CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/07/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02740739
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 13, 1951

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Noifi '.jr arak.A1..t 141,1
13 luly 1951
Copy, No. e
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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N111414/41 RE. linvm
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
USSR
USSR maintains aloofness from Korean developments (page 3
. Soviet air display reveals new plane types (page 3).
F.ARIOAST
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NEAR EAST
5. Rumored return of Iranian gold from USSR is unconfirmed (page 5
6. US Ambassador regards solution of receipt problem as key to
Iranian oil settlement (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
. Renewed European Army talks are encouraging (page 7
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10P SEUILET
04"
USSR
1. USSR maintains aloofness from Korean developments:
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Deputy Foreign Minister Bogomolov main-
tained that the Soviet Government is not
Involved in the Korean affair, and that an armistice was for the military
'commanders to conclude. When asked his views of final settlement,
Rogow�lov confined himself to saying that the first step was an armistice
and that often the first step was the most difficult to take. Ambassador
Kirk comments that the Chinese and North Korean Communists apparently
are trying to inject both political and territorial aspects into the armistice
talks, despite Gromyko's emphasis that such topics were to be avoided.
do ment: Communist propaganda and Peiping
Radio's cease-fire proposals indicate that the Communists are attempt-
ing negotiate a return to the division of Korea along the 38th Parallel
in order to avoid making concessions on this point in subsequent dis-
cussions on a general settleritent. Military preparations point to a Commu-
nist intention to continue hostilities if they tail to secure their objective
by negotiation. There are indications that if a cease-fire is achieved
bornmuntst demands concerning Formosa, the UN, and the Japanese peace
treaty will be advanced at subsequent political discussions in addition to
the already explicit demand for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from
Korea.
Soviet air display reveals new plane types:
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� The US Air Attache in Moscow reports getting
good long-distance photographs of the new
four-engined bomber featured in the 8 July air
display. Re estimates the plane to be one-
third larger than the TU-4, Soviet version of the B-29, with a long B-36
type fuselage, a single high tail and tractor propellors.
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The demonstration included a total of 490
aircraft with six confirmed new types of aircraft, five probable new
types and two modifications. Although for the present the Soviets
apparently have adopted the MIG-15 as, their standard jet fighter-inter-
ceptor, four new jet fightet prototypes were demanstrated. Three of
the four were swept-wing planes similar to and perhaps developed from
types displayed in the 1949 air show.
The appearance of nine gray twin-jet aircraft
and nine gray MIG-15's further suggests that some units of the Soviet
Navy have received jet aircraft.
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FAR EAST
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NEAR EAST
Rumored return of Iranian gold from USSR is unconfirmed:
the USSR has returned to Iran the
12. 6 million dollars in gold that it took from
the Iranian Bank during World War II. It is
not own whether the USSR also returned the eight million dollars claimed
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by Iran for war-time advances, supplies and services rendered to the
Soviet Union. The US Embassy in Moscow comments that, in view of
the Iranian Government's need for revenue to replace oil royalties, such
a move on the part of the USSR would be designed to stiffen the Iranian
Government's attitude on the oil issue.
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Comment: There is no evidence that the
USSR has actually returned or agreed to return the gold to Iran, or
that there has been progress in the financial negotiations which have
been taking place between Iran and the USSR. According to Ambassador
Grady an Iranian delegate to these financial talks flatly denied on 6 Slily
recent Iranian press rumors that some agreement with the USSR had been
reached.
6. US Ambassador regards solution of receipt problem as key to Iranian
oil settlement:
The US Ambassador has stressed again the 3.3(h)(2)
importance of solving the problem of the
receipts for tanker shipments as a means of
breaking the deadlock in the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company dispute with Iran. To date the British have not conceded the
right of the Iranians to collect receipts on oil shipments, even with the
reservation that they were signed without prejudice to the rights of the
AIOC. The Ambassador states that he does not believe that the British
would be sacrificing their fundamental rights under these circumstances,
and that such an agreement would expedite negotiations on other matters.,
The Ambassador expresses the opinion that if the British are endeavor-
ing to force the Iranians to terms by keeping them without oil revenue
funds, such a policy is most dangerous. 3.3(h)(2)
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WESTERN EUROPE
7. Renewed European Army talks are encouraging:
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The Paris European Army talks have been 3.3(h)(2)
given new impetus by the presence of Chan-
cellor Adenauer's chief security adviser
Theodor Blank. French and German
differences now appear less irreconcilable. Although the chief French
representative was not authorized to offer concessions on the size of
the, proposed units and the level of their integration into a European
Army, he clearly left the way open for a later French concession by
suggesting that this question be referred back to the governments.
However, Blank's proposal to start raising
a German contribution to NATO on the basis of the report on the recent
Allied-German talks at Petersberg -- while the Paris conference on a
European Army pursues its "long and arduous" work -- was flatly
rejected by the French representative.
Comment: Although no basic changes in the
French position on Germany's defense contribution are likely before
Serdtember, influential officials in the Foreign Cittice are revealing greater
determination to press on toward mutual Western agreement on this
question. Bonn has shown a similar determination by sending Blank
Instead of his subordinates to Paris.
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