CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/11/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02008388
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 10, 1951

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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10 November 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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NEXT REVfEWDATE: S
AUTIji tddiaFt
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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USSR
1. Postponement of Moscow Economic Conference designed to attract more
Western support (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Japan's attitude toward China disclosed (page 3).
NEAR EAST
3. Iranian Government opens propaganda campaign against Tudeh (page 4).
4. New statement issued on principles of Middle East Command (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. British believe German NATO candidacy must be deferred (page 5).
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USSR
1. Postponement of Moscow Economic Conference designed to attract more
Western support:
3.3(h)(2)
The American Embassy in Moscow believes
that the sponsors of the International Economic
Conference, now postponed to April 1952, hope
it_will contribute to relaxing Western trade
restrictions. According to the Embassy, the recurring postponements of
the meeting probably indicate Soviet appreciation that the conference could
not score more than propaganda gains unless it included more representative
elements than so far obtained. Evidently the USSR still hopes to attract
more non-Communist businessmen and specialists who are anxious to
restore economic ties with the Soviet Orbit.
3.5(c)
Comment: Concern has been expressed that
non-Communist attendance at the conference would in fact result in in-
creased public pressures on Western governments to allow shipment of
critical items.
FAR EAST
2. Japan's attitude toward China disclosed:
3.3(h)(2)
The Japanese Government believes that nego-
tiations for a peace treaty with the Chinese
Nationalist Government should be delayed until
after the multilateral treaty comes into force,
accor � mg to Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. He pointed out that
Prime Minister Yoshida desired to "do everything possible not to antagonize
the UK and Commonwealth Governments prior to their ratification of the
peace treaty," but left the impression that the Japanese would be receptive
to an early Chinese Nationalist approach for exploratory negotiations.
The Vice Minister also strongly reaffirmed that
the Japanese Government has no intention of concluding a bilateral peace
treaty or establishing relations of any kind with Communist China.
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Comment: This is the first time that Japan's
policy regarding a peace treaty with Nationalist China has been clarified.
Prime Minister Yoshida's careful circumlocution of this question in the Diet
led to some speculation that Japan would seek to work out a modus vivendi
with both Chinese regimes.
Under considerable pressure from industrial
interests not to prejudice future trading prospects with the Communists, but
at the same time cognizant of the need for Japan to parallel US policy on
China, the Japanese Government probably will be receptive to the conclusion
of a treaty with the Nationalists which would extend only to the territory and
people now under Nationalist control.
NEAR EAST
3. Iranian Government opens propaganda campaign against Tudeh: 3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Prime Minister Mossadeq and the Shah have
ordered a coordinated anti-Tudeh campaign by
press and radio. Local newspapers are reportedly
to be subsidized by the Shah. The Acting Director
epar ress and Propaganda, who gave this information to the
US Embassy in Tehran, added that the Shah is "most concerned" and Prime
Minister Mossadeq "very worried" over increased Tudeh activities. The
campaign was opened by a Radio Tehran broadcast on 5 November which the
Embassy found ambiguous and watered down; portions were as much anti-
AIOC as anti-Tudeh.
Comment: The broadcast referred to appears
to be typical of the attitude adopted by the National Front towards Communism.
Although most responsible Iranians realize the real threat presented by the
Tudeh, many Iranians under-estimate the danger and the Nationalists, unable
to see this threat, are unwilling to take drastic action against the Communists
as long as they do not become too unruly.
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4. New statement issued on principles of Middle East Command:
The three Western powers and Turkey are
releasing on 10 November an 11-point statement
indicating their intention to proceed with the
establishment of a Middle East Command. The
statement outlines the principles on which the Command is predicated, inviting
all interested states individually to associate themselves with it. Members
of the Command will be offered equipment "to the extent possible." The
sponsoring powers specifically state that the Command will in no way affect
existing agreements and that organizational changes and adjustments in the
Command may be made as needed.
Comment: While the four sponsoring powers do
not expect any substantial Arab support for the Middle East defense plan at
this time, this general statement of principles should encourage those officials
in the Arab world who have privately expressed concern over the inherent
military weakness of the area.
3.3(h)(2)
Serious difficulties, nevertheless, face the
eventual implementation of these principles. While many Arab leaders have
sharply criticized Egypt's precipitous rejection of the Middle East Command
proposals, these same officials do not have the courage to oppose Egypt in
public on this issue, or to break the formal united Arab front.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. British believe German NATO candidacy must be deferred:
3.3(h)(2)
A senior Foreign Office official, confirming the
British Government's opinion that Germany should
eventually be admitted to NATO, has indicated
that his government now feels that German ad-
mission may have to be put off for some time. He emphasized that a "dramatic"
German entrance now might cause "serious trouble" with the Russians, and
quoted Foreign Secretary Eden as saying that it was inadvisable to consider
German membership until after contractual relations are signed and a Euro-
pean Defense Force is set up.
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Comment: This attitude is in line with Prime
Minister Churchill's general faith in the feasibility of East-West nego-
tiations and his desire to avoid any actions now which might disturb the
atmosphere for top-level talks. Churchill has also referred specifically to
the question of German rearmament as a possible lever to be used in such
negotiations.
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