this new
and eminently successful technique.
Comment: This tactic has not been employed
before by the Communists, probably because it would,- ill the long run, create
hostility among the workers. It has apparently been reserved, therefore, for
use at some critical juncture like the present, when new appointments to the
top posts in the Malayan administration are being made and new vigor is
promised in the British guerrilla suppression campaign.
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5. Tension heightening over West New Guinea:
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The Indonesian Foreign Minister complained to
the United States Ambassador to Indonesia that
the "unfriendly" Dutch and Australian attitude's
on the West New Guinea issue would force
In onesia mo a neu ra is coalition with India and Burma and its government
into the "growing anti-Western camp" in Indonesia. He warned that the
Indonesian Parliament might denounce the relationship with the Dutch and
that the present Indonesian cabinet might fall if it opposes such a move.
The US Ambassador comments that Australian
and Dutch cooperation over the New Guinea dispute places the US in the
center between those countries and Indonesia. He points out the set-back
to long-term American policies which would be suffered if the present
crisis develops along the threatened lines.
6. Dutch would be sensitive to US pressure in dispute with Indonesia:
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In commenting on the crisis in Dutch-Indonesian
relations, the US Ambassador in The Hague
has stated that any US action favoring Indonesia
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in the dispute over West New Guinea's sovereignty would be regarded by the
Netherlands as undue pressure and would be "most unfortunate" in its reper-
cussions on the Dutbh rearmament program. The Dutch resentment against
the US role in the achievement of Indonesian independence has only recently
begun to diminish, and any approach to the Dutch on New Guinea would re-
vive this sentiment and tend to confirm the Netherlands' 'worst suspicions."
The Dutch Foreign Minister, who appeared quite
pessimistic on the whole subject of Dutch-Indonesian relations, has stated
that he "would not be surprised" if Indbnesia denounced the union statute next
week, in which case he did not know what steps either side could then take.
Coniment: The,Dutch Government, whichtell La'st
January as a result of domestic controversy over policy on New Guinea, has
consistently suggested a postponement of action on Dutch-Indonesian problems
until after the 1952 parliamentary elections.
NEAR EAST
7. Syria reportedly offered arms by Soviet Union:
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The French Foreign Office has been informed
that the USSR as offered 100 planes an 5 tanks
to the Syrian Government.
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Comment: \
1
by the French. While the Russians continue to make approaches to the Arab
states, they are not known to have offered to furnish arms to any of them.
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8. Egyptian King seeks curb on extremist "Liberation Battalions":
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King Farouk has directed the Egyptian Govern-
ment to restrain the activities of the so-called
"Liberation Battalions." The Egyptian Minister
of Interior accordingly issued a public statement
o e e ec a a i.eration Battalions would be put under governmental
control. The US Ambassador in Cairo reports, however, that subsequent
violent opposition to this announcement on the part of extremist elements has
apparently caused the Minister of Interior to waver in taking any further
action.
Comment: These battalions are being formed by
violently nationalistic Egyptians, including the Moslem Brotherhood, for
possible use against the British. While the battalions are militarily insig-
nificant, the leaders throughout the Arab world fear that unless these ex-
tremists are controlled, there is a real danger that similar groups will spring
up in other Arab states to threaten the existing order.
9. Greek Army officers fear trend to left:
Greek Army officers see in recent internal
evelopments a government trend to the left.
ime Minister Plastiras' amnesty program for
litical prisoners, including Communists, the
eating of seven parliamentary deputies who had
een exiled as Communists, the withdrawal of
he British police mission, the Greek Govern-
nt's pressure for abolition of the United Nations
a an ommission, an the contemplated disbandment of the civilian Armed
Defense Battalions are taken as evidence of the leftist trend. The US
Military Attache in Athens adds that the Greek officers fear that the present
trend will create conditions favorable to the return of Communism.
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Comment: Greek officers, as a group, are
strongly rightist in sympathy, and to them these developments probably
appear more alarming than they are in fact. However, the Greek Foreign
Office has information that bands of Greek Communists are preparing once
again to infiltrate into Greece, ,and the suspension of UN border observation
could increase their chances for success. The amnesty program'may be
greatly modified or abandoned if the ailing Plastiras disappears from the
political scene.
WESTERN� EUROPE
10. France again rejects US Austrian treaty strategy:
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In an aide-memoire to the American Embassy,
the French Foreign Office has once more re- ,
jected the strategy proposed by the United States
on the Austrian treaty question. This new state-
ment repeats previous objections to the abbreviated treaty draft and reverses
recent indications of a more receptive French attitude.
The Embassy believes that some concessions
will have to be made to obtain French agreement and suggests as a possible
compromise strategy (1) resumption of negotiations on the old draft treaty,
(2) public announcement in the event of failure that the West is considering a
new proposal, and (3) an attempt by the Western delegates to negotiate some
instrument equivalent to the abbreviated treaty for presentation to Moscow.
Comment: While the French have previously
stated their position in categorical terms, it is not certain that their ob-
jections to the abbreviated treaty as such are fundamental. Aside from
their professed concern for preserving the mechanism of treaty negotiation,
the French Government appears to desire only that the West shall move
cautiously in its efforts to reach a settlement. The French thus desire to
protect the measure of agreement achieved on the old draft treaty, to offer
further concessions to the Soviet Union, and if the Russians remain adamant,
to denounce publicly Soviet obstructionism and to withdraw the concessions
made previously.
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