CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/08/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02739452
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 4, 1951

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4 August 1951
Copy 14b. C
CURRENT TNTELLIGgNCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
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1. Chinese Communist attitude toward Kaesong discussions (page 3).
2. Possible CCF reinforcements total 350,000 (page 3).
3. Burma Road increasingly used to transport strategic goods to China
(page 4).
4. India and Burma may not sign the Japanese peace treaty (page 4).
NEAR EAST
5. Ex-Prime Minister Qavam returns to Tehran (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
Tito orders officials to turn over military a age
8. Yugoslav Government exerts pressure to check peasant withdrawal
from cooperatives (page 8).
3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
100 Italian cooperation in trade controls faces Soviet reprisals (page 9).
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FAR EAST
L Chinese Communist attitude toward Kae song discussions:
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3.3(h)(2)
Peiping held the following opinions re-
garding the current discussions in Kaesc,-7-,:.,-,
i(h)(2)
(a) The Chinese Communists are so anxious
to secure a cease-fire that they will grant "many concessions";
(b) The Peiping regime will attempt to dis-
cover, during the Kaesong talks, some means whereby the regime may
enter the UN and participate in the Japanese peace treaty; and 3.3(h)(2)
(c) Even if UN terms are so severe as to be
completely unacceptable to Peiping, the latter will attempt to continue the
discussions
Possible CCF reinforcements total 350, 000:
3.3(h)(2)
A study by Far East Command indicates that
In addition to the Chinese Communist units
which have been identified and accepted in
Korea, additional units may have arrived
whose estimated total strength would be 350,000. This would give the enemy
an estimated maximum possible strength of 907, 000 for an offensive.
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comment: This total is consi6rably in
excess of the 770, 000 maximum, estimated in Korea as.of 1 April, that in-
cluded units subsequently identified elsewhere as of that date. The total
force would be equivalent to 90 full strength divisions. This number of
divisions exceeds the maximum which it has heretofore been estimated that
the enemy is logistically capable of maintaining in Korea.
� According to a 3 August estimate of the Far
East Command, however, available indications point to a continued active
defense by Communist forces in Korea until such time as the present armis-
tice parleys collapse or appear no longer profitable to the enemy.
3.3(h)(2)
3. Burma Road increasingly used to transport strategic goods to China:
goods.
Quoting two reliable sources, an AP corres-
pondent reports that the Burma Road is the
principal overland route in Southeast Asia for
supplying Communist China with ptrategic
Convoys of 50 to 60 trucks, loaded primarily with tires and petro-
leum products, make the trip over the Burma frontier to Kunming, Yunnan,
three times a week.
The newsman also reports that the Burmese
Government issued transit licenses for 500 tires during July, despite the
fact that it explained its refusal to comply with the UN embargo against China
on the grounds that there were no strategic commodities in Burma ff."'
export. 3.3(h)(2)
Comment!
reports have frequently referred to tire and petroleum shipments over
the Burma Road.,
4. India and Burma may not sign the Japanese peace treaty:
Within the last week, both the Indian High
3.3(h)(2)
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Commissioner in London and an influential
member of the Burmese Foreign Affairs Ad-
visory Committee, who accompanied the Bur-
mese Foreign Minister on a recent trip to
India, have expressed the opinion that India
and Burma would not sign the multilateral
Japanese peace treaty. The Indian official
has suggested the possibility that India might
sign a separate bilateral treaty. The Indian
press has supported this view.
Comment: Prior to the end of July, all indi-
cations were that India would sign the multilateral Japanese peace treaty
after commenting for the record on subjects such as the removal of foreign
troops from Japan and the return of Formosa to Communist China. Indian
opinion then apparently began to shift toward refusal to sign the treaty. This
shift may have resulted from India's success in demonstrating its capabili-
ties for independent action vis-a-vis Pakistan and the UN in Kashmir. It
may also be a manifestation of the need of tte Congress-Party-dominated
government to take the public's mind off serious pre-election weaknesses
within the party by displaying once more the government's independence and
prestige as a "third force" in world affairs.
Despite its recent protestations, Burma has
never seriously expected to receive reparations from Japan. It has seized
upon this issue to avoid indicating its real reason for rejecting the multi-
lateral treaty -- fear of Coniniutiist Chinese feaction. Burnia has not
indicated'ari intention to sign a separate treaty with japan, but it is strongly
influenced by India in making important diplomatic decisions.
NEAR EAST 3.3(h)(2)
5. Ex-Prime Minister Qavam returns to Tehran:
Former Prime Minister Qavam returned to
Tehran on 31 July. Since his return, he is
understood to have many visitors, including
members of Parliament. The US Embassy in
Tehran is reliably informed that the Shah did not discourage Qavam's
return.
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,Coraraent; The Iranian Minister of Court,
� former Ambassador Ala, recently told W. Averell Harriman that the Bri-
tish were organizing Parliamentary and other support for Qavam with the
aim of engineering his appointment as Prime Minister in place of Mossadeq.
While this report is not confirmed, Qavam's presence in Tehran would
obviously facilitate such an effort.
The Shah, who is anxious to settle the oil dis-
pute, may hope that Qavam will provide a rallying point for the moderates
in the oil issue and simultaneously put pressure on the Prime Minister and
the extremists. The aged Qavam is admittedly one of the very few able
figures on the Iranian scene; there is no indication, however, that the Shah,
who holds a deep antipathy toward him, has wavered in his firm opposition
to Qavam's appointment as Prime Minister.
3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE
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7. Tito orders officials to turn over military data to US:
3.3(h)(2)
Marshal Tito has instructed Yugoslav officials
to cooperate, "to a reasonable and feasible ex-
tent, "in supplying the detailed data on the
Yugoslav armed forces recently requested by
ECA. This authorization was made following assurances from the US
Embassy that the information requested was primarily for economic planning
purposes, in particular for showing the impact of the Yugoslav defense
effort on the general economy.
Comment: When the request was initially
made, Chief of Staff Popovic was extremely reluctant to furnish the inform-
ation and declared that he could not see why E CA, a civilian agency, needed
the data, He agreed, however, to consult Tito and Foreign Minister
Kardelj on the matter. The willingness of the latter to make available this
data, which the regime considers highly sensitive, is evidence of the import-
ance Yugoslav leaders attach to Western assistance.
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3.3(h)(2)
8. Yugoslav Government exerts pressure to check peasant withdrawal from
cooperatives;
The US Embassy Belgrade reports that local
Yugoslav authorities are employing repressive
measures in order to check the withdrawal of�
peasants from cooperatives. Peasants apply-
ing for withdrawal are being threatened with exorbitant taxes and offered
poor marginal lands in place of the land that they originally contributed. By
these measures and by recent legislation designed to make cooperative
farming more attractive, the Yugoslav Government intends to head off the
growing secession movement.
Comment; Yugoslav leaders, including Tito,
have recently served notice that the government has no intention of abandon-
ing the cooperative movement. Although the regime has adopted several
reforms that constitute a departure from Communist principles, the govern-
ment apparently considers that the socialization of agriculture is so basic to
a Communist state that it cannot afford to sacrifice the gains it has made in
this direction,. A breakup of the cooperatives would also seriously damage
Yugoslavia's calculated, international position as an independent socialist
state and serve to justify Soviet charges that the regime had sold itself to
Western imperialists.
3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
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3.3(h)(2)
10. Italian cooperation in trade controls faces Soviet reprisals:
3.3(h)(2)
As a result of the recent Italian ban on transit
shipments of non-ferrous metals to Satellite
areas, Eastern European countries are divert-
ing current shipments to other Western Euro-
pean ports. Reprisals by the Soviet bloc may take the form of reducing the
amount of coal and bread grains exported to Italy. The US Embassy in Rome
states that if other countries in Western Europe fail to block critical material
shipments to the East, the Italian Government should not be expected to con-
tinue controlling transit trade and thus prejudice its East-West trade relation-
ship with no resulting benefit to Collective security. Italy's trade with the
Soviet bloc for the first five months of 1951 totalled 37,100,000
dollars worth of imports and 25,400,000 dollars Worth of exports.
Comment: While Italy's trade with the Soviet
bloc for the first five months of 1951 was less than five percent of its total
trade for that period, coal and wheat constitute an important part of Italian
imports from Eastern Europe. Italy can probably obtain sufficient wheat
from the US at favorable prices. The lowered availability of European coal,
however, has compelled Italy to increase greatly its imports of higher
-
priced US coal in recent months.
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