CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/11/30

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03176565
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 30, 1951

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565.,
�maiv. TUE SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
30 November 1951
Copy. No.
4 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S Cella gl
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUThi: �R 0
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECURITY INFORMATION
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
411,51)._sEeRET
SUMMARY
GENERAL,.
3.5(c)
1. Comment on Western European estimates of defense expenditures (page 3).
3.3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
5. Comment on reported Thai coup d'etat (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
6. Indian Prime Minister effects changes in government of Nepal (page 6
NEAR EAST
7. Mossadeq victory anticipated in Iranian Parliamentary elections (page 6).
8. Comment on Syrian military coup d'etat (page 7).
11.
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
West Germans pressing or I 1 um y earmgs page
LATIN AMERICA
3.3(h)(2)
* * *
3.5(c)
2
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
9)613--SEeRET
GENERAL
3.5(c)
1. Comment on Western European estimates of defense expenditures:
The Western European countries recently sub-
mitted estimates of their defense expenditures (including US aid) for the
current fiscal year to NATO's Temporary Council Committee, which is re-
assessing their politico-economic capabilities. The following tabulation
shows how these estimates compare with previous US estimates of what
those expenditures should be:
� ESTIMATED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR 1951-1952
"(in millions of dollars)
Previous US estimates
of desirable levels
Country estimates
of probable levels
Differences
(percent)
Belgium
375
400
+ 7
Denmark
120
102
- 15
trance
3100
2340
- 25
Italy
1005
811
- 19
Netherlands
465
395
- 15
Norway
140
98
- 30
United Kingdom
4270
4000
- 6
American officials in Paris have warned that
even after proper allowances are made for the different bases -- such as
price levels -- used in calculating the figures above, the remaining dis-
crepancies are so great that the various national estimates should not be con-
sidered merely as initial negotiating positions which can easily be brought up
to levels desired by the US.
In view of their growing economic difficulties,
the European countries involved will probably lose their earlier optimism and
refuse to make substantially larger commitments to the defense effort than
those now submitted. This, plus the publicized US intention not to increase
economic or military aid to Europe in the current fiscal year, makes sizeable
modifications in NATO plans most probable.
- 3 -
-TOP-SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
T)61:1-SECRET
FAR EAST
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(
4
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
5. Comment on reported Thai coup d'etat:
Fragmentary reports from Thailand on
29 November that the government had been overthrown indicate that Army
Commander Phin has assumed de facto control of the government as the
head of a nine-man military junta. This committee is said to have retained
Premier Phibun as the head of an interim cabinet.
There have been a number of reports that a
major change in the Thai Government would take place coincident with the
return of the Thai King, who is presumably en route by ship from Singapore
to Bangkok. The military leaders may have timed a bid for power prior to
the King's arrival in the hope of gaining royal support for a government com-
pletely under their domination.
5
TOP-SECRET'
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
TOP-SECRET
3.5(c)
Of significance is the absence of any mention
of the powerful Police Director, General Phao. Until Phao's position can
be determined, an accurate analysis of the new Thai political picture is
impossible.
SOUTH ASIA
6. Indian Prime Minister effects changes in government of Nepal:
3.3(h)(2)
ccording to the Nepalese Ambassador in New
elhi, Prime Minister Nehru of India was
nstrumental in effecting the recent changes in
he government of Nepal, which culminated in
e ous mg o e cen ury-o d, hereditary Rana regime and its replacement
by a "popular" government. Nehru was also responsible for the appointment
of the Nepal Congress Party leader as Prime Minister, 3.3(h)(2)
Comment: India has been intimately
connected with political maneuvers in Nepal since the Indian-
supporte "democratic" revolution of January 1951. Much of this maneu-
vering has resulted in lessening the power of the Ranas and in strengthening
Indian influence. India is increasingly concerned with the security of its
northern frontiers adjacent to Tibet. It may be expected to continue its
interest in Nepalese affairs, possibly to the point of obtaining outright con-
trol of their administration.
NEAR EAST
7. Mossadeq victory anticipated in Iranian Parliamentary elections:
3.3(h)(2)
The Iranian Prime Minister has announced that
the coming elections will be "free" and that the
government will not support any particular can-
-6
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
didate. Nevertheless, Mossadeq's National Front, throughlts sympathizers
now established in the provincial governments, is in a position to control
the electoral machinery. The Shah, who reportedly fears that Mossadeq
will allow dissident elements to enter the next Parliament, has extended
support to some of Mossadeq's opponents among the tribes.
Comment: Iranian tradition and electoral law
make it impossible to hold free elections in the American sense of the word.
The coming elections are unlikely to depart from the traditional pattern.
Pressure from the army, the landowners and the British will influence the
outcome, but all indications now point to a National Front victory. The
Shah's fear that the communists and their sympathizers may gain a foothold
in Parliament is not unfounded, for the Tudeh Party is reportedly actively
attempting to engineer the elections of its members, disguised as National
Frontists, and Mossadeq's lenient attitude toward the Tudeh suggests that it
may succeed,
8. Comment on the Syrian military coup d'etat:
The 29 November military coup d'etat in
Damascus, an essentially internal affair, re-emphasizes the dominant
position of the Syrian Army Chief of Staff, Colonial Shishakli, who for the
past two years has maintained a behind-the-scenes control over govern-
mental affairs. This sudden military action ends the day-old Populist-
dominated cabinet of Maruf al-Dawalibi, and it has probably put an indefinite
clamp on influential Populist Party leaders, who were attempting to eliminate
military control of the country.
Shishakli is essentially an opportunist, intent
on maintaining his own strong position in Syria. Since neutralism is strong
In this country, he is not likely to direct Syria into a closer relationship
with the West. Shisha,kli has been appreciative of French arms shipments,
but annoyed over the lack of similar military supplies from America and
Britain. While he has recently consulted with the SoViet Minister in
Damascus, he is not believed to be sympathetic to the USSR. He is also
opposed to a Syrian-Iraqi Union and has friendly relations with both Saudi
Arabia and Egypt.
-7
TO-P-SEGRET-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
TtrP-SEGRET
3.5(c)
This coup d'etat, the fourth in the last two and
a half years, underscores the instability of Syria. Even though the military-
controlled government may, in the short run, prevent Syria from embarking
on an anti-Western foreign policy, the establishment of a dictatorship en-
courages further violence. 3.3(h)(2)
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
TP SECRET
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
11. West Germans pressing for UN unity hearings:
3.3(h)(2)
Chancellor Adenauer is reported to be particu-
larly disturbed by the latest East German unity
lection proposals. He is anxious that the Allied
_ations at the Paris UN meeting support a
r so u on giving est Germany a hearing before the ad hoc committee on
conditions for German unity. Adenauer declares that he will need maximum
UN support to counteract these East German proposals and preserve the
West German anti-Grotewohl front of the coalition and major opposition
parties.
Comment: On 26 November the East German
commission for all-German elections formally outlined the principles for the
drafting of an election law. These principles acknowledged East German
assent to some of the conditions which the West Gernian Government
declared must be met before all-German elections could be held.
-9
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
rit)P SECRET
3.5(c)
Adenaueris plea for a German hearing at the UN
will not be very favorably received by all the Allied delegations, since some
of them feel that this would complicate current German contractual and
European defense negotiations.
3.3(h)(2)
LATIN AMERICA
- 10 -
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 C03176565
3.5(c)